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ABSTRACT

In 2015, South Africa withdrew from the International Criminal Court asserting United
Nation’s Security Council bias in referring only African cases (Strydom October 15, 2015;
Duggard 2013) and the United Kingdom reiterated a pledge to withdraw from the European
Court of Human Rights, asserting that the court impinges on British sovereignty (Watt 2015).
Both are examples of extraterritorial courts which are an important part of regional and global
jurisprudence. To contribute to our understanding of the relationship between states and
extraterritorial courts, I examine arguably the first and best example of an extraterritorial court,
namely the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). Drawing on 50 British
Commonwealth states, this dissertation explores the factors influencing the decision to accede to
an extraterritorial court and why some states subsequently opt to sever ties. I build on Dahl’s

theory (1957) that the nation’s highest court interacts with the governing coalition and, for the
most part, serves as an ally and uphold its policies. I argue that that governing coalition wants the
final appellate court that they most expect to be an ally and extend this expectation to
extraterritorial courts. As a result, the governing coalition looks at the court more critically.
States may change or abolish the jurisdiction of the court if it undermines or seems likely to
undermine state policy. Examining this phenomenon across the British Commonwealth provides
comparative insights into how governing coalitions may view extraterritorial courts.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Located in The Hague in the Netherlands and established by the Rome Statute in 1998,
the International Criminal Court (ICC) came into effect in 2002 and currently has 123 signatory
states (International Criminal Court 2015a). It is tasked with adjudicating cases involving
“persons accused of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes” (International Criminal Court 2015b, para.1). The U.N.
Security Council is dominated by the veto power wielded by the five permanent members
(Strydom 2015). Individuals can be referred to the court and tried when the state refuses or is
unable to prosecute to do so itself.
Extraterritorial courts are part of the ongoing interest in regional and global efforts to
foster law and order by adjudicating disputes and responding to challenges to policies set by
nation-states. The relationship between extraterritorial courts and states is of great importance
because these courts challenge traditional ideas of state sovereignty and the role of courts in the
policy-making process. Traditionally, states create a domestic judicial system with a state high
court sitting at the apex of this judicial system. These courts are usually constitutionally
authorized, and their structure and processes (including the selection of judges and budgetary
matters) are determined by a combination of national constitutional and statutory law. Most
important, the decisions of these courts provide the final word for legal disputes within the
country’s borders. Conversely, extraterritorial courts are located outside state borders yet
exercise jurisdiction over cases originating in the states that accede to the court. In other words,
the extraterritorial court can have jurisdiction in multiple states but is not under the direct
administrative control of any single state.
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While the constitution and administration of final appellate courts in other jurisdictions
are not monolithic, there is a reasonable comparison to be made with the role played by the U.S.
Supreme Court in policy-making and that in other states. States can decide on the appointment
mechanism, number, and terms of service of the judges, as well as the jurisdiction and funding
for domestic courts. Further, most common law jurisdictions include the power of judicial review
comparable to that of the U.S. Supreme Court (Andrade 2001; Tushnet 2004). But not all states
have a domestic final appellate court over which they retain administrative control. There are
some states with constitutional ties to an extraterritorial judicial entity which then serves as the
court of last resort. Not all extraterritorial courts, however, are the same. On the one hand,
member states exert a significant degree of control on the ECJ (Alter 1998). Further, the ECJ is
part of the growth of European law which is central to the broader process of European
integration (Garrett et al 1998). The World Trade Organization (WTO) also has a judicial
function to hear disputes among member nations (World Trade Organization 2015), and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) adjudicates issues that supersede states’ domestic jurisdiction
making decisions in accordance with international law (International Court of Justice n.d.).
Finally, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is an institution of the Organization
of American States (OAS) that adjudicates individual claims of human rights violation in
signatory states to the American Convention on Human Rights (Organization of American States
2011).
Developing countries have repeatedly complained about the asymmetry of power in the
U.N. Security Council in that it influences its referrals to the ICC (Strydom 2015). That body has
referred three situations: Darfur, Sudan, and Libya (International Criminal Court 2015c). The
case that attracts the most criticism involves the sitting Sudanese President, Omar Hassan al-
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Bashir, who was accused of war crimes and genocide. It should be noted that although Sudan is
not a signatory, many other African states participated in negotiating the Rome Statute and have
generally supported the ICC. In October 2015, South Africa withdrew from the ICC, asserting
bias on the part of the United Nation’s Security Council in referring only cases originating in
Africa to the ICC (Duggard 2013; Strydom 2015). Led by South Africa, the African criticisms of
the ICC charge that the ICC has “lost its direction” (Strydom 2015, para. 1) pointing to the fact
that the Security Council has referred cases from Sudan and Libya while situations such as those
in Syria and Israel have not been referred. The suggestion is that there is a distinct bias against
Africa (Duggard 2013). Since the establishment of the ICC, only black Africans, particularly
high-level officials and politicians (du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly 2013), have been charged
(BBC 2015).
There is a two-pronged response by African states to the ICC. First, in 2009 the African
Union expanded the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR)
to include international crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and several
transnational crimes including terrorism, piracy, and corruption. Of the 53 members of the
African Union, 26 states have ratified the new protocol (African Court on Human and People’s
Rights n.d. a). To date, the ACHPR has adjudicated 24 cases with 30 cases pending (African
Court on Human and People’s Rights n.d. b). Some observers suggest that this new protocol was
a step toward undermining the ICC (du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly 2013). The court gave
African states more control over the extraterritorial court in general and over the cases that were
referred to it for adjudication:
According to the Protocol (Article 5) and the Rules (Rule 33), the Court may
receive complaints and/or applications submitted to it either by the African
Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights or State parties to the Protocol or
African Intergovernmental Organizations. Non-Governmental Organizations with
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observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
and individuals from States which have made a Declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court can also institute cases directly before the Court. (African
Union n.d., para. 4)
This is an interesting development because there is not a complete disavowal of extraterritorial
courts, but instead the replacing of one extraterritorial court for another. It may indicate that
states are not generally opposed to extraterritorial courts but are sensitive to perceived bias of the
courts and how their policies are constrained by the court. The second response in Africa has
been at the state level, such as when South Africa officially withdrew from the ICC in October
2015. An announcement by Obeded Bapela, head of South Africa’s governing African National
Congress (ANC) international relations commission, followed a vote on the matter (Laing 2015).
Bapela stated, “The principles that led us to be members remain valid and relevant. However, the
ICC has lost its direction unfortunately and is no longer pursuing that principle of an instrument
that is fair for everybody” (Laing 2015, para. 4). The issue surrounding the referrals and actions
of the ICC are also expected to be on the agenda for the next African Union Summit in 2016,
where withdrawal from the ICC is forecasted to attract wide support from member states (Laing
October 11, 2015).
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is another exemplary extraterritorial
court. The ECtHR is part of the ongoing process of European integration under the banner of the
European Union (E.U.). Established in 1959, this court has adjudicated 10,000 cases from
individuals and states for alleged violations of the European Convention on Human Rights
(Council of Europe 2014). One state that has expressed misgivings about continued membership
of the ECtHR is the U.K. In 1998 the U.K. Parliament, then dominated by the governing Labour
Party, ratified the European Convention on Human Rights. On the other hand, the manifesto of
the Conservative Party had pledged to sever ties with the ECtHR and make the U.K. Supreme
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Court of Judicature the final appellate court in all human rights cases (Travis 2015). In June
2015, Prime Minister Cameron from the governing Conservative Party was cited by Watt (2015)
for refusing to back away from the pledge to withdraw the U.K. from the ECtHR. Prime Minister
Cameron claims that the court’s decisions impinge on British sovereignty (Watt 2015). Further,
he refuses to rule out abandoning the European Convention on Human Rights unless the U.K. is
able to win the right to veto decisions of the ECtHR. In addressing the U.K. Parliament, the
prime minister stated:
Let me be very clear about what we want, which is British judges making
decisions in British courts…… If we can’t achieve what we need – and I’m very
clear about that when we’ve got these foreign criminals committing offence after
offence and we can’t send them home because of their right to a family life – that
needs to change. And I rule out absolutely nothing in getting that done (Watt
2015, para. 7)
However, when questioned directly by Andrew Mitchell, another Member of Parliament from
the Conservative Party, Prime Minister Cameron stated that there are no immediate plans to
abandon the ECtHR (Watt 2015).
This contentious issue arose following a series of decisions by the ECtHR that denied the
U.K. the right to deport suspected terrorists (Travis and Watt January 17, 2012; Pearson 2015).
The political environment in 2015 with the Conservative Party in power is quite different from
that under the Labour Party when Parliament ratified the Human Rights Convention in 1998.
Further, the unfavorable decisions of the ECtHR came at a time when the governing
Conservative Party had publicly expressed its policy objective of limiting the jurisdiction of the
ECtHR in the U.K. Nevertheless, no action has been taken because there is discord in the
governing coalition. For example, a conservative member of the House of Lords, Lord Mackay
of Clashfern, who served under previous conservative Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major,
states that this course of action would send the wrong signal to Europe (Bowcott 2015). There
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was also discord in other elite circles. Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon said any move to
scrap the HRA will be resisted in Scotland (Simpson September 24, 2015). Lord Mance, a judge
on the U.K. Supreme Court of Judicature, defends the contributions of the ECtHR to British law
while other judges decry the ECtHR as undermining democracy in the U.K. (Henley 2013).
Incidentally, Lord Mance was also a Law Lord of the JCPC. It is evident, therefore, that while
the Conservative Party traditionally loathes the ECtHR (Henley 2013), the decisions of the court
and political environment have not served to coalesce the political will of the governing coalition
to change the status quo. It may also speak to the persistence of the institution once in place and,
like the European Court of Justice (ECJ), its role in the integration of the European Union
(Garrett, Keleman, and Schultz 1998).
The implications of a possible U.K. withdrawal from the ECtHR is not lost on observers
outside of the U.K. Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein of Jordan, the U.N.’s High Commissioner for
Human Rights, states that a U.K. withdrawal would be “profoundly regrettable” (Bowcott 2015,
para. 2). A former prosecutor with the ICC and South African Judge, Richard Goldstone, states
that it would be a disappointing precedent for the U.K. to set. He concedes that “It would enable
some autocratic set of leaders around the world to say, why should we be bound by international
law if this great font of democracy, the United Kingdom, is pulling out?” (Elgot 2015, para. 13).
These are just two examples of the tensions that currently exist between states and
extraterritorial courts. For states with extraterritorial courts, the domestic appellate courts are the
last wrong in the judicial hierarchical structure before a possible challenge before the
exterritorial court over which the governing coalition has no administrative leverage. As courts
play an important role in adjudicating challenges to state policies, the decision to accede to an
extraterritorial court seems an affront to state sovereignty and a potential constraint on state
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policy making. Thus, why do states accede to such courts, and what may lead states to later sever
ties with them?
To answer these important questions, I begin with the assumption that judges, as well as
courts, must be understood as part of the political and judicial decision-making process; Shapiro
(1964, 16) refers to this notion as “political jurisprudence.” A central issue for all states,
therefore, is the organization of the judiciary and the role it plays in policy-making and
furthering the “peace, order and good government” (POGG) as a feature of constitutional rule
(Yusuf 2014, 1) and state sovereignty. As challenges to policies deemed necessary for POGG
percolate up the judicial hierarchy, legitimization of those policies by the judiciary is an
important issue (Dahl 1957). Slaughter (2000; see also Garrett et al 1998) points to the
interactions of national courts with extraterritorial courts. This is exemplified by the national
courts of Germany, France, and the U.K. They follow precedents established by the ECJ, which
has the effect of co-opting “the support of the domestic courts” (Garrett et al, 150). As the
highest forum for legal challenges, therefore, an extraterritorial court functioning as the final
appellate court can play a crucial role in policy-making.
In the context of the British Empire, the colonies had no voice in the role of the JCPC, for
a modern state to choose an extraterritorial court as its nation’s highest court of appeals is an
extraordinary situation. State sovereignty is linked to autonomy and can be defined as having
particular capacities or powers that can be utilized without the consent or approval of another
(Brown 2002). Relying on an extraterritorial court appears to be outside the modern notion of
state sovereignty. Since courts play an important role in governing a state and adjudicating
disputes, the decision to retain an extraterritorial appellate institution such as the JCPC seems
counterintuitive and an affront to state sovereignty. Elden (2006) asserts that modern states are
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anchored by three fundamental canons. They are “the notion of equal sovereignty of states,
internal competence for domestic jurisdiction and territorial integrity” (11). These canons capture
the tenets of sovereignty and the importance having the domestic institutions needed for
supporting the state. The final appellate court is one such important institution. When decisions
in the lower courts are appealed, the ultimate interpretation of constitutional elements and the
adjudication of laws generally rest with a final appellate court (Aronson 2009). This renders the
final appellate court a natural target of the other branches of government charged with making
public policy. Capturing the role of the U.S. Supreme Court, Dahl (1957) stated:
To consider the Supreme Court of the United States strictly as a legal institution is
to underestimate its significance in the American political system. For it is a
political institution…for arriving at decisions on controversial questions of
national policy. (p. 279)
For independent states, the JCPC’s function is not imperial but national, with any limitations on
its jurisdiction prescribed by each state’s constitution (Beth 1977). While the JCPC can rely on
cases from other jurisdictions as precedents, it is not part of a broader system or process of
integrating the states. States have no control over any aspect of the JCPC other than the
constitutional power to limit or abolish the jurisdiction of the court. Creating a domestic final
appellate court, however, gives the state control over important aspects of the court including the
selection of judges, terms of service, jurisdiction, and budget. This brings the adjudication of
national policy within the state with the goal of making the court a more reliable partner in the
national governing coalition. It is important, therefore, to understand more clearly why a state
would accede to an extraterritorial court. The aim is to better understand these phenomena by
examining why a newly sovereign state shedding British colonial rule and emerging onto the
international stage would choose to retain the JCPC over which it has no leverage, rather than to
create a domestic final appellate court.
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The legitimizing process and the question of the compatibility of the JCPC with state
sovereignty are exemplified in M. B. Ibralebbe alias Rasa Wattan & Another v Queen (1963).
The JCPC addressed these issues on the behest of the Attorney General of Sri Lanka. The court
is asked to address the issue as raised in a 1963 appeals case in Sri Lanka by Chief Justice
Basnayake. Chief Justice Basnayake appears to challenge the existence of the JCPC’s
jurisdiction to hear appeals, asserting that the fact that Sri Lanka gained independence in 1947
automatically severed ties with the JCPC. The JCPC argues that the right of appeal was a
prerogative offered by the British monarch to an independent state and that the parliament of Sri
Lanka possessed the constitutional power as a sovereign state to modify or terminate appeals to
the JCPC. Kelly (1994) notes that, “there was nothing in the independence instruments to
exclude the prerogative in relation to the Privy Council jurisdiction” (108). This point was not
lost on the JCPC when it asserted that since its jurisdiction had not been specifically abolished by
the parliament, the right of appeal persisted after independence. Cox (2002; 2001) conversely
challenges the notion that New Zealand’s sovereignty is compromised by having a court such as
the JCPC as the final appellate court. He argues that it is actually a sign of political maturity. As
these debates highlight, the decision of a state as to whether or not to retain the JCPC as the
highest appellate court raises important questions about judicial power, state sovereignty, and the
role of the judiciary in the national policy-making process.
The ACHPR, ECtHR, and the ECJ are not without precedent. Possibly the first and best
example of an extraterritorial court is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). The
JCPC is the British colonial exterritorial court created to serve as the final appellate court for all
cases originating from British colonies. The JCPC was the final appellate court for the British
Empire and was retained by some former colonies upon gaining independence from the U.K. In
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effect, some newly independent states declared that the highest court in the land would be a
colonial institution over which the new governing coalition had no administrative control, and
which is staffed by British judges and housed in London. Examining the case of the JCPC, I look
at important junctures in history when British Commonwealth states make decisions about the
state’s final appellate court.
With one important exception, the new governing coalition assumed authority of all of
the governing institutions of the state. India is a good example. Just after midnight on August 15,
1947, the last few bars of “God Save the King” faded into the night. The Union Jack was
replaced by “Tiranga,” the national flag of India (Mapsofindia 2015), marking the official end of
British colonial rule. The magnitude of the prowess of British colonial expansion can be captured
by one fact. As of 1947, the U.K. with a population of 49,520,000 (Populstat 2006a) had ruled
the Indian colony with a population of 345,520,000 (Populstat 2006b) for almost 100 years. India
was the crown jewel of the British Empire, and her emergence as an independent state signaled
the start of the post-World War II process of British decolonization (Sharples 2003). In his
inaugural address, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated, “It is a fateful moment for us in
India, for all of Asia and for the world. A new star rises, the star of freedom in the East. A new
hope comes into being, a vision long cherished materialized” (CiteHR n.d., para. 13). The Indian
constitution provided that the final appellate court would continue to be the colonial court, the
JCPC. India’s choice was not unique. The British Empire included territories in Africa, Asia, the
Americas, Europe, the Pacific, the Middle East, and the U.K.’s internal colonies (Ireland, Wales,
and Scotland). At independence 32 of the 61 colonies (52 percent) retained the JCPC at
independence. There are currently 14 overseas territories and colonies that still retain the
jurisdiction of the JCPC (The Commonwealth 2015).

11

The relationship between the JCPC and the British Commonwealth, therefore, provides
an appropriate case study. Why do many states shedding British colonial rule choose to retain the
JCPC as the highest court of appeal? More generally, how can we explain why a state would ever
accede to an extraterritorial court? Drawing on 50 former Commonwealth states, this dissertation
explores what factors influence the decision accede to an extraterritorial court and why some
states subsequently may opt to sever ties. I build on Dahl’s theory (1957) that the governing
coalition wants the nation’s highest court to serve as an ally and uphold its policies. He asserts
that the U.S. Supreme Court is part of the national policy making process and, for the most part,
generally shares the policy views of the majority in the U.S. congress. I argue that this is not
coincidental and that states not only choose the final court of appeal that they most expect to be
an ally, but also extend this expectation to extraterritorial courts. While states may perceive some
benefit when acceding to an extraterritorial court, the governing coalition will abolish the
jurisdiction of the extraterritorial court if it undermines or seems likely to undermine state policy.
Examining this phenomenon across the British Commonwealth provides comparative insights
into how states may view and interact with existing or proposed extraterritorial courts.
The JCPC is an example of an extraterritorial court with broad appellate jurisdiction
serving multiple states. It serves as the final appellate court for many former British
Commonwealth states with the states having no role in the appointment, number, or terms of
service of the judges, nor fiscal responsibility for the court (Howell 1979; Swinfen 1987). The
JCPC hears appeals of decisions reached by a state’s lower appellate court in cases based on
domestic policies and statutes with the authority to affirm, vary, or overrule the domestic courts’
decisions. Further, the JCPC’s jurisdiction is not necessarily limited to any particular area of law
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nor constrained in its authority to adjudicate disputes between individuals or governments within
the British Empire or those Commonwealth states that retain the right of appeal (Mohr 2011).
How the JCPC participates in and influences the domestic jurisprudence is evident the
decisions handed down by the court. In Thakur Persad Jaroo v Attorney-General of Trinidad
and Tobago (2002), Lord Hope of Craighead follows the precedent established by Lord Diplock
in Kemrajh Harrikissoon v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (1979) against abuse of the
constitutional motion in criminal cases where there is a parallel remedy. The same point is made
again in Hinds v Attorney-General of Barbados (2001) where Lord Bingham of Cornhill also
reiterates a position taken by Lord Diplock in Kemrajh Harrikissoon v Attorney-General of
Trinidad and Tobago (1979). This is an example of the influence of precedents linking the
interpretation of the constitutions of different jurisdictions over an extended period of time. It
also demonstrates the JCPC’s influence on the stability and continuity in these common law
jurisdictions.
This research is distinct from the current literature. Courts outside the U.S. have only
been analyzed sporadically, and there is a need for macro or institutional analysis (Hönnige
2011). This research, based on the case of the British Commonwealth, provides a starting point
for better understanding how states may respond to other existing and new extraterritorial courts.
It is important to understand what states expect of an extraterritorial court, and how changes in
the political environment of the state and decisions of the court influence the state’s governing
coalition. This is important because of the increased attention to the role and importance of
judicial institutions as a part of democratic institutionalization (Huntington 1991; O’Donnell
1973) and globalization (Slaughter 2000).
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While I examine what factors influence the choice of final appellate court, some of the
extant literature looks at the economic effects of the choice. They find that the type and duration
of colonial rule significantly influence the subsequent economic development or prosperity of the
state (Acemuglo, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002; Crosby 1986; Gerring et al 2011; Grier
1999; Lange 2004, 2009). This literature does not distinguish between the factors that influence
the choice of the final court from other institutions after independence, however, and thus does
not really provide insights into the governing coalition’s expectations of the court as part of state
governance. Voigt et al (2007) focus on the courts and compare the resulting economic outcomes
of states that retained the JCPC at independence with those that replaced that court. This research
demonstrates a potential causal link between retaining the JCPC and positive economic outcomes
for those states. However, it does not help us understand states’ choices to retain the JCPC at
independence. The positive economic outcomes are identified after the fact with no evidence that
the governing coalition made the decision with that expectation. The gap in our understanding of
factors that influence the actual decision to retain the extraterritorial court in the first place
remains unfilled. To ascertain whether the governing coalition is likely to view the JCPC as a
reliable partner or likely to undermine the state’s goals, I empirically examine the effect of
several factors of colonial rule on the choice of final appellate court. This will better inform our
understanding what contributed to the perception of the court and the decision regarding its
status.
1.1

Purpose of the Study
At independence, Commonwealth states made dissimilar decisions with regard to the

right of appeal petitions to the JCPC that existed under British colonial rule. My examination of
the history of these new states shows that not only did the decision at independence vary, but
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also how long ties were retained by those states that did retain the JCPC. Examining the state’s
choice at independence to retain this extraterritorial judicial entity or to establish a national final
appellate court will provide initial insight into why a state would choose the apparent
compromise to sovereignty as defined by Brown (2002).
First, this examination will increase our understanding of the factors that influence the
states acceding to an extraterritorial court. Using the case of the British Commonwealth, I
describe proxies for the influence of colonial rule on a state’s decision of whether or not to
abolish appeals to the JCPC at independence. In other words, at this juncture, how constrained is
the governing coalition by colonial influences of the U.K.? This addresses the path dependent
nature of institutional change and the factors that may influence any change. The persistence of
the JCPC as the final appellate court for the new state is influenced by the strength of the
colonial ties between the U.K. and the former colony. The strength of the influence frames the
governing coalition’s perceptions of the JCPC. These perceptions include whether the reliability
of the JCPC brings prestige and legitimacy to the state.
Second, my research seeks to increase our understanding as to why some states decided
to change the court while others continue to use the court, perpetuating the apparent affront to
sovereignty. I find that the governing coalition is likely to respond to unfavorable decisions of
the extraterritorial court by abolishing its jurisdiction and that this response is most likely when
there are changes in the domestic political environment that galvanizes the political will to act.
This is more likely to occur when the state becomes less democratic or when the governing
coalition embodies a new vision for the state which makes the extraterritorial court incompatible
with the preferred policies. In these circumstances the governing coalition seeks to ensure that
the final appellate court is a reliable partner in event their policies are challenged.
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Third, this dissertation will contribute to our understanding of how governing coalitions
view extraterritorial courts in the context of changing domestic political environments. Countries
that have a domestic final appellate court have established a judicial institution over which they
have control as part of the policy-making governing structure. How they view other existing and
emerging extraterritorial courts will be influenced by their perception of the status of the court
and the role it plays when the policies of the governing coalition are challenged. My research
informs what contributes to their perception of extraterritorial courts in deciding to accede, how
the state responds an extraterritorial court when it hands down unfavorable decisions and how
changes in the domestic political environment influence the relationship between the state and
the court.
1.2

Summary Outline
In the remainder of the dissertation, I examine the choice of final appellate courts in

former British colonies, with an eye toward understanding the expectations and responses of
states to extraterritorial courts. In Chapter 2, I present an abridged history and role of the JCPC
in the British Commonwealth. In Chapter 3, I lay out my theory of high court choice and statebuilding. I build on Dahl’s theory (1957), focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court, that national
governing coalitions desire a high court which will act as an ally to uphold its policies. I extend
his theory to argue that governing coalitions in all countries recognize the important role played
by courts in national policy-making; therefore, decisions about court structure and design seek to
reinforce this role in ways that benefit the governing coalition. I argue further that states not only
choose the final court of appeal that they most expect to be an ally but the governing coalition
may galvanize the political will to change a court that undermines or seems likely to undermine
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their policies. I then apply this theory to the case of former British colonies and the decision of
whether or not to retain ties to the JCPC.
Using historical path analysis, I identify two possible critical junctures at which new
states emerging from British colonial rule make important decisions about judicial structure and
the goal to have an ally in the final appellate court: (a) at independence and (b) at a later juncture
when the attitude of the governing coalition towards the extraterritorial court may change. First,
at independence, all newly independent states must design a new government, including the
structure of the courts. Former British colonies had to decide whether or not to retain the JCPC
as the new nation-state’s highest court. I argue that colonial environmental factors significantly
influence whether the newly established governing coalition viewed the JCPC as an ally or
obstacle to policy implementation, thus influencing their choice of court at this first critical
juncture. Second, later changes in the political environment may lead to a disconnection with the
JCPC after independence. If the governing coalition does not continue to perceive the JCPC as a
reliable partner, a second critical juncture may be reached, and the JCPC will be replaced with a
domestic final appellate court. The next two chapters empirically examine each of these critical
junctures.
Chapter 4 investigates the British Commonwealth, which provides a study on how states
respond to an extraterritorial court over an extended period. In this chapter, I analyze the factors
that influence the choice of the JCPC as the final court of appeal in 50 former British colonies at
the time of independence. Independence represents the first critical juncture when the new
national leadership had the opportunity to participate in making the choice of final appellate
court. This chapter presents evidence that former colonies are strongly influenced by their
colonial legacies when designing their new, independent judiciaries. In particular, the length of
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time a state experienced colonial rule, presence of a law school prior to independence, whether
the leader at independence was educated in the U.K. and the type of colonial rule are important
components of the colonial legacy that exerted influence of the governing coalition. My findings
suggest that the stronger the influence of colonial rule the more likely it was that the state would
retain the JCPC at independence. Of the 50 states in my research, 30 states retained the JCPC.
These 30 states vary significantly in size, population, GDP per capita and geographic location.
After independence a second critical juncture may arise, as some states may subsequently
decide to abolish appeals to the JCPC and replace it with a domestic final appellate court.
Chapter 5 thus assesses the factors that are likely to influence a state to sever ties with the JCPC
after independence. Utilizing a novel dataset of JCPC decisions for 28 states that retained ties to
the JCPC post-independence, I find that the decision to sever ties later is a function of changes in
the political environment, which alters the view of the governing coalition about the decisions of
the JCPC.
Chapter 6 presents case studies of three states: The Gambia, New Zealand, and The
Bahamas. These are three of the 28 states in the sample used in Chapter 3. The three states are
geographically dispersed with varying socio-economic characteristics. More importantly for my
research, however, is that all three had long democratic traditions after independence with high
levels of political freedom and civil liberties (Freedom House 2014a). The political environments
have supported multi-party elections, freedom of the press (Freedom House 2014a; Polity IV
Project 2013), and steady levels of economic growth (The Maddison-Project 2013). Finally, each
retained the JCPC for over three decades after independence. The Gambia and New Zealand
retained the JCPC at independence only to later abolish appeals in 1998 and 2005, respectively,
while The Bahamas retained appeals to the JCPC as of January 1, 2015. I trace changes in the
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political environment and salient decisions of the JCPC that I assert influenced their decision to
subsequently abolish the right of appeal to the JCPC. Conversely, I assert that The Bahamas did
not experience any shift in the political environment sufficient to shift perceptions of the JCPC
enough to abolish appeals. This approach provides the basis for a more detailed and nuanced
examination of the veracity of my theory and earlier quantitative analysis in the context of three
states. My findings indicate that changes in the political environment and decisions against the
policies of the governing coalition in all three states contributed to the ultimate decision to
abolish appeals to the JCPC and establish a domestic final appellate court.
Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the implications of my theory based on my
findings that history is important in choice of institutions and that the governing coalition is
sensitive to decisions of the final appellate court. In the context of their political environment,
states will consider the level of control they have before acceding to other extraterritorial courts.
Based on this, I suggest avenues for future comparative research on structure and the
performance of current extraterritorial courts.

2
2.1

THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL (JCPC)

Introduction to the JCPC
To understand the significance of the JCPC and the significance of the decision to retain

this extraterritorial court, it is important to delve into its origins and how it came to be such an
important part of British colonial rule. The JCPC is a part of the Privy Council, which is a large
advisory body that advises the British monarch in the performance of many ceremonial and
substantive functions assigned by the parliament (Privy Council n.d.). Drawing its members from
the Privy Council, the JCPC performs an important substantive function and derives its
jurisdiction originally from a custom based on the medieval Curia Regis (the King’s Court) or
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councilors to the king (Merriam-Webster 2015a). Its appellate jurisdiction through the JCPC is
based on the theory that the monarch is the ultimate source and distributor of justice, but by 1660
this power only extended to overseas territories under British rule (Burns 1984). Justice is
administered via the hearing of civil and criminal appeals from lower court decisions originating
states, colonies, and overseas territories.
The modern roots of the JCPC were a product of British legislative action and practice
starting with the Judicial Committee Act 1833. On becoming Lord Chancellor, Lord Brougham
introduced legislation that instituted a number of important features, thus creating the modern
JCPC and replacing the standing committee referred to as the old Appeals Committee (Howell
1979). First, Law Lords had to be lawyers by profession unless otherwise specified by the
monarch. Second, it established procedures and functions that were exercised independently of
the monarch, giving this JCPC all the attributes of a court: power to call witnesses, deliver
peremptory orders, mandate appearance, administer oaths and affirmations, punish perjurers,
direct trials or retrials, subpoena documents, determine court costs, and punish contempt of court
(Burns 1984).
Until 1844, the JCPC had no power to hear appeals without the granting of leave from a
colony’s court of appeal, usually comprised of the governor and the executive council. The
Judicial Committee Act of 1844 (The National Archives n.d.) enlarged access to the JCPC for
the appeals of British subjects from overseas territories. Under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of
1876 (The National Archives n.d.), the Law Lords became the permanent judges of the court,
and the JCPC evolved into the most important committee of the Privy Council. Today, anyone
who holds or has held high judicial office in the U.K. or a Commonwealth country may be
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eligible for selection by the Lord Chancellor (Minister of Justice and member of the Prime
Minister’s cabinet) and the Prime Minister (Malleson 1999).
There are two classes of appeals to the JCPC. First, there is appeal by special leave from
the JCPC itself as a right extended by royal prerogative, which may grant leave when the lower
court does not have the right or has refused to grant leave. Second, appeal lies to the JCPC
when granted by the lower court (Burns 1984; Robert-Wray 1966). It is clear that what is
formally described as an advisory body to the monarch possesses all the trappings of an
appellate court of law. Further, no monarch has ever ignored the advice of the JCPC in any
case. Currently the twelve Law Lords, sitting in panels of five or seven, preside over both
criminal and civil appeals in London and are entirely supported by the taxpayers of the U.K.
The modern legislative underpinnings leave little doubt of the judicial nature of the JCPC
(Burns 1981).
The development of the JCPC was part of the growth and consolidation of British
colonial rule around the world, and it served as the final appellate court for the British Empire
(Howell 1979; Swinfen 1987). Herbert Bentwich (1856-1932), a British barrister and law
commentator put it this way: “[T]he King, the Navy and the Judicial Committee are three solid
and apparent bonds of the Empire; for the rest, the union depends on sentiment” (Mohr 2011,
126). The exceptional reputation and lofty position of the court in the British Empire is
encapsulated in its regal motto “Honi Soit Mal Y Pense” or “shame on him who thinks ill of it”
(see Figure 2.1)
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Figure 2.1 Motto of the JCPC - “Honi Soit Mal Y Pense”

As the British established colonies in Africa, the jurisdiction of the JCPC grew
accordingly with the authority of the Privy Council. For example, in 1886 the Settlement of
Lagos (later the capital of the colony of Nigeria) was separated from The Gold Coast Colony
(later the colony of Ghana) by the Order in Council (Privy Council provisions in the Letters
Patent of January 13, 1886). The Order also provided for right of appeals from the new Supreme
Court of Lagos to the JCPC (Mwalimu 2007; Stafford and Wheeler 1901). The contribution of
the JCPC to the jurisprudence of the colonies and the Empire cannot be understated. Records of
all cases adjudicated by the JCPC from 1809 to 2015 are available in the database of the British
and Irish Information Institute (2014). For example, starting in 1858 when India became an
official colony until its independence in 1947, the JCPC handed down approximately 3,750
decisions. A total of 347 Malaysian cases were decided during 86 years of colonial rule (1826 to
1957). With the start of decolonization in 1931, the JCPC continued to play a role in the British
Commonwealth as independent states retained the JCPC as the final appellate court. Despite the
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decline, this caseload is not insignificant. With a peak of 119 cases in 1931, the JCPC
adjudicated an average of 52 appeals per year from 1932 to 2014. The branches of law on appeal
are broad and important with fundamental principles being adjudicated (Robert-Wray 1966).
Examples of this diversity include extradition requests; constitutional challenges to the death
penalty; libel cases involving politicians; eminent domain; personal injury and issues involving
provincial verses federal power. Further, the cases originate from jurisdictions with diverse legal
histories and systems.
Over the years it has been asked for final rulings and interpretations of many
different kinds of law, from Roman Dutch law in appeals from South Africa, to
pre-revolutionary French law from Quebec, and Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu law
from India. (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 2015, para. 2)
This rich and diverse history contributes to the positive reputation and the continuing role and
influence of the JCPC in the common law legal system shared throughout the British
Commonwealth. While colonies had no choice in the establishment of the JCPC as their final
appellate court, newly independent states and their governing coalitions did have this choice
during the process of decolonization when the colony gained independence.
2.2

Decolonization and the Persistence of the JCPC
Decolonization launched the process of moving a colony to an independent state. Of

importance for this dissertation is the fact that during this process the emerging governing
coalition could decide whether or not the JCPC would continue as the final appellate court or be
replaced by a domestic final appellate court at independence. In 1858, Oxford University
professor Goldwin Smith called for colonial emancipation and a severing of all constitutional ties
between the U.K. and her colonies (Howell 1979). Needless to say, Smith’s assertion was
derided both in the U.K. and in the colonies. This call, however, foreshadowed the process of
decolonization that unfolded gradually after 1900. Although four colonies were granted
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dominion status within the Empire soon after 1900, it was not until 1931that these five
dominions – Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa – established
themselves as sovereign states in the international community. It is noteworthy that only Ireland,
having fought for independence (Dorney 2012), exercised the option to immediately server ties
with the JCPC in 1931.
The process of decolonization accelerated after World War II. Starting with India in
1947, the U.K. introduced onto the world stage a plethora of new countries in Africa, Asia, and
the Caribbean. The process unfolded relatively quickly continuing after India with Pakistan, Burma,
and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), and with the termination of the U.K.’s mandate in Palestine. This was
followed by the end of British rule in the Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria, Sudan, and Malaysia. By
1963, Cyprus and nine other African states had gained independence (Watts 2010). The process
started in the Caribbean with Jamaica in 1962, followed by 11 other states. These states formed
the regional organization known as the Caribbean Free Trade Association CARIFTA in 1973,
which evolved into the Caribbean Community or CARICOM (Caribbean Community Secretariat
2011a). While most constitutional and institutional ties were severed at independence, arguably
the most influential institutional bond between the U.K. and the former colonies was the
common law legal system. Some states such as Tanzania, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone abolished
appeals to the JCPC at independence. Yet, despite the gradual process of decolonization that
unfolded after World War II and the states establishing new regional ties, the JCPC continued to
play a role in policy-making as part of the governing coalition in many independent states. The
JCPC continued to be part of the judiciary in many small states such as the island states in the
Caribbean, but also in large and populous states such as Malaysia and Sri Lanka in Asia, The
Gambia in Africa, and some Pacific states. For example, New Zealand and Sri Lanka severed ties
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with the JCPC 95 and 24 years respectively after independence. Others, such as Jamaica and St.
Lucia, still retain ties with the JCPC 52 years and 22 years after independence, respectively.
Today, there are 14 remaining “British overseas territories: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic
Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar,
Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia and
South Sandwich Islands, Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, Turks and
Caicos Islands, and Virgin Islands” (Passportia 2015, para. 2) that comprise the British Empire.
The British Commonwealth has 53 member states from “Africa, Asia, the Americas, Europe, and
the Pacific” regions (The Commonwealth 2015, para. 1).

Figure 2.2 The British Empire in 2015 © (The Commonwealth, 2015)

A preliminary review provides more insight into the relationship between the sample of
50 states from the British Commonwealth and the JCPC. A comparative review reveals that
based on this choice, states can be placed in the three distinct groups displayed in Table 1.1. The
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absence or presence of change puts the states on varying trajectories of institutional choices
suitable for analysis to better our understanding of what influences the governing coalition and
the relationship with an extraterritorial court.
Fifty former colonies are represented in Table 2.1. Group 1 is comprised of the 20
colonies (40 percent) that abolished all appeals to the JCPC at independence. This group does not
include the 13 North American colonies that became the United States because they did not
emerge as separate independent countries. Further, the independence of the 13 colonies in 1776
pre-dated the more formal and modern JCPC established later as part of the expansion of British
colonial rule. In Group 2 are the 17 states (34 percent) that retained the right of appeal for a
period after independence before abolishing access to the JCPC.
Table 2.1 The Status of the JCPC in Each State at Independence

Group
1

2

3

Relationship with JCPC

States
Botswana, Cyprus, Ireland, Rep. of,
Abolished appeals to JCPC at
Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Malta,
Independence (20 states)
Myanmar, Nauru, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Tonga, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Australia, Barbados, Belize, Canada,
Retained appeals to JCPC for a
Guyana, Fiji, India, Gambia, Ghana,
period before severing (17 states) Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Uganda
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Brunei,
Retain appeals to JCPC
Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati,
(13 states)
Mauritius, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, St.
Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad &
Tobago, Tuvalu

It is only after independence that the new governing coalition is directly impacted by the
decisions of the final court of appeal. The decisions of the court can influence the governing
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coalition’s perception of the court as a reliable partner. In Group 3 are the 13 former colonies (26
percent) that as of January 1, 2015, still retain the JCPC as the final appellate court. These
differences point to competing approaches in governance and policy-making by sovereign states
and to how states may view this extraterritorial court as a partner in policy-making and the
approach to state sovereignty.
Second, I analyze 26 of the 30 states (Group 2 and 3 in Table 2.1) that retained appeals to
the JCPC after independence. Subsequently, 15 of those states (58 percent) abolished appeals at
different times with 11 states (42 percent) retaining the JCPC as of January 1, 2015.
As states emerged from colonial rule, therefore, there was a decrease in the number of
states served by the JCPC and a decrease in the number of cases adjudicated. Figure 1.2 displays
the decline in the number of states over time starting in 1931 (Act of Westminster) and the
corresponding change in the number of cases disposed of by the JCPC from 1931 to 2014. The
number of cases includes the states, colonies, and territories that continue to retain the JCPC as
of January 1, 2015. The steep drop in the annual number of cases from 119 in 1931 to 34 in 1950
can be explained by the fact that Canada and India abolished appeals to the JCPC in 1948 and
1950, respectively. After that time, despite the gradual decline in the number of countries from
48 in 1955 to 13 in 2014, the number of cases per annum actually increased from 39 in 1955 to
43 cases in 2014, illustrating a continued reliance on the JCPC. Based on my review of JCPC
cases, an uptick in appeals in death penalty cases from the Commonwealth Caribbean explains
the high point in 1995 with 61 cases. Despite the gradual decline in the number of states, those
that continue to use the JCPC do so more frequently. It also speaks to the reputation of the JCPC
and the reliance the states have on this extraterritorial court, despite the apparent contradiction
with the ideal of sovereignty. As discussed earlier, the understanding of state sovereignty and the
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linkage to political autonomy (Brown 2002) is contradicted by the reality that many new states
emerging from colonial rule retained the right of appeal to JCPC.
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Figure 2.3 The Number of JCPC Cases from 1931 to 2014 and the Number of States

Using the British Empire and the Commonwealth states as case studies, this dissertation
examines the decisions of the governing coalition as the states emerge through the process of
decolonization and the status of the JCPC after independence. My research covers a period of
approximately 360 years, beginning with the declaration of the earliest British settlements as
colonies and culminating with colonies that attained independence and the right to determine the
fate of the relationship with the JCPC. The 14 territories that are currently British colonies and
dependencies are not included. This is an important and appropriate case for both theoretical and
methodological reasons. First, the size of British Empire provides a large number of states to
study, as well as important similarities and variations across states. The states in the sample share
the British common law system, use of English as a common language, and colonial history and
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socio-economic ties with the U.K. However, they also vary in important ways: land area,
population size and density, demographic location, and socio-economic conditions.
Second, the British were the first to recognize and enforce differing styles of imperial
rule (Fisher 1991). My research, therefore, can examine the influence of differing political
environments. The British goal was to impose efficient and effective rule and avoid resistance
where possible. While British colonial holdings can be described in five broad groups listed in
the next sections, they tried to individualize each colony’s institutional framework to best adapt
to the specific circumstances. The first three groups represent states that gained independence
after varying periods of colonial rule and experienced direct or indirect formal colonial rule are
as follows: (a) settled colonies; (b) dependencies; and (c) the special case of India. The next two
groups, where the U.K. exercise control over the territories without formal colonial rule is as
follows: (d) protectorates and (e) mandated territories. Though the period of colonial rule varied
from state to state, these groupings provide a uniform framework to establish comparable periods
of analyses from which to justify my sample of states.
(a) The first group, settled colonies, is exemplified by Canada, New Zealand, Australia,
and also the 13 American colonies that declared their independence from the U.K. as the United
States of America in 1776. Crosby (1986; Veracini 2013) describes settled colonies as those
where settlers tried to replicate European institutions, emphasizing private property and checks
on government. Haslam (1972) points out that an early association of the British Diaspora in
New Zealand led to the natural constitutional practice of enabling appeals to the JCPC with the
transposition of the legal system by colonists in a most distant part of the Empire. For them, with
large British settler and insignificant indigenous populations, there was nothing artificial about
placing the seat of ultimate appeal in London as the center and capital of the Empire. It is safe to
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also extend this view to both Canada and Australia. A sub-group of colonial holdings was the
original Caribbean colonies including Barbados and Jamaica. These were primarily plantation
colonies lacking indigenous populations, with small British settler populations and large African
slave labor forces. British institutions permeated all these colonies, resulting in what was later
characterized as carbon copies of British constitutional practice (Juegensmeyer 1964) or what is
generally referred to as the ‘Westminster Model’;
(b) Dependencies were colonies governed by British imperial policy, which included
defense and foreign relations. This group includes colonies such as Malaysia, Kenya, and
Nigeria, where the purpose of colonial administrations was to transfer as much of the resources
of the colony to the colonizer as possible (Crosby 1986). In these colonies with large indigenous
populations and small British settler populations, colonial officers supported miniscule
administrative-legal institutions concentrated in the capital with little interaction with the
indigenous population, therefore permeating very little infrastructural power (Porter 2012; Mann
1984);
(c) The special case of colonial India includes geographic areas that were drawn into the
colony via various means. Areas that were under the administration of local kings were
incorporated by agreement or force. Known as the native or the princely states, the defense and
foreign policies of these areas were entirely controlled by the British during that period, but they
did enjoy a substantial degree of self-rule in internal administration. Unlike other colonies, India
did not have a single appeals court until 1938 when the Federal Court of India was created under
the Government of India Act of 1935 (Gadbois 1963; De 2012). As a result, India was described
as “mixed colonial state” (McCartney 2015, 187). On gaining independence in 1948, all areas
were integrated into an independent Indian state with a standardized administration and legal
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system (Iyer 2010). Although members of the British Commonwealth, Pakistan which was
originally part of the Indian colony, and Bangladesh which was originally part of an independent
Pakistan (Hauss 2015), are both excluded.
The last two groups are territories that experienced British rule without the formal
colonial status but via the status of protectorate or mandate. No territories from these groups are
included in the sample of states as they were never recognized as formal colonies by an act of the
British parliament but are included here so as to provide a contrast with the first three categories.
(d) Protectorates such as Aden, Nyasaland, and Somaliland were territories with no
properly organized internal government. The British, therefore, not only controlled external
matters, such as defense and foreign relations, but also established internal legal and
administrative institutions. Britain’s involvement in their protectorates was roughly equivalent to
its involvement in the colonies without the status of a formal colony (Lange 2004; 2009);
(e) Mandated territories such as Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan were administered by the
British Empire via a mandate from the League of Nations and we never formal colonies. These
territories only experienced administrative rule for a relatively short period of time (Lange 2004;
2009). Fieldhouse (2006) characterizes these as collaborations being between the imperial
power, the existing local institutions, and the elite after the fragmentation of the Ottoman
Empire. As a result, they are not included in this research.
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Figure 2.4 The British Empire in 1746 © (Oxford Culture Mania, 2015)

Third, the growth of the empire reflected the replication of British institutions in
territories where no traditional/customary institutions existed, the local institutions were erased,
or British institutions were superimposed on traditional institutions in colonized territory. Their
effectiveness in replicating or superimposing institutions not only contributed to the number
states available for analysis, but also increased suitability for comparative research. The
existence and persistence of a signature colonial institution such as the JCPC was a phenomenon
unobserved in other post-colonial states that emerged from other empires, such as the French or
Spanish Empires. The effectiveness of the colonizing process was exemplified by the growth of
the empire from a few islands in the Caribbean seized from Spain, settlements along the eastern
seaboard of North America, around the rim of Hudson Bay and Nova Scotia, and a few trading
posts on the west coasts of Africa and India in 1746 (Smith 1998; see Figure 1.3) to
encompassing twenty-five percent of the world by 1914.

32

The Empire eventually included large geographic areas of Africa, Asia, North
America, and the Caribbean (see Figure 2.4) and its global trade included close links with South
America and other areas (Lawrence 1996). The extent and diversity of the Empire and the large
number of independent states that emerged during decolonization makes it an appropriate case
for analysis.

Figure 2.5 The British Empire (red) in 1921 © (The British Empire in 1921 n.d.)

First, the JCPC is arguably the first and most important example of a single
extraterritorial court that evolved specifically for colonies, as no other colonial power had such a
court. Further, I assert that the JCPC is the best example of a modern extraterritorial court. The
JCPC is not just of historical significance, but it also illustrates the expedience of such a court
and the integral role and influence of JCPC in British Commonwealth (Roberts-Wray 1962). In
addressing the influence of the JCPC and the respect it engendered in Australia, the words of the
Hon. Justice Michael Kirby (2008) can be easily ascribed to other British Commonwealth states:
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First, there was the realistic appreciation that the same personalities substantially
constituted both their Lordships’ House and the Privy Council, so that a very high
coincidence of judicial approach and conclusion was to be expected from each
tribunal. Secondly, the habits of Empire inculcated in Australian lawyers a high
measure of respect for just about everything that came from the Imperial capital.
Not least in the pronouncements of law which was the glue that helped to bind the
Empire together. Thirdly, traditions long observed and utility derived from
linkage to one of the great legal systems of the world as well as the high standards
of reasoning typical of the House of Lords, helped maintain the impact of its
influence long after the Imperial tide had receded. (7)
The fact that the JCPC existed for an extended period before and after decolonization presents
the opportunity to study both why a country would retain ties with an extraterritorial court and
also why it may later decide against retaining the jurisdiction of that extraterritorial court.
The JCPC was an important part of the expansion, consolidation and governance of the
British Empire. What makes the phenomenon of the persistence of the JCPC unique is the fact
that the U.K. made the court available to former colonies and that some new states did accede to
the JCPC at independence. This effectively outsources the final appellate court to the former
colonial power in an apparent affront the traditional understanding of state sovereignty (Brown
2002). There is no denying the judicial experience, quality and the prestige attributed to the
JCPC and that for some of the new states continued affiliation with the JCPC conferred some
degree of legitimacy to their judicial system. The quality of the JCPC decisions is an important
part of its credibility and the high quality of the Law Lords and their decisions is not seriously
questioned in the literature. New states having not established an independent reputation for
impartial adjudication would benefit from the right to appeal to the JCPC as it increases the
credibility of their policy preferences (Voigt et al 2007). This is exemplified by statements by the
then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore that the retention of the JCPC is a sign to the
world of a commitment to judicial independence (Seow 1997, Tan 2015). The JCPC allows me
to examine the influence of perceptions of the court, reputation, impact of decision making and
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the domestic political environment. The JCPC, therefore, having a long and prominent role in the
judicial development of colonies and many sovereign states provides an appropriate case study to
increase our understanding of the relationship between extraterritorial courts and states. In
Chapter 3 I turn to an explication of my theory of the relationship between extraterritorial courts
and nation-states.

3
3.1

THE JCPC AND THE GOVERNING COALITION: A THEORY OF THE ROLE OF
THE FINAL APPELLATE COURT
Introduction
The role and influence of the final appellate court, and in particular those courts with the

power of judicial review, on the policies of the governing national coalition are still subjects of
debate in the extant literature. My research focuses on the final appellate court with judicial
review as exemplified in British Commonwealth states. As the highest court in the judicial
system, the final appellate court is the last judicial forum to which one may appeal for review of
legal challenges. I assert that the governing coalition will want a final appellate court that it
expects to be a reliable partner when its policies are challenged in court. In the relationship with
an extraterritorial court, the governing coalition may not be just satisfied with working within the
existing the administrative structures but may move to completely sever ties with the court.
Courts function as forums for “dispute resolution,” “behavior modification,” “allocation
of gains and losses,” and “policy-making” (Baum 2013, 7–8). In other words, they are central to
civic engagement about the constitution, laws, and public policy. First exemplified in a modern
state by the U.S. Constitution, the establishment of governing institutions and codified rights and
responsibilities are now a hallmark of the vast majority of state constitutions. The extant
literature discusses the role and administration of the domestic final appellate courts in the U.S.
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and other states. Reviewing this literature informs my theory of the governing coalition’s
expectation of extraterritorial courts. Hamilton’s description of the judiciary as the weakest
branch of the government (The Federalist Papers #78 in Bickel 1962) notwithstanding, history
shows that the power of the JCPC to rule on the constitutionality of policies or to adjudicate
disputes with the state is important to the credibility of the national governing coalition, the
legitimacy of their policies, and, ultimately, the effectiveness of those policies (Voigt et al 2007).
This shift toward constitutionalism may have encouraged growing involvement of the
courts in a broad range of issues, which is animated by an apparent failure or reluctance on the
part of legislatures to address important policy issues decisively (Saunders 2010). All legal
systems have a court of last resort as the final judicial authority for public policies, effectively
making them “devices of centralized policy-making” (Shapiro 1981, 20). In many instances,
therefore, the decisions of the final court are the last word on a given matter. The outcome is that
the courts become part of the policy-making and legitimizing process. Furthermore, the decisions
set the precedents for lower courts and influence the development of domestic jurisprudence
(Lupo and Voeten 2011).
Given the courts’ role and function as the final appellate court, states care a great deal
about courts and how they are structured. Stability and continuity are important to the governing
coalition for a number of reasons. First, support from the final appellate court can confer
credibility on the government’s policies. Not directly subject to popular will, the court may be
viewed as an unbiased arbiter of disputes and challenges to the validity of laws and actions of the
governing coalition. The view of the court as an unbiased arbiter of conflicts is supported by
public opinion surveys. For example, the Maxwell Poll (2005; see also Justice at Stake
Campaign 2001) in the U.S. found strong support for the notion that independent judges are
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unbiased protectors of constitutional rights. On the other hand, though driven by legal principle,
there is recognition that the courts are political institutions (Bailey and Maltzman 2008; Keck
2007). Nevertheless, it is recognized in the extant literature that the U.S. Supreme Court does
have the “power to confer constitutional legitimacy” (McKeever 1997, 161) on the policies of
the governing coalition (Dahl 1957; Geyh 2006; McKeever 1997).
Second, when the court supports the state, it reduces uncertainty in the society about
enforcement of laws (Voigt, Ebling and Blume 2007). In a comparison of African and
Commonwealth Caribbean states, Voigt et al (2007) find that states that retained the JCPC
experienced higher levels per capita growth indirectly attributable to enhanced state credibility in
the realm of property rights enforcement. Third, the court’s support can be particularly important
for politically sensitive or controversial policies and can legitimize particularly salient cases
(Dahl 1957). Dahl (1957) posits that the “Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the national
alliance” that develops and enacts public policy (293). The final appellate court confers
legitimacy on: (a) the policies of the dominant majority and (b) the behavior required for the
operation of a democracy (Dahl 1957). The court, therefore, is expected to work in consort with
the national alliance.
The U.S. Supreme Court is the final appellate court that provides answers to important
legal questions that underpin national public policy. The clash between President Roosevelt and
the U.S. Supreme Court over key New Deal legislation in the 1930s exemplifies the role and
influence of the final court of appeal in public policy. The Supreme Court declared several acts
of Congress to be unconstitutional, which stalled the implementation of policies the executive
and legislative branches deemed necessary to address the economic challenges facing the United
States during the Great Depression. This exercise of judicial review, however, did not go
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unaddressed. The power of the executive and legislative branches to replace retiring Supreme
Court justices with justices who shared the policy preferences of the elected branches was crucial
to resolving the impasse with the U.S. Supreme Court. A threat to enlarge the court and appoint
additional justices had the desired effect. Justice Roberts changed his position on the legality of
Washington’s minimum wage statute challenged in West Coast Company v. Parrish (1937) and
the Supreme Court subsequently reversed itself and affirmed many key New Deal policies
(Carson & Kleinerman 2002; Currie 1987). Whittington (2007) reframes Dahl’s position on the
U.S. Supreme Court. He characterizes it as being friendly or sympathetic to the dominant
majority.
In addition, Geyh (2006) points out that the court rarely used its power of judicial review
in ways to precipitate direct conflicts with the legislative and executive branches of government.
Between 1789 and 2014, only 177 acts of the U.S. Congress (whole or in part) have been
declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court (Government Publishing Office 2014). In
other words, over time the court took a very pragmatic approach in exercising its power of
judicial review (Epstein and Walker 2014). Support by the judicial branch is characterized as
increasing the “credibility of the government’s promises” (Voigt et al 2007, 88) and presenting a
unified position on the policy. In reality, therefore, the governing coalition desires that the final
appellate court be an ally against challenges to its policies. As a result, elected officials select
judges whose interpretation of the law will not impede the policies of the dominant coalition
(Tushnet 2006).
This raises the importance, therefore, of the relationship between the branches of
government, including issues such as the process of placing justices on the court, tenure, and
jurisdiction. With regard to court appointments, Dahl points out that “Presidents are not famous

38

for appointing justices hostile to their own views on public policy” (284). This highlights a key
point of leverage the elected branches of government have over the U.S. Supreme Court. The
procedure for placing justices on a court is widely discussed, and its importance cannot be
overestimated (Baum 2013; Moralski and Shipan 1999; Steigerwalt 2010), but is only a part of
the spectrum of administrative control that can be exerted by the governing coalition. The power
to determine the structure and composition of the final appellate court is, therefore, important to
the governing coalition, as it determines the relationship of the court to the other branches of
government and defines how the court functions as part of the governing coalition. Dahl asserts
that this relationship makes the court a “national policy maker” (565). This legitimizing role
makes the judiciary an important participant in the national political and decision-making
process (Dahl 1957) led and influenced by the governing coalition. The final court lends
legitimacy to the policies of the dominant majority, which Dahl (1957) describes as the
“lawmaking majority” in Congress (284). Further, Dahl asserts that “the courts are not long out
of time with the policy views dominant among lawmaking majorities of the United States” (285).
In other words, democracy requires that the branches of government are generally in step with
each other and work to produce public policies, with the courts functioning as “political
institutions working with legal tools” (Rosenberg 2001, 619; see also Dahl 1957).
While the important role the final appellate court plays in policy-making is recognized
and demonstrated in the extant literature on the U.S. Supreme Court (Casper 1976; Feeley and
Rubin 1999; Frymer 2003; Mather 1995; Melnick 1994; McCann 1986; Scheingold 1974), other
works argue differently. The significance of this role is disputed by others, including Rosenberg
(2008), Delgado (2008) and Klarman (2004). They, along with others, assert that the role is
considerably constrained by and dependent upon the actions of the other branches of
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government. This position is echoed with regard to extraterritorial courts. In the review of the
role of the ECJ in the European Union, Garrett et al (1998) assert that the “spectre of coordinated
responses [by a governing coalition] will make the ECJ more reticent to make adverse decisions”
(151). Nevertheless, the growing partnership exemplified between the ECJ and E.U. member
states and the role of the ICC when states fail to act (Chayes and Slaughter 2000) makes
improving our understanding of the relationship between extraterritorial courts as final appellate
courts and states even more important.
This interaction of governing institutions is also witnessed in other jurisdictions. The
period of emergency in India from 1975 to 1977 during the rule of Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi’s ruling Congress Party illustrated this dynamic in another common law jurisdiction. In
one decision, the Indian Supreme Court rejected the objections made by the Prime Minister’s
legal counsel and found her guilty on charges of corruption, despite admonitions from counsel
about the repercussions of not finding in favor of the prime minister. In another decision,
however, the court sided with the government’s disregard for the right of habeas corpus (Das
2007) in an attempt to legitimize the actions of the government during the state of emergency.
Hirschl (2000) finds that a comparison of specific cases in Israel, Canada, and New Zealand
demonstrates that courts rule for the most part in accordance with the policy preferences of the
governing coalition. It should be noted, however, that this research was not a comparative study
of the actual decisions of the courts, but a qualitative look at specific cases in the context of the
political environment in each state. While the governing coalition may not feel significantly
challenged by any single contrary decision, over time they may decide to change the court if it
does not appear to support the governing alliance or if there is increasing sensitivity to the legal
challenges adjudicated by the extraterritorial court. Maintaining this alliance may go beyond
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exercising control over the court through mechanisms such as the appointment of judges and
delineating jurisdiction. In the case of British colonies attaining independence, the choice of final
appellate court enshrined in the constitution is particularly significant. The role of the final
appellate court was more than symbolic, as retaining the JCPC preserved a significant tie with
the former colonial power.
The abolition of the JCPC and the establishment of a domestic final appellate court to
make a total institutional break with the U.K. are in keeping with the concept of the modern
state. Each state, however, could maintain the status quo by retaining the JCPC. This choice by
the governing coalition may have been an effort at securing their interests with a prestigious
court they expected to be a reliable partner. Exemplifying this assertion, Dippel (2014) finds that
the political leaders in British colonial settlements voluntarily abolished their locally selected
assemblies after the abolition of slavery in the Empire in 1836. This effectively moved the
settlements away from a democratic process, albeit with limited enfranchisement, to totally
autocratic rule by the U.K. (Borland 1976; Dippel 2014).
In a study of former British colonies in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Dippel (2014)
further demonstrates that governing coalitions chose this course of action to protect their
interests and preferred policies from the influence of the wider population. As a colony moves
towards independence, there is a gradual expansion of voting rights that brings more people into
the governing process. The governing coalition, who were cultivated by and had benefited from
colonial rule, may naturally feel that their interests are more likely to be protected by the JCPC
that is a part of the colonial institutional structure. The role and administration of an
extraterritorial court, therefore, are not any less important to the states that accede to the court
than if it was a domestic final appellate court. The predominant consideration for the governing
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coalition, therefore, is whether the extraterritorial court is likely to uphold their policies when
challenged in court. When states use an extraterritorial court as the final appellate court, they
effectively relinquish control over this important institution in the state’s policy-making and
governance structure. The governing coalition risks having a court over which it has no direct
control making the final judicial decision on challenges to its policies.
The final appellate courts in British Commonwealth countries can function as a check on
the executive and legislature by delivering decisions that run contrary to the policies of the
governing coalition. Extending Dahl (1957) beyond the U.S. Supreme Court, I posit that the
court’s decisions and the political environment are important when legal challenges are made to
the state’s policies, as the members of the governing coalition want the final court that is most
likely to uphold and legitimize its policies. This is held because of the similarities in the
historical background reflected in the political and legal institutions. The political environment
influences whether states will change that court if it perceives a disconnection with the court.
The governing coalition must perceive a disconnection with the court that is enough to galvanize
its political will to change the status quo with regard to the final court of appeal. I test this theory
at two critical junctures faced by governing coalitions with regard to the JCPC in states that
emerge from the British Empire. If at independence it is expected that JCPC will fulfill the role
of legitimizing their policies, the governing coalition will maintain the status quo. If, however, at
some later point there are changes in the political environment and the governing coalition
determines that the decisions of the final appellate court reflect a disconnection with their
policies, the final appellate court will be replaced.
Independence, therefore, is the first time the new governing coalition has input on the
final appellate court for the new state. It is here that the colonial influence frames the governing
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coalition’s perceptions of the JCPC as it moves the colony to independence or the first critical
juncture. For those states that choose to retain the JCPC at independence the governing coalition
is then influenced by the decisions of the court and the political environment which may lead to a
second critical juncture. Ultimately, I propose that states will choose the final court of appeal that
they most expect to be an ally and reliable partner, and may move to change a court that
undermines or seems likely to undermine their policies. The decisions of the governing coalition
can be observed at these two possible critical junctures.
3.2

Critical Junctures
Mahoney (2000) defines a critical juncture as a point when a specific choice is made

among two or more options. The juncture may occur after a period of path-dependent stability or
continuity and represents a period when a clear change is possible (Capoccia and Kelmen 2007).
Here, critical junctures present possible turning points when the court is no longer perceived as a
reliable partner in the governing coalition. Existing institutions, however, favor the perpetuation
of those institutions; once a state has embarked on a course, it can be difficult and costly to
change directions. In other words, history does matter to institutional development and changes
(Crouch and Farrell 2004; Pierson 2004). Historical institutionalism uses the concepts of path
dependence, critical junctures, and the salience of ideas to frame this course change. More
precisely, dependent actions and decisions in the past underpin path-dependent institutional
patterns and outcomes (Djelic and Quack 2007; Page 2006). Vergne and Durand (2010)
described these historical underpinnings as what links the past and the future. In practical terms,
the colonial experience may influence the new governing coalition of the emerging state to retain
the right of appeal via the JCPC. The colonial history and effect may constrain the choices and
perceptions of the governing coalition with regard to the institutions that are included in the
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constitution at independence. Some state leaders may expect that favorable rulings from the
JCPC, a court not controlled by them, will grant greater legitimacy than a domestic high court. In
the case of the JCPC, understanding what factors perpetuate that colonial institution despite the
change in the political environment marked by independence is the key at this critical juncture.
After this first critical juncture, the new state and the governing coalition find themselves
in a “new stable institutional equilibrium” (Bernhard 2015, 976). Over time, however, changing
conditions and new developments can alter the course of institutional development (Vergne and
Durand 2010). Streeck and Thelen (2005) describe this as “incremental change with
transformative results” (309). After independence, there may be changes in the political
environment and the governing coalition’s view of the JCPC’s decisions sufficient to interrupt
that status quo and possibly lead to a second critical juncture. In Chapter 3, I examine the
decisions made by the new states at independence, which is the first critical juncture, and in
Chapter 4, I examine the circumstances that may lead to a second critical juncture for some
states.
The first critical juncture for emerging states occurs at independence, while the second
may arise later in the state’s development. Figure 3.1 illustrates three paths colonies may follow
in selecting a final appellate court, as well as where the two critical junctures may arise. At the
time of independence, 30 of the 50 colonies in group 1 in my sample perceive the JCPC as an
ally and reliable partner and retain the court at independence. Group 2 with twenty states,
therefore, do not view the court as an ally and reliable partner and abolish the JCPC at
independence. The decisions of the new governing coalitions at independence are influenced by
the realities of British colonial rule. The colonial experience underpins the path dependence
influence on institutional development and changes. The colonial history makes a difference in
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making the ultimate break with the colonial power and the common law legal institutions that
existed during the colonial period. Of the former colonies in Group 3 that retain the JCPC at
independence, some choose to form a new domestic final appellate court at another critical
juncture some years later. This juncture is not inevitable, but 17 states abolished the JCPC at
various times after independence. I argue that this second juncture is a function of a changed
political environment and a disconnection between the policy preferences of the state and the
court after independence. In other words, political changes and uncertainty as to whether or not
the JCPC will uphold their policies may lead the governing national coalition to view the JCPC
as threat to the legitimacy of their decisions (Dahl 1957) or to the new vision for the state. At the
point where the governing coalition perceives this discontinuity with the JCPC as an
impediment, they may move to abolish the right of appeal. It is important to better understand the
factors that influence the perceptions and opinions of the governing coalition about this final
appellate court as an institutional partner.
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Figure 3.1 The Critical Junctures for Choosing a Final Appellate Court

In this section, I discuss each critical juncture in more detail. The closer look at the 50
states reveals a clearer picture of the realities of the colonial experience leading up to
independence. With regard to the decision at independence, former colonies fall into three
categories: (a) those that abolished appeals to JCPC at independence; (b) those that retained
appeals to the JCPC for a period after independence before abolishing the appeals process; and
(c) those that retain appeals to the JCPC as of January 1, 2015.
At the first critical juncture at independence, all states must design their new government
structures, including the judiciary. Formal deliberations about the constitution for the new state
lead to the first critical juncture at independence. Decisions about the judicial structure and the
final court of appeal are part of the formal process of developing the constitution the colony will
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adopt at independence. This formalizes the framework for the executive, legislative, and judicial
institutions to be transferred from the British authorities to the new governing coalition.
Reliance upon an extraterritorial court as the final appellate court for an independent
state is fundamentally incompatible with the modern notion of sovereignty (Swinfen 1987).
Retaining the JCPC post-independence, in effect, outsources the power of final judicial review to
a court over which the state has no control. In The Gambia, this issue was part of the campaign
to adopt the new constitution in 1996 that excluded appeals to the JCPC (Senghore 2010).
Similarly, New Zealand’s 2005 abolition of appeals to the JCPC was an election promise by the
Labour Party. On winning the 1999 general elections, the governing coalition led by the Labour
Party completed the process culminating in the abolition of the JCPC characterized as an
important step in the national development of New Zealand (Wilson 2001). In supporting the
establishment of the Caribbean court of Justice for the Commonwealth Caribbean, the former
Prime Minister of St. Lucia, the Honorable Kenny Anthony states, “No self-respecting nation
should allow its sovereignty to be at large” (Anthony 2003). More than half of all British
colonies, however, retained the JCPC at independence. As of January 2015, St. Lucia still relies
on the JCPC decades after gaining independence, while states such as Malawi and Zambia
abolished appeals to the JCPC at independence. Other states such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and
Guyana retained the JCPC at independence only to abolish appeals to that extraterritorial court
some years later. There are two underlying questions. First, why then did some states emerging
from British colonial rule retain the JCPC? The effects and influence of British colonial rule is
much debated in the literature (Porter 2012). On one hand, some argue the British rule was a net
positive to the territories (Ferguson 2003; Porter 2012). On the other, some scholars maintain
that while British colonial rule conferred important institutions and elements of modern
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statehood on the former colonies, it was brutal and repressive (Gott 2011; Porter 2012). As with
all empires of the past, however, the influence lingers regardless of our normative interpretation.
The British Empire is no different, and I assert that the influence is evidenced in the national
governing coalition’s decision about the final appellate court at independence.
Further, some states that retained the right of appeal at independence only later abolish
the right, while others continued to allow appeals to this extraterritorial court. This mutability
raises the second question. Why do some states ultimately decide to abolish appeals to the JCPC
and establish a domestic final appeals court? I posit that states that retain appeals to the JCPC at
independence may later decide to abolish appeals if political changes increase uncertainty as to
whether the JCPC will uphold and legitimize the state’s policies. A disconnect may emerge over
time that leads the governing national coalition to take steps to abolish that right of appeal.
3.2.1 First Critical Juncture: Independence
The colonial period precedes the first critical juncture at independence. My theory that
the role of the final appellate court is the upholding and legitimizing of the policies of the
governing coalition presents a better understanding of why some states choose the JCPC as their
final appellate court at independence. I test macro hypotheses dealing with structural factors
(Rokkan 1966) of colonial rule that influence former British colonies as they emerge as
independent states. In reality, the colonial experience encapsulates a variety of factors that affect
each state differently in a complex and interactive manner. Length and type of colonial rule,
period of independence, legal resources, and leadership each have an important role. The next
section reviews the literature and explicates the influences that frame the perceptions of the
governing coalition.
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The establishment of a colony in territory effectively controlled by British settlers
confirms total control by the Colonial Office in London over the political and administrative
apparatus of that colony (Borland 1975). It marks the formal integration of the area into the
British Empire and establishes the authority of the Crown (Dippel 2014). The legacy of colonial
rule is complex (Porter 2012) and its influence multifaceted. The change in formal status
embedded the colonial institutions in a colony to varying degrees and the effects of this
undeniable legacy are still debated (Ferguson 2003; Gott 2011; Porter 2012). During the colonial
period, a governing coalition was developed from the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government and led by the governing elite. The governing elite or ruling class,
which would make up the governing coalition, may include the senior political elite and
bureaucrats, the leading members of the liberal professions, the growing bourgeoisie, and the
leading members of the security institutions (Markovitz 1987).
Whether the governing coalition viewed the JCPC as a viable partner in the policymaking process of the sovereign state was influenced by the colonial experience which framed
the composition and outlook of the governing coalition. For example, the cultural and ethnic
makeup of the group varied on whether a colony was “settled” or “exploitative” as defined by
Crosby (1986; see also Veracities 2013). Settled colonies were those in which British settlers
tried to replicate British institutions with an emphasis on private property and checks on
government power (Crosby 1986; McCartney 2015). The largest settled colonies were Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia. With relatively small and dispersed indigenous populations, the
culture and ethnicity of the local governing elite at independence were inextricably linked to
their British heritage. This commonality may support the recognition of shared interests with the
JCPC in maintaining the status quo after independence. As Diop (2012) points out, the
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institutions and infrastructure of the large settled colonies are steeped in the culture and tradition
of the colonial power and designed to maintain the status quo. This broad characterization of that
group of former colonies contrasts with exploitative colonies. In colonies such as Kenya, India,
and Sierra Leone where the purpose was the movement of resources from the colony to the
colonizer (Crosby 1986; Meredeth 2005), the characteristics of colonial rule and the effect on the
emerging governing coalition varied. In African and Asian colonies where the British settler
population was generally very small, the local elite came from the indigenous populations and
those of mixed heritage. The new local elite or “a new class of individuals exposed to aspects of
European Culture that were super-imposed on the local ethnic cultures” (Diop 2012, 224)
emerged as nationalist movements, usually culminating with independence. These colonies saw
the rise of a “new bureaucratic class that was nurtured during colonialism,” but which still had a
history of tradition and customary courts functioning during colonial rule (Diop 2012, 224). I
posit that this made them less attached to an extraterritorial court, such as the JCPC, as the final
appellate court at independence.
The Commonwealth Caribbean provides an interesting subset of settled colonies. With
the decimation of indigenous populations (Caribs/Gariganu, Siboneys, Tainos, and Arawaks), the
colonies were populated primarily by descendants of former slaves. Those of Afro-British
ethnicity and later indentured Indian laborers resulted in “cultural heterogeneity” (Pramdas 1996,
9) producing “new native residents” (Pramdas 1996, 15) or in “creolization as a cultural mode of
indigenization [that] is often rendered as essentially a single Afro- or Eurocentric standard”
(Pramdas 1996, 17). Though exploitative in nature, Caribbean colonies were directly ruled with
no indigenous institutions functioning in parallel to the colonial institutions as observed in the
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indirect rule exploitative colonies. As with the other settled colonies, this subset of states retains
the JCPC at independence.
I analyze the influence in the political environment of British colonial rule on the
governing coalition’s choice of final court of appeal. Britain and its former colonies provide an
important case study as it is the only colonial power to design a single court specifically for legal
cases originating within her colonies, as authorized by the Judicial Committee Act of 1844
(Finlay and Walwyn 2008). As observed by Lord Spens, it continued to serve as the “great
unifying legal influence” of the British Commonwealth (Hansard May 30 1960, Column 95).
The Law Lords on the JCPC viewed themselves as “umpires” of the Empire (Ibhawoh 2013, 6).
The role of the court as an umpire continues when the state retains the right to appeal to the
JCPC. Variations in structures and procedures notwithstanding, fundamental aspects of the
British legal system persist. Important features such the adversarial and writ systems, along with
principles such as stare decisis (let the case precedent stand), due process, equity, and an
appellate hierarchy, are entrenched across common law jurisdictions. The JCPC, however, also
upholds differences between British laws and those of the colonies and states. The decisions
based on the laws of the respective colony or state reinforces the idea of “otherness,” which
reinforces the distinction between colonizer and colonized (Ibhawoh 2013, 9). This is
particularly evident in states with indigenous populations where customs and traditions are
recognized, thereby supporting the tendency of these states to abolish the JCPC at independence.
Still, decisions of the JCPC influence the development of common law in every corner of the
British Empire (Ibhawoh 2013; Swinfin 1987), and this influence continues in states that retain
the JCPC at independence. As heirs to the British common law legal tradition, courts in other
former colonies have a comparable role in national governance as described by Dahl (1957), and
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there is no reason to believe that the role of the JCPC varies from that of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Specifically, therefore, I explore what contributes to the governing coalition that the
extraterritorial court will be a reliable partner when its policies are challenged.
In the next section, I consider how in the case of the JCPC the perceptions develop over
the colonial period generally and the component activities that are generally part of the
decolonization process in which the governing elite participated. The length of official colonial
rule was closely linked to the degree to which the colonial institutions became embedded and
intertwined within society and the effect on the new governing coalition at independence. Lange
(2004) finds that long periods of colonial rule lead to stronger state institutions that are
connected to a broad swath of the society. This, he asserts, contributes to colonial and
postcolonial development based on societal expectations that institutions contribute to the overall
societal wellbeing.
The political environment the local governing coalition experiences influences their
ability to identify with governing institutions. This includes their perspective on and degree of
identification with the JCPC as a viable final appellate court for the new state. Iweriebor (2011)
describes indirect rule having three main institutions,
The native authority made up of the local ruler, the colonials official, and
administrative staff; the native treasury, which collected revenues to pay for local
administrative staff and services; and the native courts which purportedly
administered native laws and custom, the supposedly traditional legal system of
the colonized that was used to adjudicate cases. (para.13)
I suggest that the political environment represented by the type of colonial rule – direct or
indirect (Lange 2004) – is one influence on the type of final appellate court the state will choose
post-independence as the governing elite seek to establish the credibility of the new national
governing coalition. I build upon Lange’s (2009; see also Fisher 1991; Hirairi 2012) direct-
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indirect rule theory but focus solely on the highest court. Direct rule permits local elites to run
only the very lowest levels of the colonial administration, while colonial officials perform all
other functions. Building on Doyle (1986), indirect rule entrusted extensive governance of the
colony to the locals under supervision of imperial governors with both indigenous and colonial
institutions functioning in parallel during the colonial period (Lange 2004; 2009). With the
introduction of common law traditions, the British still permitted considerable local exceptions
in procedures and content in areas such as family, property, and criminal law (Hooker 1975;
Mitchell, Ring and Spellman 2013) in some colonies. Recognition of local traditional law placed
legal power in the hands of local chiefs (Hooker 1975; Mamdani 1999), who exercised
traditional authority over indigenous populations. The chiefs handled many disputes at that level
concurrently with the established British common law state level courts that typically supplanted
the authority of traditional law. It should be noted, however, that the exercise of this authority
was at the absolute discretion of the colonial officials and subordinate native leadership
(Iweriebor 2011). At the time of Ghanaian independence in 1957, colonial laws provided for the
operation of “Native Courts” in the territories of Togoland, Ashanti, and the Northern Territories
that comprised the new state (Harvey 1962, 584). These courts were linked to the colonial legal
institutions through three mechanisms:
(1) appeals to higher tribunals within the Native Courts system and in limited
instances to an appeal tribunal outside the system; (2) transfers of cases from one
Native Court to another or to a Magistrate’s Court; and (3) review and revision of
court action by District Commissioners or the Judicial Adviser (585).
In his examination of the Japanese colonial era in Korea (1905–1945), Kohli (1994) also
acknowledged the distinction between direct and indirect colonial rule. He finds that the
Japanese used both forms of rule by greatly concentrating power in Seoul complemented with a
densely bureaucratic periphery, and concludes that this provided the foundation for the
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development that occurred in South Korea after the Korean War. The type of colonial rule is
closely linked to whether the colonial institutions became embedded and intertwined with the
society. This contributes to the persistence of the institution after the end of the Japanese
occupation. The governing coalition in colonies exposed to indirect rule experiences a duality of
institutional structures as customary and traditional legal institutions operate in parallel. This is
in contradistinction to purely colonial institutions existing in direct-rule colonies. Kohli’s (1994)
findings in Korea underscore the significance of types of colonial rule on state outcomes. The
type of colonial rule is likely to influence the choice of institutions post-independence. Indirect
rule depends on collaboration with the traditional institutions supported by large indigenous
populations that control regions with small colonial administrations isolated in the capital (Lange
2009). Alternatively, direct rule is characterized by dominant colonial institutions that are
territory-wide and centralized, producing bureaucratic legal-administrative institutions controlled
by colonial officials (Lange 2009). These institutions permeate where there are few or no
indigenous peoples supporting traditional institutions. Direct rule is characterized by virtually
complete domination of colonial institutions. The national leaders, therefore, view the JCPC as a
natural extension of their embedded institutional hierarchy that brings credibility to the judiciary.
These states that experience direct colonial rule are more likely to retain the JCPC at
independence. The type of colonial rule – indirect or direct – is important to the significant
influence on the relationship between the governing coalition and the U.K. Table 3.1 presents the
lists of the 24 direct rule colonies and 26 indirect rule colonies from the total sample of 50 states.
Of the 24 colonies that experienced direct colonial rule, four (17 percent) abolished appeals to
the JCPC at independence. Of the remaining 26 colonies that experienced indirect rule, 16 states
(81 per cent) abolished appeals to the JCPC at independence.
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Table 3.1 Type of Colonial Rule in the 50 Colonies

Direct Colonial Rule (24 states)
Retain (20 States)
Abolish (4 states)
Antigua & Barbuda
Cyprus
Australia
Ireland, Rep. of
Bahamas
Malta
Barbados
Seychelles
Belize
Brunei
Canada
Dominica
Gambia, The
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
Mauritius
New Zealand
Singapore
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent &
the Grenadines
Trinidad & Tobago

Indirect Colonial Rule (26 states)
Retain (10 States)
Abolish (16 states)
Fiji
Botswana
Ghana
Lesotho
India
Malawi
Kenya
Maldives
Kiribati
Myanmar
Malaysia
Nauru
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
South Africa
Samoa
Tuvalu
Sierra Leone
Uganda
Solomon Islands
Swaziland
Tanzania
Tonga
Vanuatu
Zambia
Zimbabwe

The extension and imposition of British colonial rule, therefore, is inextricably
intertwined with the institutional development of the colonies and with the perception reliability
of the final appellate court as important to the governing coalition. Since colonial influences on
this development culminated at independence, it is important to understand how the formal
process evolved and how the colonies transitioned to independence. My examination of the 50
former British colonies extends this comparative approach with the focus on this specific
institution.
I assert that the duration of colonial rule also influences the choice of the final court of
appeal at independence. The average length of colony status for the states included in this
research is 121 years. On one extreme there is St. Kitts & Nevis, which was a colony for 360
years before transitioning to independence in 1983 and still retains the right of appeal to the
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JCPC at the end of 2015. Zambia, at the other end of the spectrum, was a British colony for only
40 years when it gained independence in 1964 and abolished the right of appeal to the JCPC. The
difference may be explained by the lack of indigenous people and institutions on St. Kitts &
Nevis which allows the colonial influence to be stronger over the longer period of colonial rule
as opposed to the contrary situation in Zambia. The strength of the colonial influence contributed
to the decision on the status of the JCPC. Only two of the 20 states (10 percent) that experience
colonial rule longer than the average abolished the JCPC. Of the 30 states that retained the JCPC
at independence, 13 states (43 percent) experienced shorter than the average length of colonial
rule.
The end of colonial rule marks the transfer of governing authority from the colonial
power to the new national governing coalition who inherits the governing institutions with the
constitutional authority to make public policy. The lengths of colonial rule contribute to the
degree to which the institutions become embedded in the colonial society. This increases the
familiarity of the new governing coalition with the role of the JCPC as more cases would be
appealed during longer periods of colonial rule. This familiarity and longer periods of reliance on
the JCPC increase the willingness to accept this colonial institution as part of the governing
institutions of the sovereign state. The length of colonial rule contributes to the degree to which
colonial institutions including the JCPC are embedded in the governing structures of the state
(Lange 2009; 2004; Mamdani 1996). The colonial institutions have been in place longer and are
more embedded in the societies (Lange 2009; Mamdani 1996).
Figure 3.2 presents the 50 colonies categorized by the type and average length of colonial
rule experienced prior to independence and merely demonstrates the variation in the sample of
states. At independence, 16 of the 27 (62 percent) colonies that experienced indirect rule,
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averaging 70 years of colonial rule, abolish appeals to the JCPC. Of the 23 colonies averaging
170 years of colonial rule, that experienced direct rule, only three (13 percent) abolish appeals to
the JCPC at independence. This shows a greater tendency of indirectly ruled colonies to abolish
the JCPC at independence. See Appendix A for the length of colonial rule for each state.
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Figure 3.2 Types and Average Lengths of Colonial Rule in the 50 Colonies under either
Indirect or Direct Rule

I briefly discuss internal self-government and constitutional commissions that contribute
to our understanding of the emerging local elite at this first critical juncture. During these
processes, important national leaders emerged and led the colony to independence. My review
shows that the first prime minister inevitably emerged from these groups of leaders (Appendix
B). This is important, as it may contribute to the strength of attachment the governing coalition
feels to the JCPC.
During the first phase of the decolonization process, the U.K. grants colonies internal
self-government. This process devolves the responsibility for domestic affairs to the locally
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elected officials, the emerging national elite, except for the responsibility for defense and foreign
affairs, which remain the domain of the colonial power. The process of decolonization brings a
shift in authority from the colonial power to the local governing elite and the opportunity to
influence the judicial structure. For most colonies, the next step after being granted internal selfgovernment is independence. The length of this pre-independence period varies with each colony
but averages 14.25 years, ranging from less than 1 year for Zambia and Tanzania to as many as
75 years for New Zealand. Leading up to and during this period, the emerging national coalition
is introduced to or becomes more highly integrated into the governing process and institutions.
During this phase, therefore, with devolution of the responsibility for domestic affairs, the
nationalist political parties emerge to contest elections. While these groups are neither
monolithic nor homogeneous, national leaders do surface to take the reins of domestic
governance. The background of these leaders may be significant, as they lead the local governing
coalition’s participation in the commissions and committees developed as a part of that transition
period to work with the U.K. officials on the independence constitution.
The emerging governing coalition also participates in constitutional commissions as the
second phase of the decolonization process. These commissions are instrumental in providing the
framework for the local leadership to participate in crafting the written constitution adopted at
independence, including provisions for the final court. Constitutional commissions are comprised
of colonial and local elite and serve principally in a supporting role to the legislative assembly.
Their primary function is to provide expert advice on constitutional problems and issues in
addition to actually proposing and drafting entire constitutions (Straum 1977). The goals are to
develop constitutions that establish or strengthen the political community and to establish or
amend the rules governing the state’s power (Ghai and Galli 2007). Internal self-government is
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anchored in the Westminster model of government and universal adult suffrage, with external
and defense matters remaining the responsibility of the U.K. Considering the option of retaining
the JCPC or establishing a new domestic final court of appeal is a part of this process. These
commissions are significant in moving colonies to internal self-government to independence.
This period of self-government culminates with the decision of the governing coalition about the
independence constitution, including the status of the JCPC.
Domestic law schools play an important role in the development and practice of law,
resulting in the local jurisprudence. Lawyers are also considered to be a part of the local elite and
influence attitudes towards the colonial institutions (Kelly 1994). The absence of a law school
would indicate closer ties with the U.K., making it more likely that the state would retain JCPC
appeals. This has two aspects. First, if a law school exists in the state prior to independence it is
likely to increase the number of local lawyers. This would support a larger pool from which
judges could be selected for service on the bench. Second, locally trained lawyers may feel less
affinity for British institutions than those trained in the U.K. Conversely, the absence of law
schools makes the colony more reliant on the U.K. and contributes to the strength of the colonial
influence.
As Acemulgo et al (2001) state, therefore, the “colonial experience” is broad and far
reaching influencing the development of the colonial settlements and the persistence of
institutions (1370). While the colonizer and colonized influence each other, the influence is
asymmetrical with the colonial power exerting more influence as opposed to the colonized
(Alemagung 2010). Further, “the political, cultural and general polity” left as part of the colonial
legacy implanted “neo-colonial nationalist leadership” that led the colony to independence
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(Alemagung 2010, 64). These factors contribute to the additive effect of the colonial influence
leading up to independence. This leads me to my first hypothesis (H1):
H1: The stronger the perceptions of reliability, the more likely the governing coalition is
to retain appeals to the extraterritorial court.
In the next section, I discuss the second critical juncture that may arise for those 30 states
that retained the JCPC at independence. Seventeen of these states at some point replaced the
JCPC with a domestic final appellate court, with 13 states maintaining the status quo as of
January 1, 2015.
3.2.2 Second Critical Juncture: Post-Independence
If the JCPC was retained at independence, another critical juncture may have surfaced
some years later that led the state to abandon the JCPC and establish a domestic final appellate
court. Dahl’s (1957) assertion that the courts are integral to the national governing coalition
makes the decision about the final court important. In the face of challenges to policies, states
seek a high court that will reinforce the policies of the governing coalition. JCPC decisions that
go against the state may undermine that goal. The court is, therefore, less likely to be viewed as a
partner or ally. As the state has no administrative means to bring the JCPC back into line, as a
U.S. president may have the opportunity to do through judicial appointments or the Congress
through other administrative and jurisdictional changes, the remedy is to replace the JCPC with a
national court over which some administrative leverage can be exerted. I thus argue that states
retain the JCPC when they believe the court is likely to support the governing coalition, but sever
ties when they perceive the role of the JCPC as incompatible with the policies of the national
governing coalition. I argue that this juncture is a function of an increased disconnection between
the policy preferences of the state and the JCPC and of a heightened sensitivity to the role of this
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extraterritorial court in the domestic affairs of the state. If the JCPC’s decisions become
increasingly unlikely to reflect the preferences of the governing coalition, this may be viewed as
a threat to the legitimacy of their policy decisions (Dahl 1957). At the point where the governing
coalition is convinced that this extraterritorial court threatens their policies, they may initiate the
process to sever ties. This juncture is not inevitable, however, as evidenced by the fact that 13
states still retain appeals to the JCPC at the end of 2015. I now examine the factors after
independence that may influence the emergence of this second critical juncture.
The divergence of preferences may prompt the governing elite to muster the political will
to abolish the JCPC. After all, it is tempting for the governing coalition to assume authority over
and responsibility for this important institution to increase the reliability of the entire judiciary
when challenges arise. This makes unraveling the puzzle as to why states would not assume this
constitutional function at independence more pressing and important. States that retain appeals to
the JCPC are bound to a final appellate court that is far from the state physically, beyond the
administrative control of the governing coalition, and whose judges also serve on the Supreme
Court of Judicature in the U.K. From the sample of 50 former colonies, 30 states (60 percent)
that emerged from the British Empire retain the JCPC for some period after independence. Of the
30 states, 17 eventually sever ties with the JCPC. Figure 3.3 displays the numbers of years each
state retained the JCPC after independence. Arguably, these 30 states are the most interesting and
raise the question of why any state would change an institution it previously deemed appropriate.
The extant literature does not effectively address the reasons why states that retained the JCPC as
the highest appellate court would later abolish appeals to this extraterritorial court. Further,
examining this phenomenon will inform our understanding of the path dependent nature of
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institutional persistence. This is important as states establish and maintain ties with
extraterritorial courts.
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Figure 3.3 Numbers of Years before States Abolish the Right of Appeal to the JCPC Post
independence

Several countries (Ghana, Guyana, India, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda) retain the JCPC for less
than five years after independence. All these states promulgated new constitutions as part of
political changes that established republics as a general attempt to further break lingering
colonial influence represented by the Westminster model of government adopted at
independence (Galligan and Versteeg 2013). These new constitutions also replace the JCPC with
a domestic final court of appeal.
I argue that the new governing coalition in each state in this sample expects the court to
be a reliable partner and legitimize their policies when challenged. This raises an important
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question: What post-independence changes contribute to the disconnection that leads some states
to a second juncture? The reality of governing the state in a changing political environment may
heighten the national coalition’s sensitivity to their inability to leverage this extraterritorial court
in their favor. African leaders, for example, who experienced comparatively shorter periods of
colonial rule, had more limited experience governing through the “essentially alien structures
hastily superimposed over the deeply ingrained political legacies of imperial rule” by the time of
independence (Gordon 2007, 62). It was likely that, over time, events and changes in the political
environment as well as decisions of the JCPC lead to a disconnection between the state and the
JCPC. In other words, when the governing coalition perceives the JCPC as not fulfilling the role
of a reliable partner, a second critical juncture may surface. At that point it is more likely that the
state will abolish the JCPC and replace it with a domestic final appellate court.
To address this second issue of why some abolish appeals to the JCPC at different times,
I theorize that after independence two factors influence whether or not the governing coalition
continues to view the JCPC as a reliable partner in the governing coalition. The first factor
includes the levels at which the JCPC uphold the policies of the governing coalition. Voigt et al
(2007) find that membership of this extraterritorial court has both a statistically and
economically positive effect on economic growth, which may be attributable to the right of
appeal to the JCPC, and may in turn enhance the credibility of the state. My research goes
beyond Voigt et al (2007), who only examine that affect the presence or absence of the right of
appeal to the JCPC. To gain insight into the possible influence of extraterritorial court decisions
on the state, I will examine decisions in cases originating in states that retained appeals to the
JCPC after independence and changes in the political environment. I will present a more nuanced
understanding of when the state may be willing to sacrifice any perceived credibility or colonial
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attachment to the JCPC and move to abolish appeals by looking at JCPC cases where the state is
a litigant. I expect that a detailed examination of JCPC decisions from each jurisdiction will
reveal that a higher ratio of appeals in which the JCPC did not support the state’s preference
indicates a policy disconnection with the governing coalition and reinforces the notion that the
court is not a reliable partner. This increases the likelihood that the state will abolish appeals to
the court. This leads to my Hypothesis 2 (H2):
H2: The likelihood of abolishing appeals to the extraterritorial court will increase as the
state’s level of success before the court decreases.
Given that the role of the state is not the same in the legal challenges before the JCPC,
the sensitivity and responses to the decisions may vary. I therefore look at sub-groups of all the
decisions when the state is: (1) the appellant; and (2) the respondent. The state is the appellant in
19 percent of all the cases during the period of study. Of the 26 states, 20 (77 percent) had at
least one case in which it is the appellant before the JCPC. When the lower court decision is
unfavorable to the governing coalition, the onus is then on the governing coalition to utilize their
resources to petition the JCPC and make the case for the appeal. I assert that cases in which the
state is the appellant before the JCPC may be particularly important. Having lost at the lower
court, the state considers it important to petition the highest legal forum for relief from the
decisions of the lower court. Further, losing in the domestic lower court is more publicly visible
as that court is physically within the state. Unfavorable decisions may be interpreted as signaling
the illegitimacy of the policy. The immediacy of this may make the governing coalition more
apprehensive about responding if the reliable final appellate court is uncertain. Focusing on the
JCPC’s decisions in these cases may be a state barometer of court reliability. The governing
coalition may be especially sensitive to the decisions of the court in these cases and may rely on
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the JCPC to have a legitimizing effect (Dahl 1957), having failed in the lower court. This leads
to Hypothesis 2.1(H2.1):
H2.1: The likelihood of abolishing appeals to the extraterritorial court will increase as
the state’s level of success in cases where the state is the appellant decreases.
Second, changes in the political environment after independence could contribute to the
second critical juncture being reached by the state. Many British colonies emerged as states with
the Westminster model of government and institutions that were, in many ways, carbon copies of
British constitutional practice (Juegensmeyer 1964). Changes in the political environment can
evolve in different ways, with not all changes resulting in significant shifts in the status quo or in
the relationship between the state and its citizens being reflected in the governing institutions
including the courts. These changes can disrupt the institutional equilibrium established at
independence. The goal is to better understand what changes will galvanize the governing
coalition to move against the JCPC. Some state leaders then change the constitution postindependence to meet the perceived needs of governing; some retain more democratic practices
while other become more authoritative. A more authoritarian regime that relies less on
democratic legitimacy may feel a greater need for the courts to validate their policy preferences.
The literature indicates that courts in authoritarian regimes are not usually independent of the
executive branch and may instead be characterized as purely an extension of administrative
power for the purpose of implementing ideological or political initiatives (Linz 1975; Tate and
Haynie 1993). Retaining the JCPC would not conform to this characterization because the state
would not have control over the court and increase the likelihood of severing ties.
Political changes could also be led by changes in the governing coalition that ushered in
new visions for the state. These changes may be made via elections, as was evident in New
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Zealand in 1999 (Wilson 2000; 2010), or military coups, as occurred in Fiji in 1987 (Tran 2006)
and The Gambia in 1994 (Jammeh 2011; Senghore 2010). As a result, the governing coalition
may seek control over the final appellate court to minimize the likelihood of successful
challenges to their policies and to keep the decision-making process completely within the
control of the state. Some states, however, have not experienced changes in the political
environment or the changes are not sufficient to influence the governing coalition’s perception of
the JCPC enough to take steps to abolish the court. This research will increase our understanding
of how changes in the political environment influence the governing coalition’s decision about
continued reliance on the JCPC as the final appellate court. This leads to Hypothesis 3 (H3):
H3: States that experience political changes are more likely to abolish appeals to the
extraterritorial court.
More authoritarian (less democratic) regimes also may have heightened sensitivity to the
fact that the JCPC is supported and staffed in a liberal democracy and former colonial power.
The perceived reliability of the JCPC in the political environment of the U.K. may be altered by
the political environment of the state and the sensitivity to the courts decisions. The response to
the JCPC may be a function of the heightened sensitivity cause by changes in the political
environment interacting with the decisions of the court. In other words, unfavorable decisions
regardless of the how many may elicit more of a reaction from the governing coalition in less
democratic regimes. The decision to sever ties with the court is more likely when unfavorable
decisions are handed down by the final appellate court in less democratic political environments.
This leads me to Hypotheses 3.1(H3.1):
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H3.1: A less democratic political environment heightens the governing coalition’s
sensitivity to unfavorable decisions resulting in an increased likelihood that appeals to the
extraterritorial court will be abolished if the court hands down unfavorable decisions.
3.3

Competing Explanations?
A review of the literature identifies three possible factors that help to explain why states

might abolish or retain appeals to the JCPC: (a) socio-cultural forces; (b) litigant access; and (c)
geography. The research focuses on the states that retain the JCPC at independence then
subsequently decide to abolish the right of appeal at different times. Further, the studies are
uniformly qualitative and examine a very limited number of states without defining the causal
mechanisms that influence the selection of the final appellate court.
(a) Socio-cultural forces
Another explanation proposed by scholars is the incompatibility of an extraterritorial
court with national ethnic customs and traditions (De 2012; Joseph 1985). Cultural and
traditional differences are important in several jurisdictions where lower court cases follow
customary law (Lange 2009) or native law and custom (Iweriebor 1997). These cases magnify
the differences between the JCPC’s administration of British common law and the administration
of customary and traditional law (e.g., marriage and property rights) by the lower courts in the
colonies the experienced indirect colonial rule.
(b) Litigant access
A primary constraint on litigants accessing the JCPC may be the cost of pursuing an
appeal. Taylor (2005) points out that it is not difficult to start an action if one can afford an
attorney. Accessing the JCPC, however, is not just a matter of being able to afford an attorney. It
also usually burdens litigants with the costs of engaging attorneys in England to shepherd the
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process along. Litigants incur added travel costs and inconveniences just to appear before the
JCPC (Swinfen 1987), considering the distance between London and many far-flung former
colonies. Costs incurred are not only for local representation, travel, and accommodation in
London, but meeting U.K. visa requirements for entry into the country (O’Conner and Bilder
2012). Wilson (2000; see also Joseph 1985) concludes that some litigants’ inability to afford the
cost of appearing before the JCPC effectively denies the full right of appeal. While
acknowledging this added financial burden on litigants, scholars have not established a link
between costs of pursuing litigation before the JCPC in London and severing ties with that court.
Former British colonies that retain the JCPC after independence are all far away from London
and include some of the richest (e.g., Brunei, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and poorest (e.g.,
Sri Lanka, Belize, Gambia, Fiji, and India) countries in the world (International Monetary Fund
2008). It also should be noted that the cost of pursuing an appeal before the JCPC places a
burden not only on private litigants, but also governments with limited resources. A review of
leading economic indicators (e.g., Heston, Summers & Aten – Penn World Table) demonstrates
that – with the exception of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – all former British colonies
could be generally classified as developing countries, with many classified as least-developed
countries (LDCs) in terms of gross national income, weak human assets, and economic
vulnerability (Nations Online Project 2015). It also suggests that even if access was costly and
only a few cases went to the JCPC, states expected to benefit from the good reputation of the
court. In The Bahamas, which still retains appeals, a former President of the Bar Association of
The Bahamas argues in favor of the JCPC as providing assurance of a high quality and impartial
legal forum for commercial disputes (cited by Rolle 2012). When New Zealand was deliberating
the constitutional amendment that eventually abolished the JCPC, a similar argument was made
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by the chairman of the accounting firm Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu on behalf of retaining the
JCPC (cited by Story 2001).
(c) Geography
Not unconnected to costs and credibility, the large geographic distances between the
colonies and the U.K. are noted. Hogg (2006) concludes that the JCPC’s shifting personnel and
distance make it inappropriate as a court of final appeal. In 1943, the question arose as to
whether the JCPC half a world away could adjudicate a situation in India better than a national
judicial body actually based in India (De 2012). De concludes that the Indian Federal Court
established itself partly by claiming a degree of authenticity based on location in India, in
contrast to the placement of the JCPC in the U.K.
3.4

Summary
A final appellate court is not just at the apex of the judiciary but an important part of the

governing institutions of a state. The governing coalition of the state is most likely to choose the
court of appeal it considers the most reliable ally in the face of legal challenges to its policies.
Instead of staffing and funding their own final court at independence, some states choose to
retain the right of appeal to the JCPC. This choice contrasts with the fact that the states who
emerge from colonial rule take responsibility and control of all other governing institutions. The
anomaly of an extraterritorial final court of appeal with no domestic institutional controls
presents a unique opportunity to gain a better understanding of the effect of the court’s decisions
and the political environment on the state’s relationship with the court. First, this research seeks
to gain insight into the factors that influence the choice of court prior to independence. Second, I
examine the factors that influence the state’s decision to sever ties with the JCPC at some
juncture after independence.
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In Chapter 4, I examine factors that may influence the persistence of the relationship
between states and an extraterritorial court. Using the case of the British Commonwealth and
JCPC as an option for the final court of appeal at independence, I explore a critical juncture
using quantitative analyses of the factors that influence the choices of the governing coalition of
the state at independence. It is at this critical juncture that the new national leadership has the
first opportunity to participate in development of the new constitution, which includes the choice
of final appellate court. This juncture is critical because it produces a new political and
institutional equilibrium in the form of an independent state, which changes its relationship with
the U.K. and other states. At independence the constitution comes into effect, under which the
new governing coalition pursues polices for POGG of the sovereign state.

4
4.1

THE FINAL APPELLATE COURTS AT INDEPENDENCE

Introduction
At midnight on August 31, 1957, the flag of The Federation of Malaysia replaced the

British flag, marking the end of 61 years of British colonial rule. U.K.-educated Tunku Abdul
Rahman led the new governing coalition as Prime Minister-elect (BBC News 2015). He declared
that “Independence is indeed a milestone, but it is only the threshold to high endeavour – the
creation of a new and sovereign State” (The Malaysian Insider 2013, para. 7). However, even
though the new governing coalition asserted its independence and sovereignty, Malaysia chose to
retain a significant vestige of British colonial rule in the form of the JCPC. Over the next few
decades, similar scenes played out in all corners of the British Empire. For many states, the final
court of appeal for the new state continued to be a colonial institution completely under the
administration of the former colonial power. Despite there being no question about the
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adjudicative quality and reputation of the JCPC, retaining such a powerful vestige of colonial
rule seems counterintuitive. Why would sovereign states choose this extraterritorial final
appellate court?
This chapter examines the factors that may influence some newly independent states to
retain ties with the JCPC. I argue that a state’s governing coalition will choose the final appellant
court it expects to be the most reliable partner in policy-making and the prestige and reputation
associated with the court. I further posit that the new governing coalition’s perception of the
court is influenced by the colonial experience, which influences the path of institutional change.
The process of decolonization or dismantling of the British Empire spans many decades. It was a
deliberate process involving the transition of authority from the colonial rulers to the local
governing coalition. This process, however, did not negate the effects or historical constraints of
colonial rule that shapes the governing coalition leading the colony to independence. The
discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 provide insights into colonial development and the preindependence environment which leads to independence. This exemplifies a grouping of
interrelated influences the shape the perceptions of the governing coalition and ultimately the
decision on the choice of the final appellate court. I therefore hypothesize that the strength of
colonial rule encapsulates these interrelated influences which informs decision-making during
the period of decolonization about whether the JCPC remains the final appellate court at the first
critical juncture: independence.
For the purposes of this research, the end of colonial rule for the dominions is marked by
the U.K.’s Westminster Act of 1931, which gave Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and
South Africa, the option to abolish appeals to the JCPC (Swinfin 1987; see also Roberts-Wray
1962). The critical juncture for all other states is the year of independence, starting with India in
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1947 to the most recent, Brunei, in 1984. In this chapter, I empirically test the colonial influences
on the choice of final appellate court. The level of colonial influence exerted by the U.K. is
operationalized by an additive index of specific features colonial rule discussed in the next
section. My findings suggest that level colonial rule experienced by the state is a significant
influence on the choice to retain the JCPC at independence with a higher index score pointing to
a greater likelihood that the state will retain the JCPC at independence.
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, I explain the selection of former
colonies for the sample. Second, I present the operationalization of the dependent, explanatory,
and control variables. Third, I present descriptive analyses with support of bivariate and
multivariable probit regressions used to test the theory on the sample of 50 states. Finally, I
present the results of the tests, analyses, and summary conclusions.
4.2

Unit of Analysis and Sample of States
The unit of analysis is the former colony or the state. Fifty former British colonies make

up the “risk set,” or sample, from the entire group of colonies and territories in the British
Empire (see Appendix C). I analyze 50 former colonies from the year of the official start of
colonial rule to the year of independence. In effect, the analysis starts the beginning of British
colonial administration with St. Kitts in 1623 and ends in 2014, which would be the last year in
this analysis that a colony could gain independence. This spans a total of 391 years. For each,
observations are made in the year the colony became an independent state. Importantly, there is
the accessibility of fairly high quality data from primary and secondary sources (Gerring et al
2011).
The diversity of the British Empire poses a potential problem for unit homogeneity. This
cross-regional comparison of analytically distinct units may cause inaccuracies in the results

72

(Lange 2009). To increase unit homogeneity, I am partially guided by Lange (2009), who
excludes the following categories of colonies: (a) hybrids that merged into other non-British
territories; (b) internal colonies or those adjacent territories (for example Northern Ireland)
conquered by the English; (c) British Mandates in the Middle East; and (d) other Middle East
territories governed by the British for only a very short period of time. Unlike Lange who
examined economic outcomes and considered the economic development of Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand as distinct from other British colonies, I choose to include, who each had the
option to abolish the JCPC under the Westminster Act of 1931. This is appropriate for this
research because those states faced the same critical juncture in 1931 as other states in the
sample faced at independence. All had the option to abolish ties with the JCPC and establish a
domestic final appellate court. The assumption is that for the purposes of this analysis the
colonial influences and historical factors at work are similar enough to include them in the risk
set. States included, therefore, are only those overseas colonies recognized as part of the British
Empire by an act of the British parliament. Table 4.1 presents the independent states included in
the sample.
Table 4.1 The 50 States in the Sample Risk Set

Antigua & Barbuda
Australia
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Botswana
Brunei
Canada
Cyprus
Dominica

Sample Risk Set of 50 States
Fiji
Malawi
Ireland, Rep. of
Gambia
Malaysia
Samoa
Ghana
Maldives
Seychelles
Grenada Malta
Sierra Leone
Guyana
Mauritius
Singapore
India
Myanmar
Solomon Islands
Jamaica
Nauru
South Africa
Kenya
New Zealand Sri Lanka
Kiribati
Nigeria
St. Kitts/Nevis
Lesotho
Papua New
St. Vincent & the
Guinea
Grenadines

Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Tanzania & Zanzibar
Tuvalu
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Uganda
Vanuatu
Zambia
Zimbabwe

73

4.3

Exploring the Decision to Retain the JCPC at Independence
As discussed in Chapter 3, the predominant consideration for the governing coalition is

whether the final appellate court is likely to uphold their policies when challenged in court. The
loosening of colonial rule starting in the 1030’s, results in a nationalism that results in self-rule
during the period leading up independence (Furedi 1994). The governing coalitions emerge from
elections contested by political parties that formed out of the nationalist movements during this
period. This is observed in all states and clearly exemplified in Belize where The Peoples United
Party (PUP) defeated the National Independence Party (NIP) in four elections leading up to
independence in 1981. The leader of the PUP, Honorable George Cadle Price, became the first
prime minister. I theorize that the new governing coalition at independence desires a final
appellate court that will support their policies and contribute legitimacy with the reputation and
prestige of the court as they take responsibility for the POGG of the new state. I argue that
perception of the JCPC as a reliable partner and legitimizing factor is influenced by the colonial
rule experienced by the state. The decision at the critical juncture of independence is whether to
retain appeals to the JCPC or establish a domestic final appellate court. I posit that this decision
is influenced by the colonial experience of the state, which influences how strong the ties are to
the U.K., which then influences the decision.
To test my central hypotheses, therefore, I estimate a multivariable probit model1. The
Model employs the additive variable (Influence of the Colonial Power) with four control
variables. In the next sections I explicate the dependent variable and the independent variables.
The dependent binary variable for both models is whether the colony retains or abolishes
appeals to the JCPC. In reality, the right of appeal to the JCPC is either explicitly provided for in
1

The robustness is limited by the size of the N (n= 50). The results are augmented with the descriptive analyses.
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the constitution of the state at independence or there is no such provision. In other words, did the
“event” occur at independence? The binary variable is appropriate as there is no nuanced
variation to be captured. If the JCPC is retained at independence the variable is coded ‘0’ and if
abolished it is coded ‘1’. Of the 50 states in the sample risk set, 30 (60 percent) of the states
retain the JCPC at independence while 20 (40 percent) of the states abolish appeals to the JCPC.
Figure 4.1 separates the risk set into those who retain and those states that abolish the JCPC. (See
Appendix D for a complete list of states in each group)

20 (40%)

Abolished Appeals
to JCPC

States
30 (60%)

Retained Appeals
to JCPC

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Figure 4.1 States Retained (30) and Abolished Appeals (20) to the JCPC at Independence

To examine the decision of the states about whether to retain or abolish the JCPC, I
create an additive index variable to capture the effects of colonial rule. The stronger the colonial
ties of the newly-independent state to its colonial past and the influence of the U.K., the
increased likelihood that the JCPC will be retained at independence. The goal is to capture more
effectively the broad concept of colonial rule and its influence on the new governing coalition,
which may not be captured by any one single proxy. An additive index is most appropriate when
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individual factors do not measure the effect of the entire concept (Ethridge 2002). Based on the
additive model in Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward (2013)2, my additive index is scaled zero to four
with states that experience the weakest colonial influence at zero and those with the highest
scoring four (0-Low; 1-Med-low; 2-Medium; 3-Med-high; 4-High). A higher score reflects a
great level of colonial influence on the governing coalitions’ perception of the JCPC’s reliability
and advantages resulting in closer ties to the U.K. This may provide some insight into why the
state may accede to an extraterritorial court. The additive indexed variable is comprised of the
four discrete factors: (1) Length of British colonial rule, (2) Type of colonial rule, (3) Tertiary
education of leader at independence, and (4) Whether or not the state had a law school. I discuss
each in this order.
(1) The length of British colonial rule, determined by how long the state experienced
formal British colonial rule before independence. This section explores the distribution and
central tendency of this factor and shows the correlation between length of colonial rule and the
decision about the status of the JCPC as part of the colonial influence. British occupation of a
specific territory may have started much earlier. For example, the East India Company (also
known as the English East India Company) operated in parts of India starting as early as the
1620s (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015), but India only became a formal British colony in 1858
(CiteHR n.d.). Another example is Belize where British settlers started commercial logging as
early as the 1650s (Belize.com 2015; Mwakikagile 2014), but the settlement did not become a
colony until 1840 (Borland 1975; see also Mwakikagile 2014). The establishment of an official
colony, therefore, signals the inclusion of a specific territory as part of the British Empire. This
provides a definitive starting point for calculating the number of years the state experienced

2

Additive index utilized to measure “the dynamic legal forces on judicial decision” using five discrete variables to
capture different aspects of each case that indicate legal certainty (Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward, 2013, 69).

76

British colonial rule (see Appendix E). The total number of years for each colony represents the
duration of colonial influence on the local institutional development and is a proxy for how
deeply embedded the institution is in society (Grier 1999; Lange 2004). The institutions are more
intertwined in the fabric of the society. I expect, therefore, that the influence of colonial rule
grows stronger over time making more likely that retaining the JCPC would not be viewed as a
threat to the new governing coalition at independence who are more likely to view the link with
the U.K. institution as adding credibility to the new state.
Periods of official British rule for each colony varied from as few as 16 years in
Myanmar (previously governed as part of the Indian colony) to as many as 360 years in St. Kitts
and Nevis. The year of independence and the period of colonial rule from colony to
independence for each state in the sample are presented in Figure 3.2. The length of British
colonial rule ranges from 15 to 360 years, with an average length of 120.9 years (SD = 79.61).
Based on the length of colonial rule for each state, I also calculate the average length of colonial
rule for the states in each group. Figure 4.3 displays the 50 states disaggregated into four
categories with the average number of years of colonial rule. Twenty (38 percent) states with an
average of 70 years of colonial rule abolished the JCPC at independence. Seventeen (34 percent)
states averaging 106 years of colonial rule retained the JCPC at independence, but abolished
appeals at some time after. As of January 1, 2015, 13 (26 percent) states retain appeals to the
JCPC. Those states averaged 214 years of colonial rule.
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314

Antigua & Barbuda

141

Australia

256

Bahamas

339

Barbados

141

Belize

78

Brunei

168

Canada

219

Dominica

96

Fiji

77
55

Gambia
Ghana

190

Greneda

135

Guyana

89

India

292

Jamaica

68

Kenya

87

Kiribati

61

Malaysia

158

Mauritius

91

New Zealand

60

Nigeria

153

Singapore

59

South Africa

135

Sri Lanka

165

St Lucia

360

St. Kitts & Nevis

195

St. Vincent & Grenadines

148

Trinidad & Tobago

Years of Colonial
Rule - Abolished
JCPC (20 states)

57
48

Uganda
Botswana

82

Cyprus

120

Ireland

80

Lesotho

78

Maldives

150

Malta

16

Myanmar

49

Nauru

87

Papua New Guinea

43

Samoa

161

Seychelles

146

Sierra Leone

81
66

Solomon Islands
Swaziland

45

Tanzania

70

Tonga

83

Tuvalu

74

Vanuatu

40

Zambia

90

Zimbabwe

0
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200

Years Of
Colonial Rule Retained JCPC
(30 States)

300

400

Figure 4.2 Length of British Colonial Rule in Each State
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The number of years the state experienced colonial rule is coded as “1” if the state was
under colonial rule above and “0” if it was below the sample median of 89 years. When the right
of appeal to the JCPC is not abolished, average length of British colonial rule is 148.27 (SD =
88.34). When abolished, the average length of British colonial rule is 79.95 (SD = 38.55). These
findings suggest that the less time a state spends under British colonial rule, the more likely it is
to sever ties with the JCPC at independence. There is a central tendency of states below the
sample median having experienced colonial ties for a shorter period would have weaker ties with
the U.K., and are therefore less likely to retain JCPC appeals. I expect longer periods of colonial
rule to have the opposite effect. Over time the governing elite will become more attached to the
prestige and reputation of the JCPC increasing the likelihood that the state will retain the JCPC.
(2) The type of colonial rule – direct or indirect colonial rule. This section explores the
distribution and the central tendency of this factor. It shows the correlation between the type of
colonial rule and the decision about the status of the JCPC as part of the colonial influence.
Direct rule is defined as colonial institutions permeating the colony to the exclusion of customary
and traditional institutions, with locals only participating at the lower levels of the colonial
administration. Indirect rule is defined as having extensive governance of the colony entrusted to
the locals under supervision of British governors, with both indigenous and colonial institutions
functioning in parallel during the colonial period (Lange 2004; 2009).
Table 4.2 Average Numbers of Years of Colonial Rule and the Status of Right of Appeal to the
JCPC in 50 States
Abolished JCPC
Retained Ties for a Retained JCPC
Appeals at
Period before
Appeals- January 1,
Independence
Abolishing JCPC
2015
Number of States
20
17
13
Average Years of
70
106
214
Colonial Rule
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As Iweriebo (2011) points out, the system of courts using native and customary law were
established as a pillar of indirect rule. Since the focus is on legal institutions, the indirect-direct
rule variable is operationalized using the percentage of total court cases following customary law
(Lange 2009). Adopting Lange’s definition, the indirect-direct rule is not dichotomous but on a
spectrum. The percentage of total court cases adjudicated using customary or traditional law is a
proxy for the extent to which the colony experienced the imposition of colonial judicial
institutions concurrently with customary and tradition institutions. Table 4.3 displays the
percentage of cases adjudicated under traditional and customary law at the time of independence.
Table 4.3 Percentages of Cases Adjudicated Under Traditional and Customary Law

Customary Law Cases* = 0% (23 States)
Antigua & Barbuda
Australia
Bahamas
Barbados

Canada
Cyprus
Dominica
Grenada

Jamaica
Malta
Mauritius
New Zealand

Belize
Brunei

Guyana
Ireland, Rep of

Seychelles
Singapore

Customary Law Cases* 1% > 50% (7 States)
Botswana (43%)
India (49%)
South Africa (39%)
Gambia (27%)
Myanmar (49%) Swaziland (49%)
Customary Law cases* > 100% (20 States)
Fiji (55%)
Malawi (82%)
Ghana (65%)
Kenya (59%)
Kiribati (55%)

Malaysia (60%)
Maldives (55%)
Nauru (55%)

Lesotho (50%)

Nigeria (93%)

Papua New Guinea
(55%)
Samoa (55%)
Sierra Leone (81%)
Solomon Islands
(52%)
Tanzania (45%)

Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent/
Grenadines
Trinidad &Tobago

Zimbabwe (40%)

Tonga (55%)
Tuvalu (55%)**
Uganda (80%)
Vanuatu (55%)***
Zambia (60%)

*Lange, 2009
**Use customary law in village courts for indigenous peoples. Estimates based on the research by Ottley 2002; Brown
1999; Patterson 1995; Zorn 1994.
***Buddhist law: Estimate based on the research of Nyo Nyo 2005; Gutter 2001; Kyaw 1994.
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This is operationalized by the percentage of total court cases in each colony following
customary or traditional law (Lange 2009). I use a continuous variable starting at 0 for colonies
where no cases were adjudicated using customary/traditional law to 100 percent if all cases were
adjudicated using customary/traditional law of the colony. This variable ranges from 0 to 93
percent, with a median of 39 percent (SD = 30 percent). For example, in Canada, The Bahamas,
and New Zealand no cases were adjudicated using customary or traditional law, indicating that
only colonial institutions made up the governing structures. In Nigeria colonial and indigenous
institutions operated contemporaneously with 93 percent of the cases adjudicated using
customary or traditional law. In other colonies such as India and Botswana, the use of customary
or traditional law is closer to 50 percent. Figure 4.3 presents the number of states above and
below the average of 39 percent that retained the JCPC; the number of states below ten percent
that retained the JCPC; the number of states between 10 and 50 percent that retain the JCPC; and
the number of states where more than 50 percent of the cases are adjudicated using customary
and traditional law retain the JCPC.
In 25 (50 percent) of the 50 states, the percentage of total court cases following
customary or traditional law is above the average of 32 percent and thirteen (52 percent) retain
appeals to the JCPC at independence. Of the 25 states below the average of 32 percent, 18 states
(88 percent) retain appeals to the JCPC at independence. The type of colonial rule
operationalized by the percentage of cases adjudicated using customary/traditional law. I coded
“1” if the number of cases adjudicated by customary/traditional law is below and “0” if it is
above the sample median of 39 percent. There is a central tendency of states that experienced
higher levels of indirect colonial rule above the median of 39 percent to replace the JCPC at
independence. When the state decides to retain the JCPC, the average percentage of total court
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Figure 4.3 Numbers and Percentages of States Above and Below the Median of 39 Percent that
Retained/Abolished the JCPC

cases following customary law is 0.23 (SD = 0.30). When the state decides to abolish appeals to
the JCPC, the average percentage of total court cases following customary law is 0.46 (SD =
0.26). This shows that the average percentage of total court cases following customary law is
significantly higher in the states that abolish appeals to the JCPC. These findings suggest that the
higher the percentage of cases adjudicated under customary or traditional law, the more likely it
is that the state will abolish appeals to the JCPC. States above the sample average indicate
weaker ties with the U.K. as the presence of colonial institutions would be less pervasive in the
population and, therefore, less likely to retain JCPC. I expect the opposite effect if the percentage
is below the sample average.
(3) As the colony moves toward independence and as part of the decolonization process,
the U.K. grants colonies internal self-government under the leadership of the new governing
coalition. This section explores the distribution and central tendency of this factor and shows the
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correlation between where the leader received tertiary education and the decision about the status
of the JCPC as part of the colonial influence. The leader who eventually becomes prime minister
at independence is used as a proxy for an affinity of the governing coalition for British
institutions by those leaders educated in the U.K. This variable, therefore, represents whether or
not the prime minister of each former colony at independence was educated in the U.K. This
control variable is dichotomous for whether the leaders received tertiary or professional
education in the U.K. (1) or not (0). Table 4.4 presents whether the first prime minister of each
country in the sample received tertiary or professional education in the U.K. Appendix F displays
a complete list of prime ministers, tertiary/professional educational background and sources.
Table 4.4 U.K. Educated and Non-U.K. Educated Prime Ministers at Independence

U.K. Educated Prime Ministers at Independence (19 States)
Bahamas
Barbados

Malaysia
Mauritius

Gambia
Guyana

Nigeria
Seychelles

India
Jamaica

Sierra Leone
Singapore

St. Lucia
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
Tanzania/ Zanzibar
Trinidad/ Tobago

Non-U.K. Educated Prime Ministers at Independence (31 States)
Antigua & Barbuda
Grenada
Myanmar
St. Kitts & Nevis
Australia
Ireland, Rep of
Nauru
Swaziland
Belize
Kenya
New Zealand
Tuvalu
Canada
Kiribati
Papua New Guinea
Tonga
Cyprus
Lesotho
Samoa
Uganda
Dominica
Malawi
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Fiji
Maldives
South Africa
Zambia
Ghana
Malta
Sri Lanka

Figure 4.4 displays the numbers of prime ministers who received a tertiary education in the U.K.
and the number of states that retained the JCPC. Nineteen states had initial prime ministers who
were educated in the U.K. (38 percent). Of those 19 states, 15 (79 percent) retain appeals to the
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JCPC at independence. Of the remaining 31 states with prime ministers who were not educated
in the U.K., 55 percent (N=17) retain appeals to the JCPC. The difference (24 percentage points)
indicates the propensity for those leaders educated in the U.K. to be more inclined to champion
the retention of appeals to the JCPC. Further, there is a central tendency of states where the
leader was educated in the U.K. to retain the JCPC at independence. A U.K. education may
increase the willingness of a new governing coalition to accept an extraterritorial court as a final
court of appeal. Returning to lead the colony to independence, these leaders appear more likely
to influence the governing coalition to retain appeals to the JCPC.

31

Non-U.K. Educated
17 (55%)

# of
Leaders

19

U.K. Educated
15 (79%)

0
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20
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the JCPC

30

40

Figure 4.4 Numbers of Prime Ministers Not Educated, Educated in U.K. and the
Numbers of States that Retained the JCPC

(4)

Domestic law schools play an important role in the development and practice of law, resulting in
the local jurisprudence. Lawyers are also considered to be a part of the local elite and influence
attitudes towards the colonial institutions (Kelly 1994). In discussing the British colonial
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attitudes towards training lawyers, Kelly states of those with lawyers who “qualified in English
law, that usually sealed the fate of the Privy Council jurisdiction” (107). The absence of a law
school would indicate closer ties with the U.K., making it more likely that the state would retain
JCPC appeals. This has two aspects. First, if a law school exists in the state prior to
independence it is likely to increase the number of local lawyers. This would support a larger
pool from which judges could be selected for service on the bench. Second, locally trained
lawyers may feel less affinity for British institutions than those trained in the U.K. Conversely,
the absence of law schools makes the colony more reliant on the U.K. and contributes to the
strength of the colonial influence. While Kelly is only referring to lawyers educated in the U.K.,
it may provide some broader support for the result that leaders educated in the U.K. are more
likely to want to move away from colonial institutions at independence.
If the state had at least one law school at independence, it was coded as “1” and as “0” if
no law school existed. Of the 50 states in the sample, 20 had at least one law school at
independence. Law schools contribute to the pool of qualified people for appointment to the
bench. Due to distance and costs, relying of law school outside the colony restricts access and
limits the number of local people able to attend law school. The presence of a law school,
therefore, contributes to the local judiciary and may decrease a perceived need to rely on the
JCPC as adding to the credibility of the judiciary. Figure 4.5 displays a summary of the states
with regard to the presence/absence of at least one law school and whether the state retained or
abolished the JCPC. There is, however, no central tendency of states with law schools to abolish
ties with the JCPC.
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of the 50 States Based on the Presence of at Least One Law School and
whether or not the JCPC was Retained

The indexing of these proxies for colonial rule provides me with a single score for each
state in the sample. Of those states that experience medium-high (8 states) or high levels (7
states) of colonial influence, 88 percent and 86 percent, respectively, retain the JCPC. Of those
states the experience medium (11 states), medium-low (19 states) and low (5 states), 64 percent,
58 percent, and 40 percent retain the JCPC at independence. This indicates the stronger tendency
of states at and above the medium level of colonial influence to retain the JCPC. Figure 4.6
displays the results, showing the percentage of states that retain the JCPC at independence at
each level of the scale of the additive index.
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Figure 4.6 Percentages and Numbers of States that Retain/Abolish the JCPC at Independence at
Each Level of the Scale of the Additive Index

I estimate a bivariate probit model using the additive indexed variable - Colonial
Influence. The dependent variable is whether or not the state abolished the JCPC at
independence, and the independent variable is the level of colonial influence at independence.
The results of a bivariate probit regression displayed in Table 4.5 show that the strength of the
colonial influence is significantly (p-value = 0.009) associated with the choice to retain appeals
to the JCPC. In other words, this provides further support for my theory that the stronger the
colonial influence, the more likely the governing coalition will view the JCPC as a reliable
partner in policy-making. Further, the governing coalition view of the prestige and reputation of
the JCPC may be enhanced by the stronger colonial influence and increase the likelihood of
retaining right of appeal to the JCPC at independence.
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Table 4.5 Bivariate Probit Regression Results of Additive Indexed Variables on the Decision to
Retain the JCPC
Explanatory Variable
p-value
Influence of the Colonial Power
(U.K.)

.44176
(.1681)

Constant

.5215
(.3395)

Psuedo R-squared
Observations

0.1134
50

0.009

The first control variable is access to the JCPC. The litigants from disparate regions of
the world bear the cost of appearing in a court located in the U.K. These costs may impede both
private litigants and the state from accessing the JCPC. The costs may also influence the decision
to establish a national final appellate court in an effort to reduce costs and increase access.
Access is operationalized using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of each colony in
the year of independence. The estimate of the GDP per capita for each colony is in U.S. dollars
and is calculated in the year of independence (The Maddison-Project 2013). The distribution of
GDP per capita of the colonies at independence varies widely, from as low as U.S. $625.00 in
Myanmar to U.S. $37,806.00 in Brunei at the upper limit. The approach provides a basis to
compare the advantage the more prosperous states may have over those less prosperous. Those
less prosperous states may view the cost of accessing the JCPC as a barrier that in effect denies
access to the highest court. Table 4.6 displays the GDP per capita groups at the time of
independence.
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Table 4.6 GCP Per Capita Groups for States in the Year of Independence

*GDP per Capita < US$1000 (7 States)
Botswana
Guyana

Lesotho
Malawi

Myanmar
Samoa

*GDP per Capita US$1,000 > US$5,000 (32 States)
Antigua & Barbuda
Ireland, Rep. of Nigeria
Belize
Jamaica
South Africa
Dominica
Kenya
St. Lucia
Fiji
Kiribati
Sri Lanka
Gambia
Malaysia
St. Vincent/
Grenadines
Ghana
Maldives
Papua New Guinea
Grenada
Malta
Sierra Leone
India
Nauru
Singapore

Tanzania/Zanzibar

Solomon Islands
Swaziland
Tonga
Tuvalu
Uganda
Vanuatu
Zambia
Zimbabwe

*GDP per Capita $5,000 > US$10,000 (8 States)
Australia
Canada
Mauritius
Barbados
Cyprus
New Zealand

St. Kitts/ Nevis
Seychelles

*GDP per Capita $10,000 > US$20,000 (1 State)
Trinidad/ Tobago
*GDP per Capita $20,000 > US$30,000 (1 State)
Bahamas
*GDP per Capita $30,000 > US$40,000 (1 State)
Brunei
* GDP per capita is calculated in 2012 U.S. dollars for the year of independence

The average GDP per capita for each state at independence is U.S. $4,197.90 (SD =
6042.8) and the median is U.S. $2,389. This variable controls for any comparative advantage
more prosperous states may have over those less prosperous states in baring the cost of accessing
the JCPC. The cost of litigant access from jurisdiction around the world was suggested as an
impediment and motivation to abolish appeals to that court (Wilson 2000; Swinfen 1987; Joseph
1985). Figure 4.7 displays the 18 states with GDP per capita above the sample median of U.S.
$2,389) with 15 states (83 percent) that retain the JCPC at independence. Of the 32 states below
the median GDP per capita, 15 states (47 percent) retain the JCPC at independence. The
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descriptive analysis shows that states above the sample average have a stronger tendency to
retain the JCPC than those states below the sample average. This may indicate some relationship
between national wealth and retaining the JCPC. The states may associate retaining the JCPC
with some continuing economic benefit to be gain from the reputation and prestige of having the
JCPC as the final appellate court.
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Figure 4.7 Numbers of States Above and Below the Median GDP Per Capita that Retain the JCPC

I also control for whether socio-cultural differences reflected in the colonial society
influence. A state with a larger British settler population may be more likely to identify with and
share socio-cultural ties with the members of the JCPC and the government of the colonial
power. By virtue of the preferences afforded to British setters in leadership positions in the
colonial administration, it is assumed that they participate in and exert influence on the decisionmaking process with regard to drafting of the constitution leading up to independence. This
influence would be commensurate with their numbers in the colony and is operationalized as the
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percentage of the colonial population represented by British settlers at the time of independence
(Barrett 1982). This is the proxy for the strength socio-cultural links between the elite and the
perpetuation of colonial institutions.
As seen in Table 4.7, the British settler population comprises an average of six percent
(SD = 21.5) of the colonies at independence. The median is 0.06. Only five states (10 percent)
have settler populations above the average of the median, and all retain the JCPC at
independence. Twenty-three (51 percent) of the remaining 45 states with a settler population
below the average also retain the JCPC at independence.
Table 4.7 Percentages Colonial Population Groups Represented by Settlers from the U.K.

Settler Pop: <1 percent (44 States)
Papua New Guinea
Sierra Leone
Tuvalu
Uganda

Belize
Dominica
Gambia
India

Malaysia
Maldives
Malta
Myanmar

Vanuatu
Ghana
Lesotho
Malawi
Trinidad &
Tobago
Kenya
Zambia

Grenada
Jamaica
Solomon Islands
Cyprus
Seychelles

Nigeria
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Tonga
Botswana

Ireland, Rep of
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
Guyana
Brunei
Swaziland
Zimbabwe
Mauritius

Fiji
Kiribati

Samoa
Tanzania/ Zanzibar

Nauru
Antigua & Barbuda

Settler Pop: >5 percent (1 State)
Barbados
Settler Pop: >10 percent (1 State)
South Africa
Settler Pop: >15 percent (1 State)
Bahamas, The
Settler Pop: >80 percent (3 States)
Australia
Canada

New Zealand

91

The vast majority of states with settler populations below the average either abolish the
JCPC at independence or soon thereafter. There are exceptions, such as Malaysia, which retained
the JCPC for 27 years. Also, of the 13 Caribbean states that were former British colonies and
have neither significant indigenous or settler populations, 11 (85 percent) retain appeals to the
JCPC as of January 1, 2015. This may indicate that there is some influence in states with much
higher settler populations, but that other factors are more significant among those states below
the average settler population of six percent. Figure 4.8 displays the number of states above and
below the average settler population percentage that retained the JCPC at independence.

5

Above the median
Settler Population

5 (100%)

Total # of
States

45

Below theMedian
Settler Population

# of States
that
Retained
JCPC

23 (51%)

0

20

40

60

Figure 4.8 Numbers of States Above and Below the Median Settler Population that Retained the
JCPC

I additionally control for whether the colony experienced armed conflict between colonial
authorities and pro-independence movements or political parties prior to being granted
independence by the U.K. Associating the JCPC with the colonial rule they resisted, new
governing coalitions may be leery of having their policies challenged before a final appellate
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court in the capital city of the former colonial power. Pre-independence conflict over policy
preferences on the issues of governance and independence, therefore, may lead the postindependence governing coalition to reject the JCPC as a colonial institution and as being not in
keeping with state sovereignty. Banks (2013) estimates the level of conflict using weighted
conflict measures: assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots,
revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations. Appendix L displays the detailed definitions of
domestic conflict (DataBanks 2015b). For the purposes of this research, the Banks scores are
represented in a binary form (1/0). Any positive Banks scores for conflict are categorized as “1”
(Yes), and the absence of pre-independence conflict are categorized as “0” (No). Nine colonies
experienced conflict during the five years prior to independence. Table 4.8 presents whether the
colony experienced conflict with the colonial authorities leading up to independence.
Table 4.8 Pre-independence Conflicts (Banks 2012)

States that did not Experience Pre-independence Conflict (41 States)
Antigua & Barbuda

Ghana

Myanmar

Australia
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Brunei
Canada

Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
Kiribati
Lesotho
Malawi

Nauru
New Zealand
Samoa
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Africa

Dominica
Fiji
Gambia

Maldives
Malta
Mauritius

Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia

States that Experienced Pre- independence Conflict (9 States)
Botswana
Kenya
Myanmar
Cyprus
Ireland, Rep of
Nigeria
India
Malaysia
Zambia

Tanzania &
Zanzibar
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Uganda
Papua New Guinea
Sierra Leone
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
Swaziland
Tuvalu
Vanuatu

Zimbabwe
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Conflict with colonial authorities and institutions prior to independence may contribute to
the emerging governing coalition’s disenchantment with such institutions, including the JCPC.
This may contribute to the apparent propensity of those colonies that experience preindependence conflict to abolish appeals to that court at independence. Nationalist conflicts
occurred in the time leading up to Nigerian independence in 1960 and Kenyan independence in
1963 (Global Literacy Project n.d.), as well as Indian independence in 1948 (Chandra,
Mukherjee, Mukherjee, Panikkar and Mahajan 2011) and Guyanese independence in 1966
(Intervention and Exploitation n.d.). Figure 4.9 displays the number of states that experienced
pre-independence conflict and the number that retained the JCPC in each group. The percentage
of colonies experiencing armed conflict (Banks 2013) between colonial authorities and proindependence movements or political parties prior to being granted independence is 18 percent
(N = 9). Four of the nine states (46 percent) that experienced pre-independence conflict retained
the JCPC at independence. Of the 41 states that did not experience conflict, 25 states (61 percent)
retained the JCPC at independence. When the state decides to retain the JCPC, the number of
pre-independence conflicts is 4 (13.33%). When the state decides to abolish appeals to the JCPC,
the number of pre-independence conflicts is 5 (25%). This shows that the number of preindependence conflicts is not significantly higher in the states that abolish appeals to the JCPC.
This is in line with the descriptive analysis of the correlation with the decision to abolish the
JCPC showing weak central tendency in either the group of states that experienced conflicts to
retain the JCPC or vice versa. These preliminary results suggest that pre-independence conflict
does not indicate a very strong tendency to either retain or replace the JCPC. It suggests that preindependence conflict does not influence the perception of the any benefit accrued of acceding to
the JPC considering the prestige and reputation that it may afford the new state.
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Figure 4.9 Numbers of States that Experienced Pre-Independence Conflict and States that Retained
the JCPC

Finally, I control for time frame or period during which the state gained independence.
The states gained independence during different periods in history since 1931. For example, the
influences on state that gained independence between 1931 (Westminster Act) and 1970, (coded
as “1”). This could be considered the primary period during which all European colonial powers
were engaged in the decolonization process for the vast majority of the colonies in the empires.
During this period, the attraction of an association with the European power may have been
different as the decline in the power of the European states on the world stage (Kwon 2010) may
make affiliation less attractive and beneficial. With the U.K. no longer a military and economic
world power, association through membership in the British Commonwealth was probably
sufficient to buttress their international credibility. The states gaining independence from 1971 to
1984 (coded as “2”) would have been received with much less international fanfare, as the states
tended to be smaller. Though, the second period coincided with the process of general European
decolonization that followed World War II (Fieldhouse 2011) with a plethora of new states
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emerge onto the world stage (Springhall 2001) the attraction of the JCPC continued through the
third period which ended with Brunei gaining independence in 1984. Further, becoming a
sovereign state was much more the norm, and the process routine, with the exception being
Zimbabwe in 1980. In 1984, Brunei was the last colony to gain independence and retain the
JCPC. Figure 4.10 displays an analysis of the 50 states in the following three periods and
identifies a number of states that retained the JCPC at independence: 1947 to 1970, during which
19 of the 234 new states (55 percent) retained the JCPC; and 1971 to 1984, during which 11 of
the 16 new states (68 percent) retained the JCPC. During the first period (1931-1946) the
tendency among the five states is to retain the JCPC. However, the subsequent periods do not
reflect that tendency. In the 45 remaining states, just over half retain the JCPC. These analyses
reveal marked tendencies within the period during which the state gains independence and
speaks to the influence of the perceived benefit of a perpetuating a significant link with the U.K.
through acceding to the JCPC at independence.
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Figure 4.10 The 50 States in the Three Periods with the Number of States that Retained the JCPC
at Independence

Acknowledging the limitations imposed by the relatively small number of states in the
sample (n=50), I estimate a multivariable probit model with the additive variable (the length of
colonial rule + type of colonial rule + the presence of a law school + whether the first prime
minister was educated in the U.K.) as a proxy for the influence of colonial rule and the five
control variables. Table 4.9 presents the results of the multivariable probit model followed by a
discussion and analysis of the model. The model was checked for multicollinearity of the
predicted variables by observing the variance inflation factor (VIF), Tolerance (1- R²),
Eigenvalues, and Condition Index (CI) for each predictor in the model. If VIF values are large
(greater than 10), Tolerance values are small (less than 0.1), Eigenvalues are small (close to
zero), or CI is large (greater than 30), then these would be signs of multicollinearity between the
covariates. None of the predictors in the models show signs of multicollinearity, as none of the
VIFs values exceeded a value of four. The model tests my theory that the stronger the colonial
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influence, the more likely the state chooses to retain the JCPC as the final appellate court. The
results show that the strength of the colonial influence is significantly associated with whether or
not the colony abolishes appeals to the JCPC at independence (p = 0.026).
This provides support for my assertion of the factor of length of colonial rule in the
overall colonial influence. The longer colonial period contributes to further entrenchment of the
institutions in the colonial society. The new governing coalition will be more familiar with the
role of the JCPC, increasing the likelihood that it will be considered a reliable and suitable
partner after independence. This colonial influence, which includes longer periods of reliance of
the JCPC, serves to increase the willingness to accept this colonial institution as a reliable partner
in the governing institutions of the sovereign state.
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Table 4.9 Multivariable Probit Results of Colonial Influence on the Status of the JCPC

Explanatory Variable
Colonial influence

-0.5631
(0. 2525)

p-value
0.026

Settler population at independence

-0.5242
(0.3574)

0.143

GDP per capita at independence

-0.4264
(0. 7294)

0.559

Pre-independence conflict

-0.2261
(0.5371)

0.674

Time frame of independence 1 (1931-1946)

2.2882
(2.3798)

0.336

Time frame of independence 2 (1947-1970)

.7047
(.4749)

0.138

Time frame of independence 3 (1971-1984)

0
(omitted)

Constant

.3830
(0.5096)

Psuedo-R-squared
Observations

0.267
50

0.452

One element that may be missing from my models is a proxy for the exercise of political
influence of colonial and local elites in the process by which the new constitution is written in
each colony leading up to independence. This process involves the negotiations between the
U.K. government and the local elite, who then lead the governing coalition into independence.
Various types of commissions and committees develop as a part of that transition period from
colony to independent state. In many cases, a constitutional commission serves principally in a
supporting role to the legislative assembly. The primary function is to provide expert advice on
constitutional problems and issues, in addition to actually proposing and drafting entire
constitutions (Straum 1977). Commissions and the resulting constitutions are products of
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constraints and criteria imposed by the creators and the ultimate need for ratification by another
body (Elster 1995), such as the local legislative assembly or the British parliament. Nevertheless,
the process varies across the Empire. For example, before independence, the Nigeria’s elected
Nigerian legislature was created through the granting of internal self-government by the
Lyttleton Constitution of 1954. Though Nigerian nationalists were part of the process of drafting
the constitution starting in 1954 and culminating with the 1958 Constitutional Conference, the
legislature never ratified the Independence Constitution, nor was it referred to the Nigerian
people via referendum. Instead, it was still imposed by an act of the British Parliament, and
under this constitution the JCPC continued to be Nigeria’s highest court (Ismail 2010). The
extant literature reveals more complex constitutional deliberation over many years leading up to
India’s independence: The Nehru Report of 1928, the Simon Commission of 1930, the Joint
Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform of 1934, the Supru Report of 1945, the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Supreme Court of 1947, and culminating with the Independence Constitution
of 1947 (Granville 1966). In Papua New Guinea, the domestic legislature in conjunction with the
colonial authorities set the stage for transition to independence. The dominant United Party of
Papua New Guinea seated seven party leaders along with four members from its ally, Pangu Pati,
on the 16-seat Constitutional Planning Committee, which produced constitutional
recommendations in the 1974 report. While the report does not provide reasons for abolishing
appeals to the Privy Council, it clearly recommends that the Supreme Court be the highest court
post-independence (Papua New Guinea Constitutional Planning Committee Report 1974).
Lastly, the British government established The West Indian Royal Commission to examine
conditions in the colonies in the Commonwealth Caribbean. This commission produced The
Moyne Report in 1945. It is arguably the single most significant document in Commonwealth
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Caribbean history (Benn 2011) and set the stage for the individual colonies to prepare for
independence. Each colony then had a domestic commission that crafted the constitution, with
all 13 colonies retaining the JCPC as the final appellate court at independence. Based on this
summary review, I conclude that this would be outside the scope of this research, but may be
part of future research evaluating the process of developing written constitutions.
4.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I sought to contribute to our understanding of the persistence of
institutions or why states may accede to extraterritorial courts. Using the case of the British
Commonwealth, I examine why the governing coalition of a state may be influenced to continue
being linked to an extraterritorial court such as the JCPC as its final appellate court. The
retention of this colonial institution would seem like an affront the sovereignty of the new states.
The JCPC, which for all intents and purposes is a British institution, put the final adjudication of
legal challenges beyond the administrative control of the governing coalition. Knowing the
importance of this court, I argue that states chose the final appellant court they expected to be a
reliable partner in the new governing coalition, and that each state’s colonial experience
influenced the decision of the new governing coalition at independence. This expectation was
influenced and constrained by the influence of colonial rule. The analysis in this chapter provides
support for the theory developed in Chapter 3. The results indicate that no single proxy can
adequately capture the influences of history and colonial experience on the governing coalition.
To test my theory, I use a multifaceted approach. First, using the additive index variable
(Colonial Influence), I found that the colonial experience of the states influenced their decisions
about the JCPC at independence. Cognizant of the small-n limitation on the robustness, I tested
the hypotheses using multivariable probit models to provide support. In Model 1, I found that the
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additive index variable operationalizing the influence of British colonial rule is significantly
associated with whether the colony retained appeals to the JCPC. Specifically, when controlling
for other factors, as strength of the colonial tie increases, the less likely the colony was to abolish
appeals to the JCPC at independence. This finding suggests that strength of colonial rule
impacted the expectation of the emerging governing coalition that the JCPC will be a reliable
partner by upholding and legitimizing its policies. By creating an additive index to capture the
effects of colonial rule on the decision at independence, I demonstrate the influence of colonial
rule at the first critical juncture at independence. The results of the bivariate (indicating a central
tendency) and the multivariate probit model with the additive index reveal the significance of
colonial rule on the decision of the governing coalition at independence. I suggest that this result
indicates that the place of the U.K. in the global community and its continued support for the
JCPC are of some importance as part of the colonial influence. As the power of the U.K. waned
after World War II (Porter 2012), it is suggested that so too did the need to be associated with the
former colonial power and the prestige and reputation of the JCPC. The influence of the political
environment after independence is examined in Chapter 5.
Second, using Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests, I explored the individual associations of the
length of colonial rule and type of colonial rule, with whether the colony retained or abolished
appeals to the JCPC. Results show that when not controlling for other factors, the length of
colonial rule and whether a colony experienced direct or indirect rule, are individually
significantly associated with whether the colony retained or abolished appeals to the JCPC.
These results find support in the descriptive analysis that point to the central tendency of states
that experienced colonial rule for longer than the average of 121 years for all states to retain the
JCPC. Nineteen (38 percent) states experienced longer periods of colonial rule than the sample
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average, and of those 19 states only three (16 percent) abolished appeals to the JCPC at
independence. The analysis also indicates that states that experienced direct colonial rule had a
tendency to retain the JCPC. In 52 percent (26) of the 50 states, the percentage of total court
cases following customary or traditional law was above the average of 30 percent. Of those 26
states, 58 percent (15) of the states replaced the JCPC with a domestic final appellate court at
independence.
This result provides support for my theory that characteristics and history of U.K.
colonial rule significantly influences the governing coalition’s view of the reliability of JCPC as
a reliable partner in policy-making for furthering “peace, order and good government” (POGG)
as a feature of constitutional rule (Yusuf 2014, 1). The JCPC, as an integral and important part of
the British colonial governance, proved to perpetuate its association with the states despite the
apparent affront to sovereignty. This exemplifies that the governing coalition is more likely to
view an extraterritorial court more favorably when there is perception that the court will enhance
its credibility. In other words, such an extraterritorial court would be more acceptable in the eyes
of the governing coalition and would increase the likelihood that it would not be considered
merely an affront to sovereignty but contribute to its legitimacy.
In the next chapter, I shift my focus to only those states that retain appeals to the JCPC at
independence. I theorize that, in the post-independence period, states continue to expect that the
final appellate court will uphold and legitimize the policies of the governing coalition. Using
split population survival models, I analyze 26 states from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. My
analyses start at the year of independence until the year ties are severed with the JCPC or
January 1, 2015, whichever comes first for each state. Within the risk set of 26 states, 58 percent
(N=15) abolished appeals and 42 percent (N=11) states retained appeals to the JCPC as of
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January 1, 2015. My purpose is to better understand what factors after independence influenced
the governing coalition to abolish appeals to the JCPC and establish a domestic final appellate
court. This will provide greater insight into how states may respond to and interact with other
extraterritorial courts as they emerge and develop.

5
5.1

THE JCPC AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Introduction
While independence from colonial rule signaled the emergence of a sovereign state, some

states in every region of the British Empire retained a connection to the U.K. via the JCPC as the
final appellate court. This phenomenon is observed in large Asian states such as India and
Malaysia, as well as small states such as Dominica and Antigua in the Caribbean, and Kiribati
and Tuvalu in the Pacific region. The phenomenon also extends to Africa where states such as
The Gambia (West Africa), Kenya (East Africa), and South Africa retained the JCPC for 33,
three, and 19 years, respectively. If some states retain the JCPC at independence, why may they
later decide to abolish appeals to the JCPC and establish a domestic final appellate court?
In effect, the states that retain appeals to the JCPC at independence perpetuate an
important institutional vestige of British colonial rule. As the final appellate court, the JCPC
retains the ultimate judicial power for disposing legal disputes originating in the respective state
or British territory, but with the state having no input or responsibility for appointing the judges,
declaring their terms of service, or funding that court (Howell 1979; Swinfen 1987). Despite its
limited jurisdiction within the U.K., the JCPC is widely viewed as a “United Kingdom
Institution” (Mohr 2011, 134). Defining sovereignty as having particular capacities or powers
that can be utilized without the consent or approval of another (Brown 2002), retaining the JCPC
is an apparent contradiction to modern understanding of state sovereignty and autonomy. As
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discussed in Chapter 4, 30 (60 percent) of the 50 states in the sample retained the JCPC at
independence. Of those 30 states, 17 states (57 percent) eventually abolished the right of appeal
at some point before January 1, 2015. Why did these 17 states eventually decide to abolish
appeals to the JCPC?
I theorize that after independence the state’s governing coalition expects the final
appellate court to be a reliable and significant partner in the process of policy-making. This
expectation is influenced by the level of colonial influence of the U.K. on the individual state as
examined in Chapter 4. Developments after independence, however, may influence how the
governing coalitions view the continued role of the JCPC. Though not inevitable, the equilibrium
established at independence may be interrupted. Changes after independence can change how the
governing coalition of the state perceives the reliability of the court and ultimately the
willingness to continue the relationship. I assert that the political environment could change the
governing coalition’s perception of the court and its sensitivity to unfavorable JCPC decisions
when policies are challenged. In other words, the governing coalition may become less tolerant
of decisions that do not uphold and legitimize its policies. If the governing coalition views the
JCPC as less of an ally and more of an obstacle, pressure may surface for the state to sever ties
with the JCPC. This is exemplified in the political debate leading up to the 1948 general
elections in South Africa. While the tie to JCPC is not singled out in the literature, the entire
relationship with the U.K. is intensely debated. Hyam and Henshaw (2003) note that there is a
shift in South African attitudes towards the U.K. based on political developments in the U.K. and
the Empire in relation to race and race equality: “By the late 1940s many [white] South Africans
recognized that British public attitudes, as well as the attitude of the British government under
Labour, had become more critical of South African racial policy” (285). The Nationalist Party,
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with a decidedly anti-British stance and an apartheid platform, won the 1948 general elections
(Hyam and Henshaw 2003). Appeals to the JCPC from South Africa were abolished in 1950, and
the governing coalition quickly passed more laws entrenching racial segregation
(Commonwealth Network 2015). Arguably, the new governing coalition in 1948 did not want to
take the risk of successful challenges to the apartheid policies before a court in the U.K. over
which it had no leverage and with which the new governing coalition perceived a disconnection.
I postulate that there are two main factors that may shift the governing coalition’s view of
the JCPC to one of an obstacle rather than a partner. First, a major function of a state’s highest
appellate court is to settle not only disputes stemming from state policy, but also challenges to
the legitimacy of the policies themselves. If the state believes that the final appellate court is
unreliable, support for that court may erode. In the context of the JCPC, a decrease in support
may lead to the eventual severance of ties and the establishment of a domestic final appellate
court over which it has administrative control. I hypothesize, therefore, that states that receive
more unfavorable decisions are more likely to cut ties with the JCPC. The decisions are observed
for each state in the sample for each year from independence until the state abolishes the JCPC
or January 1, 2015, whichever came first.
Second, while directly after independence most states inherited democratic structures in
line with the Westminster Model, the level of democratization in a state may change over time.
Less democratic states, and thus more politically repressive states, will also be more suspicious
of a final appellate court beyond their control. As a result, if the state becomes less democratic,
the likelihood of abolishing appeals to the JCPC will increase. For example, in both Fiji and The
Gambia, the military overthrew their elected governments in 1986 and 1994, respectively,
resulting in an erosion of democracy and in increasingly authoritarian regimes. Further, within
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approximately two years of this regime change both states abolished appeals to the JCPC. I argue
that this structural change to the countries’ judicial systems are in part a function of both
countries wanting to ensure that the nation’s highest court is more closely tied to the governing
coalition.
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, I explain the selection of the 26
states in the sample. Second, I identify and explain the operationalization of the dependent, main
explanatory, and the control variables. Third, I present a descriptive analysis and split population
survival (SPS) regression models grounded in my theory to test my hypotheses. Finally, I present
the results of the analyses and offer summary conclusions.
5.2

Unit of Analysis and Sample of States
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, delinking from the colonial power at independence

represents the first critical juncture for the emerging sovereign state. The fact that 30 of the 50
states (60 percent) retain the JCPC illustrates the fact that the persistence of this colonial
institution in a significant portion of the states is not insignificant. My inquiry in this chapter,
therefore, focuses on quantitative analysis of the factors I postulate may influence the governing
coalition to sever ties with the JCPC at some point after independence.
I use split population survival models with time-varying covariates to conduct this
analysis, with the unit of analysis being country-year (N= 673). My analysis examines 26 of the
30 states that retain the JCPC as the final appellate court for some period of time postindependence. The four states not included in the sample are Barbados, Belize, Kiribati, and
Tuvalu. Barbados and Belize abolished appeals to the JCPC in 2005 but did not establish a
domestic final appellate court. Instead, these states acceded to the Caribbean Court of Justice
(CCJ) established in 2001 as part of the deepening regional integration of the Caribbean
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Community (Caribbean Court of Justice 2001). While the decision of a state to trade one
extraterritorial court for another is an important question in and of itself, it is outside the scope of
this project. The micro-Pacific states of Kiribati and Tuvalu were also not included because there
is a scarcity of consistent and reliable data on these two states.
Table 5.1 displays the 26 states and the number of years they each retain ties to the JCPC.
There are wide variations in the number of years the states retain the JCPC from as few as two
years, in the case of Kenya, to as many as 75 years, in the case of New Zealand. Also, this group
of states includes the 11 states that still retain the JCPC as of January 1, 2015, of which nine are
in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Dominica, Grenada,
Jamaica, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines)
and one each in Africa (Mauritius) and Asia (Brunei). As discussed in Chapter 3, these eleven
states all experienced strong colonial influences as captured by the additive index scores.
Table 5.1 The 26 States and Number of Years the State Allowed Appeals to the JCPC

Antigua &
Barbuda (28yrs)
Australia (56 yrs.)
Bahamas (35yrs)

5.3

Gambia (27 yrs.)

Malaysia (30 yrs.)

St. Kitts & Nevis (32
yrs.)
St. Lucia (37 yrs.)
St. Vincent &
Grenadines (37 yrs.)
Trinidad & Tobago
(44 yrs.)

Brunei (25 yrs.)

Ghana (4 yrs.)
Grenada (35
yrs.)
Guyana(5 yrs.)

Mauritius (47 yrs.)
New Zealand (75
yrs.)
Nigeria (4 yrs.)

Canada (19 yrs.)
Dominica (47 yrs.)
Fiji (19 yrs.)

India (3 yrs.)
Jamaica (49yrs)
Kenya (2 yrs.)

Singapore (18 yrs.)
South Africa (20 yrs.) Uganda (3 yrs.)
Sri Lanka (20 yrs.)

Severing Ties with the JCPC after Independence
The states that retain appeals to the JCPC at independence may later decide to sever ties

and establish a national final appellate court. I argue that this process is more likely if the
governing coalition perceives a divergence in policy preferences with the JCPC. The perceived
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divergence may result in a reduced likelihood that the JCPC will uphold and legitimize their
policies. The will to change the status quo in response to the changed view of the JCPC is
influenced by the political environment, which may be such that the governing national coalition
will take steps to establish a domestic final appellate court.
The dependent variable is therefore the state-year in which appeals to the JCPC are
abolished, or the “event” occurs, in a year between 1931 and 2014. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
(2004) characterize the “event” in history analysis as “a change or transition from one state or
condition of interest to another” (8). The binary dependent variable is coded “1” in the year a
state abolishes the JCPC and “0” in all other years. Based on the sample of 26 states, Table 5.2
presents the 11 states that retain appeals to the JCPC as of January 2015 and the 15 states that
abolished appeals at some point after independence.
Table 5.2 States that Retained or Abolished Appeals to the JCPC as of January 1, 2015

Retained JCPC (11 States)
Antigua & Barbuda
Mauritius
Bahamas
St. Kitts & Nevis
Brunei
St. Lucia
Dominica
St. Vincent &
Grenadines
Grenada
Trinidad & Tobago
Jamaica

5.4

Abolished JCPC (15 States)
Australia
Malaysia
Canada
New Zealand
Fiji
Nigeria
Gambia
Singapore
Ghana
Guyana
India
Kenya

South Africa
Sri Lanka
Uganda

Explanatory Variables
After independence, the governing coalition takes the reins of power and peruses policies

enlivening the vision for state governance. The political environment in which policy challenges
reach the extraterritorial court is unlike when the state was a colony. As a result, there are
different factors influencing the status quo. I posit that there are two primary influences driving
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the possible decision of the governing coalition to eventually sever ties with the JCPC: the
JCPC’s decisions and the state’s political environment. I assert that changes in those influences
can be significant enough to cause the governing coalition to change the status quo after
independence and replace the JCPC with a domestic final appellate court. The choice of the state
at this second critical juncture is underpinned by whether the governing coalition perceives the
JCPC as a reliable partner in policy-making. I operationalize six independent variables. There are
four primary explanatory variables and two control variables. The next section presents how the
variables are measured with some descriptive analyses that provide useful information on
tendencies and patterns (Laerd Statistics 2013) to aid my analyses using the six SPS models.
Appendix H presents the summary statistics for all of the variables of interest used in testing
Hypotheses 2, 2.1, and 3.
The first primary explanatory variable is the percentage of all cases before the JCPC in
each year won by the state where the state is a party (respondent or appellant). Analyzing the
state-year reveals the level of success the states had in actual cases. All cases adjudicated by the
JCPC are available online through the British and Irish Legal Information Institute (2014). From
the universe of cases adjudicated by the JCPC, I am interested in all the cases where the state is a
party. This represents a broad spectrum of cases involving legal challenges to the policies of the
governing coalition on appeal to the JCPC as the final appellate court. Appendix I displays the
decisions disaggregated by a total in each of the following categories of cases: (1) constitutional
rights; (2) torts/administrative law; (3) criminal law; and (4) “other areas” of law where the state
is a party. I review these cases for each state-year between the date of independence and removal
of the JCPC or January 1, 2015. The win-rate is calculated based on the total number of cases in
each year from zero to 100 percent. The years in which there are no cases are coded as the state
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being 100 percent successful. There are of 864 cases originating from the 26 states, and
Appendix J displays the total number of cases for each state.
To get a more nuanced picture of state success rates before the JCPC, I disaggregate the
average favorable decisions in each state-year by decisions where the state is the respondent
(second explanatory variable) and those where the state is the appellant (third explanatory
variable). This may provide more insight into whether the governing coalition is more sensitive
when it has to respond to a challenge in the final appellate court or when the state is not satisfied
with the decision of the lower court and decides to take the case to the final court of appeal. In
the latter situation, the state decides that they are significant enough to invest public resources to
appeal the decision of the lower domestic court. In these cases, the governing coalition would
like to be able to rely on the JCPC to uphold and legitimatize its policies. It is almost impossible
to say with certainty that any single unfavorable decision leads the governing coalition directly to
the decision to replace the JCPC. Mohr (2011) asserts, however, that such decisions sharpen calls
for reforming or abolishing appeals to the JCPC:
Examples of decisions of this nature include Webb v. Outrim in Australia; Nadan
v. R in Canada; Pearl Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Government of the Union in South
Africa; Wigg and Cochrane v. Attorney General in the Irish Free State; Lesa v.
Attorney General in New Zealand and Pratt and Morgan v. AG of Jamaica in the
Caribbean. (135)
Other specific examples are worth noting and provide some indication of the importance of the
JCPC’s decision. In 1971, the year before Sri Lanka abolished appeals to the JCPC, three cases
are decided, and the state prevails in only one (33 percent). In one case (The Commissioner of
Inland Revenue of Columbo v J. M. Rajaratnam) where the state is the appellate, the JCPC
decision is not in favor the state. In Canada, the JCPC hands down unfavorable decisions in the
last two cases in which the state was the appellant. Similarly, in the last five cases before
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Malaysia abolishes appeals to the JCPC, there are only two decisions favorable to the state. This
might indicate that the state views the unfavorable decisions as an indication of a disconnection
with the JCPC.
The fourth explanatory variable is regime type post-independence. The level of
democracy has been shown to influence the likelihood of political repression (Davenport 1998)
and to potentially curb the possible abusive behavior of political leadership through judicial and
legislative restraints (Keith and Ogundele 2007). The type of regime may vary over time after
independence on a democratic-autocratic regime spectrum. This independent variable in my
models tests whether or not as a regime becomes less democratic over time, the likelihood of the
governing coalition abolishing appeals to the JCPC increases. De Bruijn (2014) points out that
no single measure “can objectively capture the full range of measurements for a stable, free, and
democratic governed country” (9). To improve the operationalization of this variable, I use two
data sources: (1) Polity IV (2014) and (2) Freedom House (2013). First, the Polity IV indicator of
regime type is based on the Eckstein and Gurr (1975) design. Polity IV produces a single score
for each state in each year which ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy). The
limitation of only relying on this indicator is that states with populations below 500,000 are not
included. Of the 26 states in the risk set, eight (Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Brunei,
Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines) are not
included in the Polity IV (2013) project. Second, Freedom House (2014) country ratings assess
states on both “Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties.” Both are measured on a one-to-seven
scale, with one scored as most free and seven the least. The issue, however, is that Freedom
House scores begin in 1972, excluding the periods of interest for three states: Canada (19311949), South Africa (1931-1950), and Sri Lanka (1949-1972). Guided by previous work on
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bilateral trade by de Bruijn (2014), I create a new regime type score that utilizes scores from
Polity IV Project (2013) and Freedom House (2014) in order to solve data limitations with each
existing measure. I develop a “new score” called Democratization by mapping the Polity IV
scores with those from Freedom House for each year of available data and assigning a value. I
assess how each defines its categories, the differences between each, and how changes in the
category contribute to the change in score. Those states with a Polity IV rating from 10 to 4 and
Freedom House score from 1 to 3 are scored “1” for Free/More Democratic; a Polity IV rating
from 3 to -3 and Freedom House score from 4 to 5 are scored “0” for Partially Free/Incoherent;
and a Polity IV rating from -4 to -10 and Freedom House score from 6 to 8 are scored a “-1” for
Not Free/More Autocratic. Table 5.3 displays how the scores from Polity IV and Freedom House
are mapped to produce the new score assigned for each category of the Democratization Score.
Table 5.3 Polity IV and Freedom House Scores Mapped to the New Democratization Score
Polity IV
Freedom House
Democratization
Score (-10 to 10)
Score (1 to 7)
Score (1, 0, -1)
Not Free/More
Autocratic

-10  -4

76

-1

Partially
Free/Incoherent

-3  3

54

0

Free/More
Democratic

4  10

31

1

Figure 5.1 simply presents a summary of the number of states and whether the JCPC is
retained in each of the three new categories. To place a state in a specific category, I merely
compare the state’s first Democratization Score with the score for the year immediately before
the year the state abolishes the JCPC or January 1, 2015, whichever comes first. Of the three
states that, over time, become more democratic, two (66 percent) still retain the JCPC. For
example, Sri Lanka is one state that becomes more democratic yet abolishes the JCPC. Ten of

113

the 13 (76 percent) states that exhibit no change still retain the JCPC. The three states with no
change – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – eventually abolish the JCPC. Nine of the ten (90
percent) states that can be broadly categorized as more autocratic abolish appeals to the JCPC.
The only state that is less democratic at the end of the research period that retains the JCPC is
Jamaica.

2

More Democratic

1

10

No Change

JCPC

3

No JCPC

1

More Autocratic

0

9

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Figure 5.1 Categorization of Regime Change and whether the State Retained the JCPC

The results in Figure 5.1 indicate the tendency of less democratic states to replace the
JCPC, as opposed to those states that become more democratic or remain the same. Since there
are states that do abolish the JCPC even though they become more democratic or exhibit no
change in the regime, there may be something else occurring in the political environment that is
not captured by the using the Polity IV and Freedom House scores. In Chapter 5, I examine this
possibility using in-depth case studies of The Gambia, New Zealand, and The Bahamas.
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I also utilize two control variables. My first control variable is the level of conflict in
each state in each year of analysis. Conflict within the state may influence the governing
coalition’s perception of how to maintain POGG and the extent to which it needs to exercise
control over the judiciary as a part of the governing institutions. The existence and level of
conflict is operationalized using DataBanks (2015a; 2015b). This database uses a weighted
domestic conflict score that reflects a weighted count of incidents as conflicts. The following
incidents of conflict are included in the score: (1) assassinations; (2) strikes; (3) guerrilla
warfare; (4) government crises; (5) purges; (6) riots; (7) revolutions; and (8) anti-government
demonstrations (see Appendix L). Scores range from 0 to a maximum of 6250 in a country-year
for the sample states.
Second, I include a control variable for each state’s GDP per capita per country-year.
This is a proxy for the fiscal capacity of the government and private litigants to afford pursuing
cases before the JCPC in London. Appeals to the JCPC are often critiqued as “a rich man’s
appeal” (Mohr 2011, 132). Litigants incur added costs and inconvenience to access the JCPC
(Swinfen 1987). Wilson (2001) points out that some litigants cannot afford to pursue their case at
the JCPC, effectively denying them their full rights of appeal. Less prosperous states may
therefore view the costs associated with accessing the JCPC as a barrier that effectively denies
access to justice. I therefore control for each state’s wealth to examine the comparative
advantage more prosperous states may have over those less prosperous states, measured as the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of each state in each year the state appears in the data.
The estimate of the GDP for each state is in U.S. dollars, as valued in 1990 International GearyKhamis dollars (The Maddison-Project 2013). This method is “the most widely used aggregation
method for multilateral comparison of prices and real product” using “purchasing power parities
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of currencies and average prices of commodities” (Rao and Selvanathan 1990, 5). The growth in
GDP per capita of states varies widely. For example, The Gambia’s GDP per capita only
increased from US$846 at independence in 1965 to US$851 in 1998 when that state abolished
appeals to the JCPC. New Zealand’s GDP per capita, on the other hand, increased from
US$4,475 in 1931 to US$18,231 in 2005 when that state abolished all appeals to the JCPC (The
Maddison-Project 2013). The average GDP per capita for all states during the period of analysis
is US$6448.71. A snapshot of the 15 states the year before they abolish the JCPC shows that four
(27 percent) states are above the average. Of the 11 states that retain the JCPC, ten (91 percent)
are above the average. This may indicate a tendency of states with fewer resources to abolish the
JCPC and, conversely, those with higher GDP per capita to retain. GDP per capita, however, is a
rather “blunt” instrument as it does not capture the resources of those in the economic elite (but
not part of the governing coalition) who may be more likely challenge the state and want to
pursue an appeal to the JCPC. Further, four (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore) of
the 15 states that abolish the JCPC are among the richest states in the world (World Bank 2013).
5.5

Exploring Changes after Independence
After independence, eleven states in the sample of 26 states do not abolish the JCPC by

the end of my research period (January 1, 2015), while 15 states do in some year prior to 2014.
As there is a portion of the states that do experience the event, it is appropriate to use a “split
population” model design. I utilize the “spsurv” STATA command developed by Jenkins (2001).
I use discrete time split population survival (SPS) modeling and time varying covariates (TVCs)
to test the above hypotheses about the decision of a state to eventually sever ties with the JCPC
post-independence. This approach jointly estimates the hazard rate of both groups of states. The
objective is to analyze when the event or “failure” (abolishing appeals to the JCPC) occurs and
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what factor contributes to our understanding of what influences the event (Bartels 2003; Fenno
1986). Since I assume that the occurrence of the event or failure is not a function of time and the
event does not occur in some states, this non-parametric model is preferred.
As a partial likelihood model, the SPS model is based on the assumption that there is no
information regarding the relationship between covariates and the hazard rate being gleaned from
the intervals between successive events (Collet 1994). This is as result of not being directly
parameterized with a baseline function or intercept. The benefit of this approach is that it makes
better use of available data by ordering events. The start of the analysis is left-truncated at the
date of independence for each country. Further, at any time all cases are at risk of failing and the
risk set decreases by one, successively dwindling as events occur. The coefficients are
parameterized in terms of the hazard rate, so a positive coefficient indicates that the hazard is
increasing as a function of the covariate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).
While parametric models such as the Weibull, exponential, and Gomertz explicitly
account for the “duration dependence or the extent to which the risk of experiencing the event
increases or decreases as a function of time…., non-parametric models leave the baseline
unspecified or unconstrained as to a specific distribution form” (Bartels 2003, 1). In line with
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001; see also Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004), my theory does
not allow me to specify a probability distribution for the time until the event occurs. In such
cases, the absence of the need to parameterize time dependency is an advantage. Further, these
SPS models effectively relax the baseline assumption by “splitting” the observations based on
time intervals during the period of analysis with no assumption that the event will occur
(Schmidt and Witte 1989).
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5.6

Results
As exemplified by every region of the Commonwealth, some states that retain appeals to

the JCPC at independence later decide to abandon that extraterritorial court and establish a
domestic final appellate court. Based on the sample of 26 states, 15 states abolish appeals at
some point after independence and 11 states retain appeals to the JCPC as of January 1, 2015
(see Table 4.2). I argue that the decision to replace the JCPC is more likely if the governing
coalition perceives a disconnection between the decisions of the JCPC and the state’s policies.
The perceived divergence may result in a reduced likelihood that the JCPC will uphold and
legitimize their policies. Further, the expectation that the JCPC will be a reliable partner may be
altered in the context of the changing political environment, prompting the governing coalition to
take steps to abolish that right of appeal and establish a domestic final appellate court.
The dependent variable is the state-year in which appeals to the JCPC are abolished, or
the “event” occurs, in a year between 1931 and the end of 2014. The Kaplan-Meier graph
captures the change in the portion of states that abolish the JCPC over time, and at the same time
includes those states that do not abolish the JCPC by the end of the period of analysis. Plotting
the estimated survival probabilities (vertical axis) over the time of the analysis produces a
survival curve that is displayed as a step function (Goel, Khanna and Kishore 2010). The
intervals indicate that a state abolishes the JCPC (occurrence of the event), and the change on the
vertical axis (0, 1) indicates the change in the cumulative probability as time passes (Rich et al
2010). Figure 5.2 displays the Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates by whether the state retained
(occurrence =0) or abolished the JCPC (occurrence = 1). For the states that abolish the JCPC, the
cummulative probability is greatest in the first 30 years of the period of analysis and more states
abolish the JCPC during that period.
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Figure 5.2 Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates by whether the State Retained or Abolished the JCPC

As described in detail in Chapter 2, I theorize that a state’s governing coalition expects
the final appellate court to support their policies. In my case, I assert that the decision of whether
to abolish appeals to the JCPC is influenced by the decisions of that court and the temporal
political environment. With the independent variables described, I estimate five SPS models to
examine the relationship between the state’s decisions to abolish appeals to the JCPC and the
decisions of that court and the political environment of the sample states. In the first model, I
regress the following: (1) the measure of the state’s win ratios in all JCPC decisions decided
from each country-year; (2) the dichotomous dependent variable for whether the JCPC is
abolished; and (3) the control variables I described earlier. In the second and third models, I
employ the variable values for the state win average when the state is the respondent and the win
average when the state is the appellant, respectively. In Model Four, I regress both the win
average when the state is the respondent and when the state is the appellant. Finally, in model
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five I examine the effect of the interactive variable – values for the nature of the regimes over
time and the win average in all decisions. I include the same control variables in each model.
In Model 1, I test Hypothesis 2 that the lower the state’s win average in JCPC decisions,
the more likely the governing coalition’s decision to abolish appeals to the JCPC. The result in
Model 1 (Table 5.4) show that the percentage of JCPC decisions that favor the state in all
decisions while controlling for intra-state conflict and GDP per capita is not significantly
associated with the governing coalition’s decision to abolish appeals to the JCPC. This result
suggests that states are not responding to their relative success rates (including the years when
there were no JCPC decisions). The governing coalition may not have considered the years in
which there were no JCPC decisions as a “success” or “win.” It may simply be that the status
quo was maintained because the JCPC failed to attract their attention in those years and may not
reflect any particular level of satisfaction with the JCPC. The null hypothesis is therefore not
rejected for Hypothesis 2. The absence of any significance of the overall success of the state may
suggest that the governing coalition is driven by a more discerning approach to the JCPC
decisions. While all cases to which the state is a party involve some aspect of policy, unfavorable
decisions may not always galvanize the political will to act. The governing coalitions generally
may not perceive all unfavorable decisions as significant enough to pass a constitutional
amendment to abolish appeals to the JCPC. To further examine the cases, I disaggregate the
sample of cases into those where the state is the respondent and those in which the state is the
appellate before the JCPC.
In Model 2, I test Hypothesis 2.1 that the lower percentages of favorable JCPC decisions
when the state was the appellate increase the likelihood that the governing coalition will move to
abolish appeals to the JCPC. The result in Table 5.4 shows that the percentage of favorable JCPC
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decisions when the state was the appellant is significant (β = -1.235, p-value, 0.035), with the
coefficient indicating the influence is in the predicted direction. To help with the interpretation of
the coefficient, it is best to convert the coefficient to a hazard ratio by using exponentiation
(Exp). The coefficient corresponds to a hazard ratio of 0.29 (Exp (-1.235) = 0.29), implying that
for every one-unit increase in the success ratio of cases where the state is the appellant, there is a
71 percent lower chance of abolishing appeals to the JCPC, while controlling for other factors in
the model. The null hypothesis may be rejected for Hypothesis 2.1.
Table 5.4 Split Population Survival Models 1 and 2

Explanatory
Variables
State Win Average in
all Decisions

Model 1

p-value

-0.785 (0.621)

0.206

State Win Average
when State is the
Appellant

Model 2

p-value

-1.235
(0.587)

0.035

Democratization
Score

-1.462
(0.437)

0.001

-1.445
(0.435)

0.001

State Conflict

0.0001
(0.0003)

0.813

0.00003
(0.0003)

0.916

State GDP per capita

0.0003
(0.00008)

0.714

0.00003
(0.00008)

0.750

Constant

-1.918 (.622)

0.002

-1.531
(0.04)

0.013

Cure Probability

0.11003
(0.1011)

0.043

0.108224
(0.1002)

0.042

ChiSq (df)
Observations

11.32
673

0.045

13.63
673

0.0181

Based on the disaggregation of the variable for the state win average in all decisions, I
explore further the effect of the win average in decisions when the state was the respondent. The
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win average when the state was the respondent is not significant in Model 3 (Table 5.5).
Considering the results from the Models 1 through 3, where the success rate of the state is only
significant when the state is the Appellant. This may indicate that the governing coalitions are
not closely monitoring their success rate in all cases over time before the court. This is an
important finding and one I return to in Chapter 6 when looking at cases and the political
environment in three specific states.
Table 5.5 Split Population Survival Models 3 and 4

Explanatory
Variables

Model 3

p-Value

Model 4

State Win Average when State
is the Respondent

-0.9859
(0.630)

0.118

-0.6775
(0 .6807

0.320

-1.0437
(0 .6181)

0.091

State Win Average when State
is the Appellant

p-value

Democratization Score

-1.5232
(0.00008)

<0.0001

-1.4769
(0.4334)

0.001

State Conflict

0.00004
(0.0003)

0.782

0.00004
(0.0003)

0.894

State GDP per capita

-0.00003
(0.00008)

0.682

-0.00004
(0.00007)

0. 651

Constant

-1.6755
(0.6758)

0.013

-1.0902
(0. 7557)

0.149

Cure Probability

0.11368
(0.1031)

0.045

0.11091
(0.1020)

0.044

ChiSq (df)
Observations

11.98
673

0.035

14.55
673

0.024

Keeping in mind my theory that the governing coalition is influenced by level of state
favorable decisions handed down by the JCPC and the political environment, I interact the

122

proxies for these two variables. The changes in the political environment make it more likely that
the governing coalition will responded to lower levels of favorable decisions by the court. The
goal is to gain more insight into the interactive effect of these variables, where the influence of
each may be more difficult to determine independently. Model 5 includes the interactive variable
Win Rate Environment (Win_Ratio* Democratization Score). The analysis results employing this
new variable, Win Rate Environment, and the control variables are displayed in Table 5.6. The
Win Rate Environment is approaching significance (β = .01449; Exp (β) = 1.01; p-value = 0.059).
Specifically, for every one-unit increase in the Win Rate Environment, there is a one percent
higher hazard of abolishing appeals to the JCPC, while controlling for other factors in the model.
This may be an indication that the political environment has heightened sensitivity of the
governing coalition to the decisions of the court.
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Table 5.6 SPS Split Population Survival Models 5

Explanatory
Variables
Win Rate Environment (State Win Average
in all Decisions* Democratization Score)

Model 5

p-value

.01449
(.0077)

0.059

-.0159
(0. 0065)

0.015

Democratization Score

-1.9649
(0.6289)

0.002

State Conflict

0.00022
(0 .0003)

0.418

State GDP per capita

-0.00003
(0.00008)

0.750

Constant

-1.9613
(0.6075)

0.001

ChiSq (df)
Observations

13.90
673

0.031

State Win Average in all Decisions

State Win Average when State is the
Appellant

The effect of the multiplicative terms (Win_Ratio* Democratization Score) shows the
conditional relationship of each variable when the other is held at “0” (Judd, McClellard and
Ryan 2009; Williams 2015). In partially free states (i.e.; when Democratization Score is held at
0), a one standard deviation decrease in the level of the regime in terms of democratic scores
increase the relative risk that the governing coalition will remove the JCPC by 86 percent (β = 1.9649; Exp (β) = 0.14; p-value = 0.002). Result shows a significant interaction effect between
Win_Ratio and Democratization Score (β = 0.01449; Exp (β) = 1.0146; p-value = 0.059) at a 94
percent confidence level. Figure 5.3 displays the marginal effect of the interactive variable on the
relative risk of abolishing the JCPC.
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Figure 5.3 The Marginal Effect of the Interactive Variable on the Relative Risk of Abolishing
Appeals to the JCPC

A significant interaction suggests that the relationship between Democratization Score
and the hazard of abolishing appeals to the JCPC, changes by Win_Ratio values. Specifically,
Figure 5.4 shows the marginal effect of the Democratization Score on the hazard of abolishing
appeals to the JCPC where the relationship between the Democratization Score and the hazard of
abolishing appeals to the JCPC can been increasing as Win Ratio values also increase. In other
words, the effect of Democratization Scores on the hazard of abolishing appeals to the JCPC
increases as the Win_Ratio values increase. For example, it shows that when win ratio = 0, the
effect of democratization score is -1.96. In other words, a 1-point increase in democracy
increases the log-odds of the event by -1.96). On the other hand, when win ratio = 1, the effect of
democracy is -1.95, so a 1-unit increase in the level of democracy decreases the log-odds of the
event by -1.95 (instead of -1.96).
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Figure 5.4 The Marginal Effect of Democratization Score on the Relative Risk of Abolishing
Appeals to the JCPC

Figure 5.5 shows the marginal effect of win ratio as the democratization score changes.
When the state win ratio in all cases is at zero percent (i.e.; when Win_Ratio is held at 0), a one
standard deviation decrease in the success rate of the state in all decisions increases the
likelihood of the governing coalition removing the JCPC by two percent (β = -.0159; Exp (β) =
0.98; p-value = 0.015). The interaction effect itself is rather small here, as the coefficient is little
changed regardless of the value of win ratio. In light of the lack of significance of the state’s
overall level of success in the court’s decision as displayed in Model 1, the finding of a marginal
effect in the interaction with the political environment is worthy of note. It provides some
support for my theory that the political environment does have an effect on how the decisions of
the court are viewed and ultimately whether the court itself is perceived as a reliable partner for
the governing coalition. Ultimately, the unfavorable decisions of the court are viewed differently
when the political environment becomes less democratic.
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Figure 5.5 The Marginal Effect of State Win Ratio on the Relative Risk of Abolishing Appeals to
the JCPC

The variable Democratization is significant in all models. There is, therefore, strong
support for Hypothesis 3 that the nature of the regime post-independence may underpin the
political environment in which it was more likely that the governing coalition would abolish
appeals to the JCPC. The results suggest that a decrease in the level of democracy, or increase in
autocracy, increases the chances that the court will be abolished. In other words, decreased levels
of democracy have a significant negative influence on how the governing coalition views the
presence of the JCPC and the options available to those challenging their policies to appeal to
this extraterritorial court that is beyond their administrative control. Finally, the results for the
control variables (State Conflict and GDP per capita) are consistently insignificant across all
models. The results adhere to expectations and the null hypothesis can be rejected.
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The results provide support for my theory that the governing coalitions in more
authoritarian regimes seem more sensitive to the presence of JCPC as an extraterritorial court
over which they have no control. The governing coalitions in more authoritarian regimes are less
likely to want to respondent to challenges to their policies before such a court. Continuing
appeals to such a court risks not having policies upheld and legitimized. The fact that the results
show that the level of success in all cases is not significant leads me to conclude that the
governing coalition is more concerned when they feel they have to appeal to the JCPC. In these
cases, they are being forced to challenge the decision of a lower court that was not in their favor.
Another factor could be that more democratic states are less likely to advance policies that get
challenged in court and are less sensitive to the risk of an unfavorable decision when a legal
challenge is launched. For example, Singapore is classified as “partially free” by Freedom House
(2015; see Appendix M). Of the 20 cases in which the state is a litigant, three cases involve state
action against opposition leaders. This may indicate some sensitivity to specific types of cases.
Of the 112 cases in New Zealand, which is always classified as “free,” none of the cases involve
state action against opposition politicians. I examine this is further in Chapter 6.
5.7

Summary and Conclusion
The goal of this chapter is to provide insight into the factors that influence whether the

state’s governing coalition will change the final appellate court. The results of the SPS analysis
on the 26 states in the sample that retain the JCPC at independence based on the theory laid out
in Chapter 2. I examine decisions of the JCPC and changes in the political environment on a
democratic-autocratic continuum. I find little support for the significance of the overall success
of the governing coalition in JCPC decisions and strong support for the effect of changes in the
political environment over time after independence. The models generally perform in the fashion

128

I expected, considering the theory and the consequent hypotheses. The results generally support
the two tenets of my theory. First, that governing coalitions are somewhat responsive to
decisions of the JCPC. More specifically, unfavorable decisions when the state is the appellant
increases the likelihood the JCPC will be replaced. Second, that the governing coalition’s
perceptions about that court are be influenced by changes in the political environment. These
changes may serve to heighten the sensitivity of the governing coalition to court decisions and
influence the governing coalition to abolish appeals to the JCPC. However, the evidence is not
particularly strong and points to the need to examine the decisions more closely.
My findings have important implications for the long term support and development of
new extraterritorial courts. States may be leery of acceding to extraterritorial courts if the
perception is that the court will not support its policies. The state will be particularly concerned
about how the court is formulated and administered. Understanding the control that it has over
domestic courts and its benefits, a court that is not within the control of the governing coalition
control may be suspect. Further, if a state does accede then my results indicate that the state will
ultimately abandon the court if the court hands down unfavorable decisions, particularly if the
case is important to domestic legitimacy and the reputation of the governing coalition. Yet the
response to the court is dependent of the domestic political environment. Changes in the
governing coalition and political environment may also influence any ongoing commitment to
the court. Depending on the judicial branch to uphold and legitimize its policies, domestic access
to an extraterritorial court may be viewed with suspicion and the level of tolerance may be lower
in less democratic regimes. Ultimately, therefore, the level of skepticism to utilize or willingness
to tolerate unfavorable decisions will influence the longevity and vitality of an extraterritorial
court.
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Further, what these quantitative analyses do not capture is whether changes in governing
regimes in democratic states may change the perception of and willingness to continue
supporting an extraterritorial court. Tate and Hanie (1993) point out the tendency of autocratic
regimes not to favor independent judiciaries. The examination of my sample shows, however,
that even strongly democratic regimes such as New Zealand and Australia eventually abandon
the JCPC, which is completely independent. Further, the recent South African response to the
ICC and the U.K.’s threat to withdraw from the EJC also are informative. This raises an
important question of whether other changes in the political environment not captured in this
chapter’s quantitative analyses could lead the governing coalition to abandon an extraterritorial
court such as the European Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, or the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. With an eye on that additional question, I present three in-depth,
single-state case studies in the next chapter.
In Chapter 6, I transfer my focus from a cross-national quantitative analysis to a
qualitative analysis using process tracing. The goal is to take a closer look at three states and the
effects of JCPC decisions and changes in the political environment. I analyze The Gambia and
New Zealand that abolished appeals to the JCPC at different times after independence, and The
Bahamas that retains appeals to that court as of January 1, 2015. Selected from the original
sample of 26 states, The Gambia, New Zealand, and The Bahamas share a British colonial
history, similar legal systems, and an adopted Westminster system of government with the JCPC
after independence, but are quite different in many other ways. I examine some unfavorable
decisions by the JCPC that challenge the policies of the governing coalition and effects of
changes in the political environment that could possibly change the governing coalition’s
perceptions of the JCPC as a reliable partner in policy-making.
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6
6.1

THE JCPC AND THE GAMBIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE BAHAMAS

Introduction
In examining the case of the JCPC and states at independence from the U.K., it is

important to understand why some governing coalitions later decide to replace the JCPC with a
domestic final appellate court. The underlying reasoning for the decision has implications for the
future of other extraterritorial courts such as the European Court of Justice, International
Criminal Court, Caribbean Court of Justice, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and other
courts yet to be developed. Further, it improves our understanding of how the governing
coalition may respond to decisions of extraterritorial courts. I posit that the governing coalition
of those states will seek a change or disengage from the extraterritorial court if it perceives a
disconnection with the court. The perception of such a disconnection is influenced by changes in
the political environment that make the state more sensitive to decisions of the JCPC that are
unfavorable to the state. Ultimately, therefore, the future success of extraterritorial courts may
rest on the domestic political environment of member states. In Chapter 5, the quantitative
analyses of the 26 states the retained the JCPC at independence provided little direct evidence of
any significant effect of the levels of state success in court decisions, while changes in the
political environment were significant in whether the governing coalition decided to disengage
from the court. However, there was evidence that the level of success in cases where the state
was the appellant did influence the governing coalition. Ultimately, my findings suggest that
changes in the political environment are very influential. These changes color the state response
to the court’s decisions and, depending on the changes, may make states more likely to sever ties
with the JCPC.
In this chapter, I employ three states as case studies to further investigate how JCPC
decisions and changes in a country’s political environment influence the governing coalition’s
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decision to abolish all appeals to the JCPC. Yin (2003) defines a case study as “an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (13). Using
causal-process observations, I conduct a within-case comparison on each sampled state leading
to the abolition of appeals to the JCPC. As pointed out by Collier (2010; see also George and
Bennett 2005), this process can further evaluate the hypotheses and deepen our understanding of
the phenomenon not possible with the quantitative analyses, which are better at “measuring
observed probability distribution relating measure of an independent variable to measures of an
outcome across a large number of cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 224). I extend the analysis
in Chapters 3 and 4, providing an avenue for causal inference by guiding a more detailed
examination of complex historical events and explaining the individual cases (George and
Bennett 2005). I trace how political changes influence the governing coalition’s view of the
JCPC and what role, if any, JCPC decisions that are unfavorable to the state play in moving the
governing coalition to a second critical juncture. I assert also that the change in the political
environment can be subtler than can be captured empirically on the democratic-authoritarian
continuum using Polity IV and Freedom House scores.
In this section, I discuss an approach that will aid in capturing the more nuanced changes
in the domestic political environment. I aver that the political environment can be captured in
three categories – drastic change, subtle change, and no change. For the purposes of this
research, I define these three categories as follows: (1) “no change” – the state does not
experience any change in the political environment when a new governing coalition comes to
power with a commitment to the constitution and the continued good governance of the state.
This does not preclude law reform, but does not fundamentally change the relationship between

132

the state and its citizens. While there may be a new governing coalition after an election cycle,
the basic tenets of the change lack ideological differences. The new coalition basically peruses
the same broad policies but with a pledge to a better job; (2) “subtle changes” are those that
follow the election of a governing coalition with a new vision based on political ideology that
underpins new domestic and international policies (Elordi 2000). These are pursued without
fundamentally systemic changes to the governing institutions or the rights and liberties of the
citizens of the state. While this may also involve constitutional changes, the changes do not
fundamentally change the governance landscape (Grace 2015); and (3) “drastic change” includes
the promulgation and adoption of a new constitution that fundamentally changes the governing
institutions, as well as the rights and liberties of the citizens of the state. In other words, these
changes generally alter the relationship between the citizens and the state, or they expand or
reduce the range of fundamental constitutional rights (Grace 2015; Thoburn v Sunderland City
Council 2003). I assert that drastic and subtle changes can lead to the removal of the JCPC, but
no change in the political environment maintains the status quo. Table 6.1 displays the 26 states
in the three categories and the status of each state with respect to the JCPC.
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Table 6.1 States in the Three Categories and the Status of the JCPC

No Change
Retain JCPC
Abolish
(10 States)
(2 States)
Antigua &
Barbuda
Bahamas

Belize

Political Environment
Subtle Change
Retain
Abolish
JCPC
(6 States)
(1 States)
Jamaica
Australia

Drastic Change
Retain JCPC Abolish
(0 States)
(9 States)
India

Canada

Ghana

Malaysia

Gambia

New
Zealand
South
Africa

Fiji

Barbados
Brunei
Singapore
Dominica
Grenada
Mauritius
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent &
Grenadines
Trinidad &
Tobago

Guyana
Kenya
Nigeria
Sri Lanka
Uganda

I examine one state from each category as follows: (1) drastic change – The Gambia; (2)
subtle change – New Zealand; and (3) no change – The Bahamas. Through these three case
studies, I will show how the nature of the changes in the political environment contributes to our
understanding of how the governing coalition responds to the JCPC and, by extension, increases
our understanding of how states may respond to other extraterritorial courts. The selection of
these three states is partially based on the quality and availability of data and information.
Further, the selection of these three cases is both theoretically and methodologically motivated.
They are all common law jurisdictions with the JCPC as the final appellate court, as well as
Westminster-style democracies with multi-party systems. However, over time, important
changes to the political environment occurred in The Gambia and New Zealand, while similar
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changes were absent in The Bahamas. I use these three cases to isolate how ensuing changes in
the political environment may lead to the specific question of whether to retain the JCPC as the
country’s final appellate court or to change the judicial structure. While the outcomes in New
Zealand and The Gambia differ from that in The Bahamas, all three were multi-party
parliamentary democracies for extended periods of time after independence. Importantly, they
provide variation on the dependent variable – abolish or retain appeals to the JCPC. The Gambia
and New Zealand were two of the 15 states that retained the JCPC at independence but
subsequently abolished the right of appeal. The Gambia and New Zealand replaced the JCPC
with domestic final courts of appeals 21 and 64 years, respectively, after independence. First,
The Gambia is representative of the category of states that experienced drastic change as defined.
All these states adopted new constitutions some point after independence that fundamentally
changed the relationship between the citizens and the state and included the abolition of appeals
to the JCPC. I examine The Gambia because of the availability of domestic and international
sources about the changes in the political environment. This democratic political environment
was fairly consistent for 21 years after independence, through the drastic change that followed
the coup in 1994 and the statements and actions of the new governing coalition vis-à-vis the
JCPC. Other states that promulgated new constitutions some years after independence that
changed the nature of the governing institutions include Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda
(Fombad 2013; Mbaku 1998; Mbondenyi 2013). These states also abolished the JCPC at that
time.
Second, New Zealand is representative of the category of states that experienced a subtle
change, where all the states experienced a consistent political environment punctuated only by
the change in vision by the new governing coalition that did not view the JCPC as a viable
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partner. These states amended the constitution to specifically abolish appeals to the JCPC. New
Zealand is a good case to examine because the process is particularly well documented. It
formally starts with the manifesto of the political party that led the new governing coalition after
the 1999 general elections and the public debate that ensued, culminating with legislative action.
Finally, The Bahamas is one of the 11 states along with eight other Commonwealth Caribbean
states, Brunei, and Mauritius that retain the JCPC as of January 1, 2015. The political
environments in these states have remained consistent after independence. The Bahamas is
representative of the bifurcated discussion in the Commonwealth Caribbean about the JCPC that
emerged around the single issue of the death penalty, with no clear political or public consensus
to change the status quo. Brunei and Mauritius are the only two with no substantive public
discourse about changing the status quo. With no apparent public discourse in Brunei on the
status of the JCPC, its continued role as the final appellate court seems secure for the foreseeable
future. Further, the last case to be adjudicated by the JCPC from Brunei was in 2007 (Bolkiah &
Ors v. The State of Brunei Darussalam & Anor) and involved the head of state, Sultan Hassanal
Bolkiah. In a challenge brought by his younger brother, Prince Jefri, the JCPC decided the four
billion Pound Sterling suit in favor of the Sultan (Pierce 2007). In Mauritius, Mauri Garments
Trading and Marketing Limited v The Mauritius Commercial Bank Limited (2015) involved the
liability of banks for the economic losses of customers. The JCPC’s decision in favor of the
banks is described locally as a testament to the Mauritian commitment to international standards
and rule of law (Noel and Bhima 2015).
In summary, despite being located in disparate regions of the world with economic and
socio-cultural differences, they share a history of British colonial rule, as well as the common
law legal system, and emerge as independent states with the Westminster parliamentary system
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and the JCPC. In addition, all three states were stable democracies for extended periods after
independence. The Gambia and New Zealand effectively abolished appeals to the JCPC in 1998
and 2005, respectively. The Bahamas retains the right of appeal to the JCPC as of January 1,
2015. Table 6.2 presents a summary comparison of the three states.
Table 6.2 Summary Comparisons of the Three Sampled States

The Gambia
(Africa)
Replaced
JCPC
New Zealand
(Asia-Pacific)
Replaced
JCPC
The Bahamas
(Caribbean)
Retained
JCPC

Population
(World
Population
Review 2015)
1.97 Million
4,127 Sq.
Miles

Change in
political
environment

Total
Conflict
decisions (&
% State a
party)
Drastic change 12 (25%)
no
(new
constitution)

GDP per
capita
(World
Bank 2013)
$477

4.6 Million
103,734 Sq.
Miles

Subtle change
(1999 general
elections)

179 (63%)

no

$42,409

388,000
5,382 Sq. Miles

None

53 (45%)

no

$22,315

In the remainder of this chapter, the goal, therefore, is to better understand the factors that
influence the choice of extraterritorial court by tracing the process that led The Gambia and New
Zealand to replace the JCPC while The Bahamas has not done so. I trace and analyze the
governing coalitions’ actions and responses to the JCPC in the context of the political
environment. I examine The Gambia, New Zealand, and The Bahamas in that order and present
my conclusions.
The Gambia (Figure 6.1) was made a formal British colony in 1910 and gained
independence in 1965. It is one of the few African colonies to gain independence after World
War II and retain the JCPC. The others are Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. Like those states, it has
a predominately indigenous population with a very a small British settler population that
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dominated the colonial era but transitioned to emergent local governing coalition at
independence. The Gambia retained the JCPC for 31 years, which is longer than any other
African state. Also, it was a multi-party parliamentary democracy from independence until 1994
when the military overthrew the government by force or a coup d’état (Merriam-Webster 2015b).
After the bloodless coup d’état in 1994, it abolished appeals to the JCPC, replacing it with the
Supreme Court of The Gambia in 1998 as the final appellate court.

Figure 6.1 A Map of the Republic of Gambia © (ezilon Maps 2009z)

New Zealand is a South Pacific state (see Figure 6.2) that became a British colony in
1840. In 2004, it was the last of the Dominions (the others being Australia, Canada, South
Africa, and Sri Lanka) to abolish appeals to the JCPC, having retained the JCPC for 74 years
after it had the authority to abolish appeals with the passage of the Westminster Act in 1931.
Finally, The Bahamas (Figure 6.3) located in the Caribbean became a British colony in 1717 and
retains appeals to the JCPC as of 2015. British institutions permeate the state with the JCPC still
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in place there today, along with eight other Commonwealth Caribbean states, Mauritius and
Brunei.

Figure 6.2 A Map of New Zealand © (ezilon Maps 2009b)

During the 31 years with the JCPC, a total of 12 Gambian cases were decided by the
JCPC, of which the state was a party to four cases, or 33 percent. Like in other states such as
Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, India, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Guyana, the JCPC was replaced with a
domestic final appellate when a new constitution was adopted. During the 74 years after New
Zealand’s independence, a total of 179 cases were decided by the JCPC, in which the state was a
party to 112 cases, or 62 percent. After the elections in 1999, the Labour Party and Alliance
Party coalition abolished appeals to the JCPC, replacing it with the New Zealand Supreme Court
as the final appellate court. Like states such as Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Singapore, and
South Africa, the abolition of appeals to the JCPC was achieved via constitutional amendments.
From Bahamian independence in 1973 to January 1, 2015, the state was a party in 24 cases, or 46
percent – a total of 52 cases decided by the JCPC.
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Figure 6.3 Map of The Bahamas © (ezilon Maps 2009c)

In Chapter 5, GDP per capita was a control variable and was not significant in any of the
six models. These three countries are different, with New Zealand being among the states with
the highest GDP per capita and The Gambia among those with the lowest GDP per capita.
However, both replaced the JCPC. The Bahamas is positioned between the two and has not
abolished appeals to the JCPC. This indicates no particular tendency toward wealth being a
factor in judicial change, and lines up with the findings in Chapter 5. Also, considered in Chapter
5 was intra-state conflict (DataBanks International 2015a, 2015b) which also was not significant
in any of the models. Even taking into account the bloodless coup in The Gambia, none of these
three countries experienced any significant intra-state conflicts.
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6.2

Tracing the Conditions for Change

6.2.1 The Republic of Gambia (The Gambia)
At independence in 1965, the Gambian constitutional system reflected the Westminster
model. Dawda Kairaba Jawara (1965-1994) led the post-independence rule of the Peoples’
Progressive Party (PPP), which is generally characterized as a period of stability with open
elections and respect for civil rights and liberties (Perfect 2010). The PPP won five consecutive
elections with the only unconstitutional challenge being the failed coup d’état in 1981 (Coleman,
2015). Perfect (2010) describes President Jawara’ s response to the attempted coup d’état as the
only lapse in an otherwise “exemplary human rights record” (57). To gauge Coleman’s (2013)
assessment of the health of the Gambian democracy, I rely on Freedom House scores (2014a).
This leading international organization monitors the political environment based on regime
changes on a democratic–authoritarian continuum. Freedom House scores are available starting
1972. States are rated in three categories (see also Appendix K for descriptions) as follows:


Respect for Human Rights: high to low (1-7)



Upholding of Civil Liberties: high to low (1-7)



Overall score (Freedom Score): Free, (1); Partially Free, (0); and Not Free (-1)

The Gambia receives a favorable rating with regard to political rights and civil liberties in 14 of
the 21 years reported. Figure 6.4 presents the scores in the three categories discussed above from
1972 to 1998, reflecting the dramatic decline starting in 1994. The Gambia is rated as “partially
free” (“0”) from 1981 to 1988, which coincides with the failed coup d’état in 1981 and the shortlived federation with Senegal from 1984 to 1989.
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Figure 6.4 Gambia’s Freedom House Scores from 1972 through 1998 (Freedom House 2014)

Based on the preceding discussion, The Gambia has enjoyed a fairly consistent period of
democratic rule after independence in 1965 until 1994. During that period, the state was a party
in three cases, with a favorable JCPC decision in only one of the three. The state was the
appellant in one of the three, and the decision was not in its favor. In the other two cases where
the state was the respondent, it prevailed in one. I suggest a number of reasons for the small
number of JCPC cases involving the state. First, the lower courts handed down decisions
favorable to the governing coalition, thereby removing any need to appeal to the JCPC. Second,
using the GDP per capita as a proxy for resource availability, the costs of accessing the JCPC is
prohibitive except in cases considered particularly important to litigants. In Chapter 3, I
discussed the literature on the high costs associated with accessing the JCPC (Joseph 1985;
O’Conner and Bilder 2012; Swinfen 1987; Taylor 2005). While the costs may be prohibitive for
many litigants, if the state is dissatisfied with lower court decisions it is prepared to use resources
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to access the JCPC, as it perceives the court to be a reliable partner. Those conditions may have
contributed to the status quo. Despite the costs and regardless of the number of cases that it
actually adjudicates, the states perceive a benefit from having this reputable extraterritorial court
(Lange 2004; Seow 1997). This point is best exemplified by the statement of the first Prime
Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, to parliament in 1967:
As long as governments are wise enough to leave alone the rights of appeal to
some superior body outside Singapore, then there must be a higher degree of
confidence in the integrity of our judicial process. This is most important.
(as cited in Seow 1997, para. 15)
Of particular importance is the case, Attorney General of Gambia v. Momdou Jobe, that
was adjudicated by the JCPC before the coup d’état in 1994. This was an appeal to the JCPC
against a decision of the Gambian Court of Appeal that declared four provisions of the Special
Criminal Court Act (1979) to be ultra vires, or in violation (Merriam-Webster 2015a) of the
1970 Constitution. The JCPC declared that only Section 8(5) was ultra vires. Section 20(2)
guaranteeing the fundamental right to the “presumption of innocence” until proven guilty and
was, therefore, unconstitutional and void (Jammeh 2011). Senghore (2010) notes that in the
Momodou Jobe decision the JCPC effectively curbed the power of the legislature by declaring a
section of the Special Criminal Court Act as unconstitutional: “This case [Jobe] represents a
practical example of the functioning of the special criminal court on one hand and corrects the
excesses of the legislature and executive on the other” (222). This challenge to the policies of the
state was important enough for the state to use public resources to appeal the unfavorable
decision of the lower court to the JCPC. The decision reinforced the constitutional rule of law,
and the governing coalition did not perceive the decision as a serious enough challenge to their
legitimacy. I suggest that the democratic political environment at the time made the governing
coalition less sensitive to the unfavorable section of decision and, therefore, willing to have its
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power curbed by the JCPC, as the decision generally upheld the governing coalition’s policy for
addressing crime reflected in the Special Criminal Court Act. This JCPC decision, despite failing
to uphold the all sections of the Special Criminal Court Act, was not sufficient to move the state
to abolish appeals to the JCPC in a political environment where the governing coalition of
President Jawara and the PPP supported reasonably strong democratic institutions (Coleman
2013).
The second unfavorable decision to the governing coalition is Alhaji Malang Kanteh v
The Attorney General and others (1975) which involved the sale of confiscated property by the
police. The appellant claimed the property was on lease to another who was subject to a writ of
fieri facias, or legal authority to seize property, to satisfy a judgment (Merriam-Webster 2015c)
for another party. The value of the claim in 1975 was US$832 which is more than twice the GDP
per capita. While this may be significant to the appellant, the decision did not undermine a policy
of the governing coalition that resulted in a negative perception of the JCPC. During this period
after independence, therefore, the governing coalition did not perceive a serious disconnection
with the JCPC and, at the same time, may have considered this credible extraterritorial court as
part of the constitutional right of appeals and beneficial to the state and the Gambian legal
system.
The coup d’état ushered in two years (1994-1996) of military rule by the Armed Forces
Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC). The 1994 coup d’état transformed The Gambia from
constitutional governance to rule by military decree, to which there was no real legal recourse
(Jeng 2013). As many as 70 military decrees were issued by the AFPRC from 1994 to 1996. The
transformation of the Gambian political environment is captured in the Freedom House scores
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(2014) which rate The Gambia as “not free” (-1) from 1994, which was the year the new
governing coalition adopted the new constitution in which appeals to the JCPC were abolished.
After the coup d’état in The Gambia, Amnesty International (1995) provided a picture of
the change in governance by the AFPRC led by President Jammeh. The 1995 report outlines a
pattern of arbitrary arrests and detentions, restrictions on political activities, movement of leaders
from the Jawara government and the PPP, and harassment of journalists and owners of
newspapers in an apparent effort to stifle criticism of the government. The AFPC transformed
itself into a political party led by a coup d’état leader turned civilian president, Yahal Abdul-Aziz
Jemus Junkung Jammeh (Jammeh 2011; Hughes 2000; Perfect 2010; Wolf 1996). The August 6,
1996, referendum returned The Gambia to constitutional rule as the Second Republic (Jeng
2013). The Constitution of the Second Republic provides for the replacement of the JCPC with
the Supreme Court of Gambia as the final appellate court. Replacing the JCPC is touted by the
governing coalition as an issue of sovereignty and important to reducing the costs of accessing
the final appellate court (The Gambia’s Independence Golden Jubilee 2015). As Senghore (2010)
points out, however, after two years of rule by military decree, Gambians were more than ready
for return to constitutional rule. Leading up the first general elections under the 1996
constitution, President Jammeh and the governing AFPRC intimidated and attacked opposition
supporters and constrained the media (Perfect 2010). The 2015 Amnesty International Country
Report (2015) on the political environment and state of human rights and liberties in The Gambia
states:
2014 marked 20 years since President Yahya Jammeh came to power. The
authorities continued to repress dissent. The government continued its policy of
non-co-operation with UN human rights mechanisms. Successive legislation was
passed further restricting freedom of expression and increasing punitive measures
against journalists. (para. 1)

145

While President Jammeh won the subsequent presidential elections held in 1996, 2001,
2006, and 2011, Freedom House does not rate The Gambia as an electoral democracy. The
Gambia’s democratic freedom scores have declined dramatically since 1993 when Freedom
House rated The Gambia as “Free” (1). I highlight the scores in 1993, the year before the coup
d’état, to 1998, which is the year following the abolition of the JCPC. In this span of time, The
Gambia received a rating of “Not Free” for every subsequent year on record. The Gambia’s
Freedom House scores in the categories discussed above from 1993 to 1998 are presented in the
Figure 6.4. The change in environment illustrates the authoritarian shift in the regime, which
increased the sensitivity of the governing coalition to challenges – including potential challenges
before the JCPC over which the governing coalition had no control. In the absence of specific
formal and recorded debate about abolishing the right of appeal to the JCPC, tracing the effects
of specific decisions of the JCPC between the 1994 coup d’état and leading up the adoption of
the new constitution in 1996 is instructive. The cases decided by the JCPC after the coup d’état,
but before that court was replaced 1998 as provided for in the 1996 constitution establishing the
Second Republic, are instructive as to the intentions of the governing coalition in replacing the
JCPC. The state is a party to one of the four cases decided by the JCPC between 1994 and 1998,
In West Coast Air Limited v Gambia Civil Aviation Authority and Another (1998) in which the
state was the respondent, damages were assessed against the state at US$500,000 for breach of
contract. Considering the GDP per capita of about US$500, that assessment was a relatively
large sum for breach of a single contract and probably enough to make the governing coalition
resentful of the JCPC for having overturned the decision of the lower domestic court of appeals.
The low number of cases could be a reflection of the lower court’s support for the policies of the
governing coalition, which would limit the governing coalition’s need to rely on the JCPC. The
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results put a spotlight on the rare cases decided by the JCPC and highlight the potential risk of
having challenges to policies adjudicated unfavorably by an exterritorial court.
The governing coalition was, therefore, not only aware of the fact that having the JCPC
as the final court of appeal was beyond its control, but also that even though only a few cases
were adjudicated by that court, the potential existed for unfavorable decisions. Conversely, the
regime was aware that it had control over the domestic courts and their role as a potential
important ally in its quest for legitimacy. This is exemplified by the case of Saihou Sanui
Ceesay, Saihou Ceesay & Sons Limited V. AMRC (1994). The actions before the High Court
(Gambian trial court) challenged the constitutionality Sections 18(1) and (2) of the Asset
Management Recovery Corporation Act (AMRC) of 1993. Section 18 (1) declares that no
injunction or other restraints could be issued against the Assets Evaluation Commission set up
under the AMRC, and Section 18 (2) declares The Gambia Court of Appeal to be the final court
on any issue. One High Court bench, therefore, dismissed the appeal in Saihou Sanui Ceesay,
Saihou Ceesay & Sons Limited (1994). As a result, the state actions of the governing coalition
could not be reviewed. In the High Court case of AMRC & Attorney General v. Saidou Sowe
(1994) that challenged Section 18 (1), it was found to be partly constitutional but Section 18 (2)
totally unconstitutional (reversing Saihou Sanui Ceesay, Saihou Ceesay & Sons Limited V.
AMRC). Both decisions were handed down prior to the coup d’état in July of 1994, presenting
conflicting decisions on the constitutionality of Sections 18(1) and (2) of the Asset Management
Recovery Corporation Act (AMRC) of 1993. On appeal after the coup d’état, the Court of
Appeals reaffirmed the constitutionality of both provisions (Jammeh 2011). The result of this
decision was that while the state was not subject to injunctive remedies leaving its power
unfettered, it had the option to seek those remedies from the court against others. Jammeh (2011)
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points out that this was a derogation of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms
enumerated in the 1997 constitution (Sections 17 through 33), including depravation of property
(Constitution of The Republic of Gambia 1997). Section 22(1) (c) (ii) specifically provides for
redress in court:
Securing to any person having an interest in or right over the property, a right of
access to a court or other impartial and independent authority for the
determination of his or her interest or right, the legality of the taking of possession
or acquisition of the property, interest or right, and the amount of any to which he
or she is entitled, and for the purpose of obtaining prompt payment of that
compensation.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals after the 1994 coup d’état illustrate that the domestic
courts may function as reliable partners in the governing coalition by legitimizing its policies.
This also confirms to the governing coalition the importance of having such a judicial partner
and the risk posed by an extraterritorial court such as the JCPC over which it has no control.
A reading of the 1996 constitution makes it clear that the governing coalition sought to
constrain the jurisdiction of the judiciary and insulate itself from legal challenges to its policies
and actions. Schedule 2 of the constitution includes Section 13 that ousts the jurisdiction of the
courts with regard to any actions or decisions of the AFPRC on the day of the coup d’état (July
2, 1994), following the suspension of the 1970 constitution and under the constitution of 1996.
Further, the 1996 constitution provides for the establishment of the Supreme Court of Gambia
within 18 months of the approval of the new constitution, with appeals continuing to go to the
JCPC until that time. The case involving Lamin Waa Juwara is a much publicized example of the
effects of Section 13 and the power to replace the JCPC in the 1996 constitution. Juwara served
as the Minister of Lands before the coup d’état and subsequently joined the opposition United
Democratic Party. In 1996, he was arrested twice for banned political activities and held for 10
weeks. He was released in October 1996 without being charged (Amnesty International 1996).
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Claiming human rights violations, Juwara filed a lawsuit against the government in July 1998,
which was dismissed by the judge, citing Section 13 of the constitution which provides immunity
from legal action to all members and representative of AFPC (Interparliamentary Union 2001).
Both the Interparliamentary Union (2001) and Mass (2012) report that Juwara filed a petition to
appeal to the JCPC. The governing coalition replaced the JCPC with the Supreme Court of
Gambia in October 1998, before the petition before the JCPC could be considered (Senghore
2010). This effectively ended the possibility of the petition going any further and any risk of the
JCPC handing down a decision unfavorable to the governing coalition. Mass (2012)
characterizes the events as follows:
Mr. Juwara took the Gambia government to the Privy Council in London. But the
Jammeh administration was determined to cover up its dirty linen from being
publicly exposed and therefore decided to change the Gambia’s legal status. It
rushed to establish the Supreme Court of the Gambia so the Gambians would not
seek redress outside the country’s jurisdiction. (para.7)
This case is particularly important because Jawara was a minister in the former governing
coalition that preceded President Jammeh and became a prominent opposition figure whose
political activities defied the constraints on such activities imposed by the new governing
coalition (Amnesty International 1996). If the Jawara case had reached the JCPC, it was
inevitable that his persecution at the hands of the governing regime would have been laid bare
before the court. A JCPC decision in favor of Jawara would have embarrassed the governing
coalition and lend support to the criticisms of the regime by Amnesty International (Human
Rights Watch 2016), the Interparliamentary Union (2001), and the annual negative democracy
scores by Freedom House (2013) that started in 1994. An example of where the actions of the
governing coalition are laid before the JCPC is illustrated in Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v The
Law Society of Singapore (1988). The JCPC decision in the Singaporean case embodies the
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concerns of The Gambian regime. Jeyaretnam was an opposition party leader (Workers Party) in
the 1984 general elections. This general election was significant because it was the first time
since independence that any opposition party had won even a single seat in the parliament.
Jeyaretnam won one of the two opposition seats. In addition, his party won 41.9 per cent of the
popular vote while the ruling People’s Action Party saw a 12.9 percent decrease in the share of
the popular vote (Elections Department Singapore 2015; Singapore Elections n.d.). Seow (1997)
describes Jeyarentnam as the “prime minister’s bêtre noire” (para. 10), or someone particularly
disliked (Oxford Dictionaries 2015) by the prime minister. The governing coalition initiated a
legal action against Jeyarentnam to force his disqualification from holding elected office. After
his successful removal from parliament, Jeyarentnam was also removed from the roll of
attorneys. He petitioned and was granted leave to appeal the decision of the Supreme Court that
removed from him from the roll. In the decision overturning the lower court, Lord Bridge of
Harwich, speaks for the unanimous court and criticizes the government’s treatment of
Jeyaretnam:
Their Lordships have to record their deep disquiet that by a series of
misjudgments the appellant and his co-accused Wong have suffered a grievous
injustice. They have been fined, imprisoned, and publicly disgraced for offences
of which they were not guilty. The appellant, in addition, has been deprived of his
seat in parliament and disqualified for a year from practicing his profession. Their
Lordships’ restore him to the roll of advocates and solicitors of the Supreme
Court of Singapore, but, because of the course taken by the criminal proceedings,
their Lordships have no power to right the wrongs which the appellant and Wong
have suffered. (22)
These comments are widely viewed as directly indicting the integrity of the Singapore judiciary
and a clear rebuke of the political environment fostered by the governing coalition (Bell 1999;
Seow 1997; Worthington 2001). The Singaporean parliament passed the Constitution of the
Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act retrospectively removing the right of appeal to the
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JCPC on disciplinary matters (Bell 1999). The human rights group Asia Watch (as cited by Bell
1999, para. 3) notes that this amendment was designed to effectively erode the judiciary and the
Bar Society of Singapore. In November 1993, the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment)
Act 1993 abolished the remainder of the JCPC’s jurisdiction in Singapore (Lim 1993; Tan 2015;
Tan and Chan 2001). Tan (2015) asserts that even if Singapore recognizes the benefit of
retaining the JCPC as the final appellate court at independence, that delegation of authority is
considered expedient and expected to be withdrawn when no longer advantageous. By ending
appeals before the case could be heard by the JCPC, the Gambian governing coalition preempted
any chance that their actions could be reviewed in the Jawara case and, like the governing
coalition in Singapore, viewed the relationship with the JCPC as expendable when no longer
advantageous (Tan 2015). Like Jeyaretnam v. The Law Society of Singapore (1988), the Jawara
case from The Gambia may be characterized as the “smoking gun” that provides strong evidence
that the perception of a disconnection between the governing coalition and the JCPC resulted in
the establishment of a new final appellate court. Under the control of the governing coalition, it
was expected to uphold and legitimize their policies with no legal recourse to the extraterritorial
court.
In the case of The Gambia, the goal of having a final appellate court as partner in the
governing coalition is evidenced not just by the choice of court, but also by the establishment of
the constitutional relationship between the executive and the judiciary. Replacing the JCPC with
the Supreme Court of Gambia in October 1998 embodies the apparent need of the governing
coalition to control the judiciary. Examining the 1996 constitution provides insight into how the
governing coalition led by President Jammeh viewed the relationship with the final appellate
court. I first examine the provisions for the appointment to and removal of Supreme Court
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justices in the 1996 constitution, and then I briefly examine how the governing coalition
exercised that constitutional authority over the new Supreme Court of The Gambia.
Section 138 (1) of the 1996 Constitution provides for the appointment of a Chief Justice
by the President after consultation with the Judicial Services Commission, and Section 138 (2)
provides for the appointment of all other judges by the President on the recommendation of the
Judicial Service Commission. Section 141 of the constitution stipulates retirement criteria for
judges at 65 for the Chief Justice and 70 years for all other judges. Senghore (2010) points out,
however, that “the security of tenure of Superior Court Judges is threatened by s. 141(2) (c) of
the Constitution, which empowers the President to terminate the appointment of Superior Court
Judges in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission” (244). This is, in effect, a
“loophole in the relationship between the executive and the judiciary that weakens the latter’s
autonomy” (Senghore 2010, 224), as the members of the Judicial Service Commission are
appointed by the president. These powers of appointment and dismissal are not available to the
governing coalition when the JCPC serves as the final appellate court.
In a more democratic state, the governing coalition may be less reliant on the court for
legitimacy in contrast to a more authoritarian state. Further, more democratic regimes may be
less willing to pursue policies that likely to be challenged in court. Authoritarian states lack the
legitimacy of elections, making it more likely to want the approval of the courts (Moustafa 2014;
Solomon 2007). After ruling by decree for two years, the new governing coalition promulgated
the new constitution, which was approved through referendum and established the Second
Republic in 1997. The JCPC was replaced with the Supreme Court of The Gambia in 1998, with
the presidential authority to dismiss justices after consultation with the Judicial Service
Committee, whose members are appointed by the president.
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At independence and with the adoption of the 1970 constitution that ushered in the First
Republic, the constitutional right to appeal to the JCPC was not an issue for the governing
coalition because the level of democracy made the state less sensitive to unfavorable decisions
by the JCPC. After 28 years of democratic rule supported by stable institutions (Perfect 2010)
and a commendable record on human rights (Coleman 2013), the 1994 coup d’état changed the
trajectory of POGG in The Gambia. The Gambia is a prime example of where the change in
political environment, introduced with a coup d’état and resulting in an authoritarian state, led to
a different perception of the continued role for the JCPC.
The governing coalition’s public rationale for abolishing the JCPC was to make the final
appellate court more accessible and affordable to Gambians (The Gambia’s Independence
Golden Jubilee 2015). They presented it as merely a part of the evolution of the judiciary
(Asemota 2014). Looking at the unfavorable decisions, the new governing coalition witnessed
firsthand the power of the JCPC to undermine its policies. The small number of cases made each
noteworthy and an easy focal point representing challenges to the governing coalition. Further,
tracing the president’s use of the constitutional power to appoint and dismiss a sitting justice
point to the conclusion that replacing the JCPC with a domestic final court of appeal is to extend
the governing coalition’s control over the judiciary. The literature points to examples where the
delivery of decisions unfavorable to the state is followed closely by the dismissal of a justice
(e.g. Jammeh 2010). Further, the examination of the governing coalition’s use of the judiciary
and other governing institutions to suppress opposition activities is reflected in the assessment of
political and civil liberties.
It is clear that the governing coalition after 1994 did not view the JCPC as a viable
partner. By establishing the Supreme Court of The Gambia, the governing coalition expected to
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gain a more reliable partner – one over which it had virtually unfettered constitutional control.
The governing coalition gained leverage over the Supreme Court of The Gambia that it had not
enjoyed with the JCPC as the final appellate court. This extension of control over the final
appellate court had the effect of reducing the likelihood of successful legal challenges to the
policies of the governing coalition.
6.2.2 New Zealand
Though both The Gambia and New Zealand eventually abolished appeals to the JCPC,
the change in the political environment was much more nuanced in New Zealand than in The
Gambia. Nevertheless, the move to abolish appeals to the JCPC was no less driven by the will of
the governing coalition in a changed political environment. Though by 1907 New Zealand was
already a Dominion within the British Commonwealth, the first critical juncture happened when
the British Parliament passed the Westminster Act of 1931. The Westminster Act gave all
Dominions the option of removing the JCPC as the final appellate court. As Wilson (2010)
points out, this act was not even adopted by the New Zealand parliament until 1947 (Statute of
Westminster Adoption Act), and the role of the JCPC in the jurisprudence of New Zealand was
never seriously challenged until after World War II.
Though Sir Robert Stout, the longest serving Chief Justice in New Zealand’s history,
called for the abolition of appeals in 1908 (Cornes 2015), serious debates about the advantages
and disadvantages of abolishing the JCPC have taken place in the four ‘waves’ after the
Westminster Act of 1931. The first was in the 1940s led by then Chief Justice Sir Michael
Myers, whose cabinet report on the future of the JCPC focused on the establishment of “a
Commonwealth Court of Appeal” (Wilson 2010, 12). The same idea surfaced again in 1965,
raised by then Attorney General Hanan at the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law
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Conference in Sydney, Australia, but the idea did not gather much political support in New
Zealand (Wilson 2010). The second attempt was the subject of research by Megan Richardson
(1997). In 1987, the Labor Party government (1984-1990) announced a proposal to abolish the
JCPC at the New Zealand Law Conference. Richardson asserts that the decision to drop the
proposal was partly influenced by the decisions favoring the government in two important cases:
(1) Databank Systems Ltd v Commissioner Inland Revenue (1990) in which the JCPC supports
the state’s regulatory power over financial services; and (2) D.J. Butcher v Petrocorp
Exploration Ltd. Et al (1991) in which the JCPC upheld the state’s authority to regulate
exploration for natural resources. Richardson (1997) concludes that “…the Privy Council has, by
its actions, served to foster its continuing links with New Zealand even if that was not its
deliberate purpose” (910).
The third attempt was initiated in 1996 when the National Party introduced a bill to
parliament to abolish the JCPC. The effort was derailed by the results of general elections in
1996, which forced the National Party into a coalition government with the New Zealand First
Party who opposed the abolition of appeals to the JCPC (Courts of New Zealand n.d.; Wilson
2010). Richardson (1997) concludes that this effort was also partially influenced by the JCPC’s
decision favoring the government in Treaty Tribes Coalition v Urban Maori Authorities & the
Attorney General of New Zealand (1997). In that case, the JCPC decision supports the
government’s claim of authority to regulate fishing rights. The final and ultimately successful
attempt was initiated when the Labor Party came to power in the 1999 general elections.
The next section traces how that fourth attempt unfolded. I assess the factors and events
that point to the causal elements underpinning the abolition of appeals to the JCPC and the
establishment of the Supreme Court of New Zealand as the final appellate court in 2004. I
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discuss changes in the political environment, the debate about the structural relationship between
parliamentary sovereignty and the power of judicial review, the role of JCPC decisions, and the
influences of the governing elite and the public.
Though not the types of changes seen with The Gambian regime after the 1994 coup
d’état, there were changes in New Zealand’s political environment in 1999. Although Freedom
House reports consistently high scores for political freedom and civil liberties and the country
always maintained its status as “free” (Freedom House 2014a; Freedom House 2014b), there
were clear ideological changes in New Zealand at that time. These changes influenced the
deliberate steps taken by the governing coalition aimed at replacing the JCPC. Led by Helen
Clark, the Labour Party that won the general elections in 1999 (Electoral Commission of New
Zealand 2015) claimed the “center-left of the political spectrum” (Markey 2008, 87). The Labour
Party had a history of liberalism, relying on support from the working class and more inclined to
view government as having an important role to play in the society (Markey, 2008). The party’s
manifesto explicitly included a pledge to abolish appeals to the JCPC, reflecting a public
acknowledgement the new governing coalition did not see the JCPC as an appropriate partner to
implement its policies. This was reinforced further with the forming of the new government with
the Alliance Party. Led by Jim Anderton, the Alliance Party was also ideologically left-leaning
(Pearce 1999) and supported the abolition of the JCPC. There was also support from the Green
Party (Wilson 2010). On taking office, Prime Minister Clark and her cabinet were very
purposeful in the handling of this issue. They tried to ensure that those who raised objections
during previous attempts were heard. The cabinet had “extensive consultation with Maori, the
legal profession and the business community before it committed to the policy” (Wilson 2010,
17). This set the stage for the public debate with the December 2000 release of Discussion
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Paper: Reshaping New Zealand’s Appeal Structure (Wilson 2000). Produced by the Office of the
Attorney General in close consultation with the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister
of Justice, and Minister of Maori Affairs, the Discussion Paper (Wilson 2000) provides five
official rationales for pursing this constitutional change as follows:


“National identity and independence” (1)



“Many Commonwealth countries have abolished appeals to the Privy Council” (2)



“Few New Zealand cases are heard by the Privy Council” (2)



“New Zealand’s changing international relationships” (2)



“Cost and accessibility” (3)

Margaret Wilson was the Attorney General (1999-2005), and after leaving that post she
went on to become a professor of Law and Public Policy University of Waikato, New Zealand.
In a lecture at Inner Temple in London,3 Wilson (2010) expounds on the rationale of the new
governing coalition government for pursuing the abolition of appeals to the JCPC. Using
Wilson’s lecture notes along with other sources, I examine the official rationales in the
Discussion Paper: Reshaping New Zealand’s Appeal Structure (Wilson 2000) for pursing this
constitutional change to replace the JCPC. I start with the issue of sovereignty. As discussed in
Chapter 1, retaining the JCPC, an extraterritorial court and a relic of the colonial era, is an
apparent affront to sovereignty. This is particularly true as all other important vestiges of
institutionalized colonial rule are shed and the fact that the governing coalition of a new state has
no administrative authority over the JCPC. What Wilson (2010) makes abundantly clear,
however, is that “while abolition of appeals to the Privy Council [JCPC] was part of New
Zealand’s development towards real independence, it was not the primary motive for the
3

The Inner Temple is one of only four Inns of Court with the exclusive rights to call candidates to
practice law in England and Wales.

157

initiative” (28). Other issues such as the costs of accessing JCPC and the small number of cases
with limited value as precedent for New Zealand are addressed by former Attorney General
Wilson but seem not to be the primary focus.
I assert that there are really three distinguishable yet interconnected reasons underpinning
the governing coalition’s initiative to abolish appeals to the JCPC and establish a domestic final
appellate court. First, the Labour Party, as the leader of new governing coalition in 1999,
espoused a new vision for New Zealand as an independent state and its role in the world
community. This included revisiting of the neo-liberal economic policies championed by the
more conservative National Party (and its coalition partners) that led the previous governing
coalition (Wilson 2010). In other words, the new governing coalition intended to pursue new
policies that would put New Zealand on a different path from that the previous governing
coalition. Charting a new path required harnessing the governing institutions, including the
judiciary, to effectively develop and implement policies that advance the new economic and
political agenda. As noted by Kelly (1994), as the British Empire contracted, business ties
weakened and the values of states diverged from that of the U.K. As a result, there was less need
for shared legal systems. Wilson (2010), therefore, reflects on the governing coalition’s view that
the JCPC was not the appropriate venue to support the new vision. The JCPC was viewed as
having a limited role in producing necessary precedents for the following reasons: (1) few cases
actually going to the JCPC; (2) decline in the number of countries that use the JCPC (while
Wilson makes no direct reference to other countries having abolished appeals to the JCPC, it
should be noted that New Zealand’s Asian-Pacific neighbors Australia and Fiji abolished appeals
in 1986 and 1988, respectively); (3) statutory limitations on the JCPC’s jurisdiction in important
areas such as workers’ rights and environmental issues limited its utility as an ally; and (4) the
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influence of legal developments in the U.K. on the JCPC was deemed inappropriate for New
Zealand. This last point is particularly significant and is exemplified in the New Zealand Court
of Appeal case, R v Hansen (2007), which refers to and interprets the U.K. Human Rights Act of
1998. In the Hansen decision, Justice Tipping states, “whether [such an approach] is appropriate
in England is not for me to say, but I am satisfied that it is not appropriate in New Zealand” (as
cited by Wilson 2010, 8).
Second, as the Labour Party took control, there needed to be a re-examination of the
vision for the state and the citizens. The prevailing view was that this issue was best handled by
“the New Zealand community and by judges familiar with that community and responsible for
the maintenance of the rule of law” (Wilson 2010, 24). The new vision focused on the
relationship between parliamentary sovereignty and the power of judicial review of the policies
of the elected governing coalition. The governing coalition’s view was that New Zealand’s
domestic and international realities changed and placed on “...both parliament and the courts new
responsibilities....in a relationship better described as a ‘collaborative enterprise’…. rather the
traditional command model…” (6). The Wilson (2000) arguments are reminiscent of those put
forward by Hogg and Bushell (2007) in addressing this issue in Canada. They describe the
relationship between the courts and the legislature as a “dialogue” (79). Without explicitly
pointing a finger at the JCPC as being an unsuitable partner in New Zealand’s “collaborative
enterprise,” Wilson (2010) states that “appeals to the Privy Council [JCPC] seemed increasingly
anomalous” (16). Further, she cites examples going back to 1904 where then-Chief Justice of
New Zealand Robert Stout notes, “At present we in New Zealand are, so far as the Privy Council
is concerned, in an unfortunate position. It has shown that it knows not our statutes, our
conveyancing terms, or our history” (as cited by Wilson 2010, 11).
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Finally, I examine a sample of decisions of the JCPC on cases originating in New
Zealand in which the state is a party. Wilson (2010) indicates no displeasure with any particular
decision or the history of decision-making by the JCPC. Nevertheless, two points need to be
made. First, in referring to examples of decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeals, Wilson
(2010) states categorically that each domestic appellate court decision “accurately reflects the
constitutional reality within which the relationship between the courts, the executive and the
parliament work” (8). In other words, the judges appointed by the governing coalition understand
New Zealand and its realities with the implication being that the domestic final appellate court,
staffed with judges from New Zealand, replacing the JCPC would ipso facto or by that fact itself
(The Free Dictionary n.d.) be advantageous for New Zealand.
Second, the data on the level of success in cases from New Zealand where the state is a
party may provide some insight. From 1990 to 1998, the JCPC decisions favor the state in 80
percent of the cases. From 2000 to 2005, JCPC decisions favor the state in 57 percent of the
cases, which is a 23 percent drop from the preceding period. From 1990 to 1998 (the year before
the general elections won by the Labour Party), there were 25 cases where the state was the
respondent. The JCPC decisions favor the state in 90 percent of the cases. From 1999 to 2005,
JCPC there were 40 cases where the state was the respondent. The decisions favor the state in 61
percent of the cases, which represents a 27 percent drop from the preceding period. This
comparison of state success before the JCPC is presented in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5 Comparison of Success Rates for All Cases in which the State is a Party and Cases where
the State is the Respondent in Favor of the State Between 1990 and 2005

Even taking into consideration that there was lag time between when the petition was filed and
when the case decision was handed down by the JCPC, the difference between the two periods
compared is stark and may be indicative of a growing disconnection between the new governing
coalition’s vision for New Zealand and the JCPC.
While the governing coalition parties were united in favor of abolishing appeals, the
opposition parties were equally opposed. The National, New Zealand First, ACT New Zealand,
and United Future Parties all voted against the bill. Besides the opposition parties, there were
other opposing voices to the proposal to abolish the JCPC. These voices were predominantly
from the legal and business communities, though there was no majority consensus for or against
the proposed change (Justice and Electoral Committee Report, 2003). As most of the cases from
New Zealand that reached the JCPC were commercial disputes, those that opposed the abolition
stressed that it would negatively affect the confidence of large companies and international
investors in New Zealand (Story 2001). The editor of the New Zealand Law Journal, Bernard
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Robertson was one such opponent who felt that the JCPC contributed to “good political policy,”
and a change was politically short-sighted (cited in Story 2001, 22). John Hagan, Chairman of
Deloitte Touché Tohmatsu, spoke on behalf of his and four other accounting firms. He asserted
that commercial interests would be subject to a biased and less competent domestic court.
Finally, Robert Kerr, Chairman of the New Zealand Business Round Table, reiterated confidence
in the JCPC, particularly with regard to commercial cases, and expressed skepticism about the
Attorney General’s process of consultation about its domestic replacement (Kerr 2002).
What did the public think about the proposal to abolish appeals to the JCPC? The
Discussion Paper (Wilson 2000) released by the Office of the Attorney General presenting the
position of the governing coalition provided for a three-month period of public discussion and
written submissions following its release. The Attorney General also continued consultations
with Maori leaders, the business community, and the legal profession. When the period for
public comment ended on March 30, 2001, only 70 submissions were received, and they were
evenly split between support for and rejection of the proposal to abolish appeals (Wilson 2010).
Another period for public comment followed the first reading of the bill in Parliament on
December 9, 2002. Wilson (2010; see also the Justice and Electoral Committee Report 2003)
reports that the 312 written submissions received were again evenly split between those
supporting abolition and those favoring retention of the JCPC, while “the majority of oral
submissions supported retention” of the JCPC (21). With a population of four million in 2003
(Statistics New Zealand 2011), this level of response from New Zealanders was low by any
measure. A petition, initiated by Attorney Dennis Gates with support from the opposition parties
(National Party and ACT New Zealand), put the question of abolishing the JCPC to a referendum
that also reflected the low level of public interest. This was opposed by the governing coalition
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partners (Labour Party and New Zealand First Party). The petition failed to gather the 310,000
signatures required by law (Archive.is 2012; Justice and Electoral Committee Report 2003).
Further, a 2003 public opinion poll found that 51 percent favored the Supreme Court Bill
replacing the JCPC, but 40 percent knew nothing about the matter (UMR Research 2003).
With a solid majority in parliament (Markey 2008; Electoral Commission of New
Zealand 2015), the governing coalition moved forward and prevailed. The Supreme Court Bill
introduced in 2002 was passed after the third and final reading in Parliament on October 14,
2003. It came into force on January 1, 2004, and officially abolished any possibility of appeal to
the JCPC for all decisions of New Zealand courts made after December 31, 2003. It also
established the New Zealand Supreme Court as the final appellate court, which began hearing
appeals on July 1, 2004 (Courts of New Zealand n.d.).
Ultimately, the change in environment started with the 1999 general elections victory of
the Labour Party with a different vision for New Zealand that was deemed incompatible with a
continued role for the JCPC as part of the governing coalition. The new coalition government,
led by the Labour Party and with the support of the Alliance Party and the Green Party, did not
believe that their new domestic and international vision for New Zealand could be realized with
the JCPC as a policy-making partner. While the governing coalition did invite public
participation, it was obvious that the passing of the Supreme Court Act of 2003 was primarily
driven by the political leadership of the governing coalition parties. Wilson confirms this based
on the public’s low levels of response: “it was obvious this was not an issue that attracted a great
deal of public concern and what concern that was expressed was amongst the elites” (18).
Tracing the change in the political environment, the specified goals, and the deliberate
process of the governing coalition in imposing its will supports my theory that a governing
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coalition expects a final appellate court to be a reliable partner in the process of producing and
upholding public policy. In New Zealand, the changed political environment is not captured on
the democratic-authoritarian continuum operationalized using Freedom House or the Center for
Systemic Peace (Polity IV) data. There was, however, an ideological change in the approach of
the governing coalition representative of a moderate change enough to shift the status quo. It
influenced the governing coalition to deem the JCPC as not the best or most appropriate partner
for implementing their new vision for New Zealand. Margret Wilson, Attorney General from
2000 to 2005, was a primary collaborator with other leaders of the governing coalition that
produced the Discussion Paper (2000) that publicly presented the rationales for abolishing
appeals to the JCPC. It seems improbable that Wilson would have been unaware of the
increasingly unfavorable decisions being handed down by the JCPC. This assertion is supported
by Wilson’s statement in 2010 that “appeals to the Privy Council [JCPC] seemed increasingly
anomalous” (Wilson 2010, 16). In other words, the right of appeal to the JCPC had become
incongruous or inconsistent with the new vision for New Zealand. Even more telling was her
repetition of the Robert Stout’s 1907 comment of the JCPC’s lack of knowledge about the laws,
practices, and history of New Zealand (as cited by Wilson 2010, 11).
By establishing the New Zealand Supreme Court, the governing coalition brought this
final appellate court within the administrative control of the governing coalition. Unlike with the
JCPC, the governing coalition could control all important administrative aspects including
judicial appointments, terms of service, and fiscal allocations for the highest appellate court. The
changed political environment with the results of the 1999 general elections was enough to
effectively forge a change to an important institution in the judiciary. This change in the political
climate was not as drastic as that ushered in by the 1994 coup d’état in The Gambia. The
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constitutional change in both states, however, was driven by the will of the governing coalition
influenced by the political climate and the perception of the governing coalition that the JCPC
was no longer a viable partner. The JCPC no longer served the purposes of the governing
coalition, resulting in the need to establish a domestic final appellate court. The importance of
the political will to effect change was summarized by the former President of the New Zealand
Court of Appeal, Sir Thaddeus McCarthy. He stated in 1976 that he had no doubt that the
questions surrounding severing ties with the JCPC “are ultimately political questions”
(Richardson 1997, 915; 1976 New Zealand Law Review, 380).
The effect of election results on the political climate in Singapore is again worthy of note.
The literature points to the JCPC decision involving opposition leader Joshua Benjamin
Jeyaretnam as the tipping point for the governing coalition, resulting in the abolition of the JCPC
(Seow 1997; Tan 2015). In the Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam decision, the Law Lords directly
criticize the government’s treatment of Jeyaretnam, and the following year the JCPC was
removed as the final appellant court. This was not unlike what occurred in The Gambia, where
the Jawara petition to the JCPC was thwarted when the governing coalition abolished appeals to
the JCPC. The political decision to replace the JCPC was in service of the governing coalition’s
goal of having a final appellate court as a reliable policy-making partner. While the change in the
political environment is subtler in New Zealand, the election of the Labour Party with a new
vision for the state was enough to move the governing coalition to abandon ties with the JCPC.
These two cases exemplify and support my theory that the goal of the governing coalition is to
have a court that it can rely on for support when legal challenges to its policies are mounted. In a
political environment where the status quo is no longer advantageous, the governing coalition
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may galvanize the political will to replace the extraterritorial court with a domestic final
appellate court over which it has leverage.
6.2.3 The Commonwealth of The Bahamas (The Bahamas)
Unlike The Gambia and New Zealand, The Bahamas retains the constitutional right of
appeal to the JCPC as of January 1, 2015. Since independence in 1973, The Bahamas remains a
parliamentary democracy with general elections every five years, as provided for in the
independence constitution. The two political parties in The Bahamas, the Free National
Movement (FNM) and the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), have both led governing coalitions
after independence with consistently peaceful transitions of power (Meditz and Hanratty 1987).
While the PLP governed from 1973 until its general election loss in 1992, that election as well as
subsequent elections, were driven overwhelmingly by issues of domestic economic policies,
increasing crime rates that affected the large tourist industry, and allegations of official
corruption (Country Watch 2015). The general elections and power transfers from one governing
coalition to another were unconstrained and peaceful. Like New Zealand, it has not experienced
any drastic changes in the political environment since independence and has received
consistently favorable scores for its high levels of democratic freedoms. This is reflected in the
Freedom House scores for political freedom and civil liberties exhibiting a high level of
democracy in The Bahamas. It has been consistently rated as “free” since independence
(Freedom House 2013a, b).
Since independence in 1973, the decisions that draw attention to the question of the status
of the JCPC as the final appellate court involve the death penalty. This is an issue that
reverberates around the Commonwealth Caribbean. Ghany (2000) contends that the JCPC has an
agenda in the Commonwealth Caribbean and concludes that “It is now clear that there is an
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agenda to make it difficult for Commonwealth Caribbean states to carry out the death penalty”
(42). There is general public support for the death penalty in the other Commonwealth Caribbean
states and unhappiness with JCPC decisions on that issue (Anthony 2003). Bahamians are also
unhappy with the JCPC’s decisions (Dames 2011; Toote 2013). Despite support in The Bahamas
for the JCPC to continue as the final appellate court (Gibson 2009; Toote 2013), the discourse is
bifurcated. The major part of the public discourse focuses on the JCPC and the death penalty,
with a separate discussion on the wider role the JCPC in Bahamian jurisprudence. I suggest that
this bifurcation in the discourse on any change in the status quo reflects a lack of consensus and
will on the part of the governing coalition to change the status quo.
I first address the discussion on the general status of the JCPC. In an interview, the
former President of The Bahamian Bar Association, Ruth Bowe Darville, explicitly supports the
retention of the JCPC (Rolle 2012). Darville points out that those who advocate the removal of
the JCPC are “treading in very dangerous waters,” as “litigants who come before us with
multi‐million dollar cases and they see us as a great financial center, they need assurance that the
Privy Council [JCPC] is there” (as cited by Rolle 2012, para. 4). In other words, the JCPC is
needed to demonstrate and reinforce the independence of the judiciary to those with economic
interest in The Bahamas. This argument is reminiscent of that used by the sectors of the business
community in New Zealand. Further, The Bahamas Advantage (December 27, 2007), the
newsletter of The Bahamas Financial Services Board, reports that Prime Minister Ingraham
reiterated the link between judicial independence and the continued role of the JCPC as the final
appellate court. The Bahamian Prime Minister states in his welcoming remarks to the Law Lords
convening for the second time in Nassau (the capital city) in 2007 that he:
reaffirmed the government’s commitment to maintain judicial independence in The
Bahamas…that the political institutions of parliamentary democracy in The Bahamas are
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modeled after Westminster, and it’s legal and judicial institutions are based on English
tradition, which he credited for the stability and prosperity The Bahamas has enjoyed
through the years. (para. 3)
A contrary position is offered by Bahamian attorney-at-law Adrian Gibson (December 2009).
He challenges the continued use of the JCPC as an affront to sovereignty and asserts that, “The
relevance of the law in local circumstances is best achieved by locals, not regional or far distant
courts whose law Lord’s thinking is not superior to that of the most ethical and scrupulous
Bahamian jurists.” (para. 26) He also notes that the JCPC praised the quality of decisions handed
down by the domestic court of appeals and states that “the notion that we can govern ourselves
but are not capable of judging ourselves is a non sequitur this is simply illogical” (para. 24). The
most divisive and actively debated issue with regard to the JCPC is that of the death penalty. Of
the total of 53 decisions, 18 involve appeals against the death penalty, with the JCPC overturning
the sentence in 15 (83 percent) decisions. Figure 6.6 displays the percentage of
favorable/unfavorable JCPC decisions for all cases in which the state was a party, with the state
winning 59 percent of the cases. In all other types of cases also displayed in Figure 5.6, the state
did much better, with a favorable outcome in 62 percent of those decisions. This was 58 percent
above the success rate in death penalty cases. This would draw much less attention, and make it
less likely that the state would perceive a disconnection with the JCPC. In death penalty cases,
however, the results displayed in Figure 5.6 are much different. This shows the variation in
outcomes and that the death penalty cases have been such a point of focus where 83 percent of
the appeals against the death penalty were successful or unfavorable to the state.

168

41

All Cases

59

Death Penalty Cases

% Unfavorable
to State

83

17

% Favorable to
State
38

Other Cases

62
0

20

40

60

80

100

Figure 6.6 Comparison of Success Rates for All Cases in which the State is a Party; Death Penalty
Cases and All Other Cases

Further, all the death penalty cases adjudicated by the JCPC between 1995 and 2013
present a strong indication as to why this issue would be so prominent in The Bahamas. A closer
look at the death penalty cases shows that the decrease in the state’s success rate in upholding the
death penalty before the JCPC. Figure 6.7 displays the states win average in death penalty
decisions handed down by the JCPC. Following the JCPC’s decision in Maxo Tido v The Queen
(2011) to overturn the death penalty sentence handed down by the domestic court of appeals in
2002, a former President of The Bahamian Bar Association, Ruth Bowe Darville, was reported
as saying, “I think the question of the death penalty needs to be addressed. I think the country is
torn by it because we’re in the throes of this crime epidemic as people have labeled it” (as cited
by McCartney June 25, 2011, para. 12). Darville suggested that the issue of the death penalty be
addressed through legislation, but with the knowledge that care must be taken not to offend the
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international community and that any action is linked to the economic well-being of The
Bahamas.
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Figure 6.7 The State Win Rate Percent per Year from 1995 to 2013 in Death Penalty Cases

Religious leaders presented another view of the issue. While Toote (2013) asserts that the
majority of the Bahamians supported the death penalty, an important divide existed in the
religious leadership. The Anglican Bishop and the Methodist synod came out against the death
penalty (Toote 2013). In 2009, the Roman Catholic Archbishop reaffirmed the Church’s stance
against the death penalty (BahamaCatholic 2009). However, the majority of Baptists, the single
largest denomination in The Bahamas at 40 percent of the population, supported the death
penalty (Toote 2013).
Only a minority of politicians came out publicly in support of the death penalty (Toote
2013). Not surprisingly, therefore, the reaction of the governing coalition is cautious. It tries to
separately address the issues of the death penalty and any calls to completely abolish appeals to
the JCPC. In addition, unlike the very public position in favor of abolishing appeals to the JCPC
taken by the Labour Party’s Manifesto for New Zealand, the approach of the political party

170

leading the governing coalition and the opposition party reflects the bifurcated approach to the
issue of the JCPC. In its Charter of Governance, the governing PLP acknowledged that death
penalty decisions of the JCPC constrained the state’s ability to enforce the death penalty. Instead
of calling for the abolition of the JCPC, it pledged to ensure “that all avenues of appeal are
exhausted without delay. Cases that are complete and warrant the death penalty shall be deposed
of expeditiously…. fast-tracked to the Supreme Court to ensure that our laws are no longer
reduced to bluffs” (Progressive Liberal Party 2011). This was a commitment by the governing
coalition to follow the rule of law. It was also a pledge to abide by the JCPC precedent set in
Pratt and Another v Attorney General and Another (1993) that overturned the death penalty
sentence on the grounds of undue delay. The opposition FNM makes two main promises in the
party’s manifesto. First, it promises to reduce delays in the prosecution of criminal cases
(Manifesto ’07, 4). Second, in a 2014 speech, the Hon. Dr. Hubert A Minnis, Leader of the
Opposition, promises to introduce a bill that would mandate that “an appeal against a sentence of
death can only be made to the Bahamas Court of Appeal, and nowhere else” (Minnis 2014, para.
35). Such a constitutional amendment would effectively oust the jurisdiction of the JCPC
specifically, but only in death penalty cases. This approach was an effort to recognize voter
support for the death penalty, and to retain the JCPC for all other matters to reassure those
interested in retaining the JCPC as a hallmark of credibility and independence of the Bahamian
judiciary.
The bifurcated discourse about the role of the JCPC in The Bahamas was driven
primarily by the single issue of the death penalty, on one hand, and the broader approach of those
who advocated the retention of the JCPC as an institution important to the credibility of the
Bahamian judiciary, on the other. This took place in a dynamic democracy where the political
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leaders were influenced by conflicting positions among the elite and the voting public. The result
was a cautious approach to the issue of the continued role of the JCPC and no strong political
will to replace the JCPC with a domestic final appellate court. While the governing coalition was
sensitive to the JCPC decisions on the death penalty, the fact that the discontent was charged by
a single issue made it difficult to ignore other elite forces and interests who favored a continued
role for the JCPC.
In The Bahamas, the political environment did not change enough to precipitate a strong
enough reaction to the JCPC to create the political will within the governing coalition to abolish
appeals. This does not discount the direct, albeit narrow, proposal to oust the jurisdiction of the
JCPC in death penalty cases only. This proposal in the 2014 speech by the leader of the
opposition party (Minnis 2014) was just that – a proposal, and one not reflected in the party
manifesto. There is no way to predict if any future victory by the current opposition (FNM)
would lead to the change in political environment and clear political will to replace the JCPC.
This is in contrast to New Zealand, which also enjoys a strong democratic tradition. The position
of the Labour Party was clear in its manifesto leading up to the 1999 general elections. When the
Labour Party took power after the general elections in 1999, the governing coalition had a clear
vision for change that it successfully executed. There was no single issue that engaged the elite
or the voting public. The change was forged by a political vision for New Zealand in which the
JCPC was not considered an appropriate partner in the new governing coalition.
6.3

Summary and Conclusions
Ultimately, it was the goals and political will of the governing coalition in The Gambia

and New Zealand that drove the process of abolishing the JCPC in favor of a domestic final
appellate court. The motivation of the governing coalition was shaped, in part, by the existence
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of an extraterritorial court over which it had no control and by varying degrees of sensitivity to
the decisions handed down by the JCPC. The governing coalitions appeared particularly
sensitive to unfavorable decisions to the state or the possibility of such decisions and not just the
relationship with the extraterritorial court. While there are commonalities among the three states,
there are distinct socio-cultural, economic, and political differences articulated in this chapter
that make them appropriate selections from the sample of 26 states that retained the JCPC at
independence used in Chapter 5. These three cases support my theory that the governing
coalition expects the final appellate court to be a reliable partner and will replace the court if a
disconnection in policy is broadly reflected in the decisions of the court and if there is a change
in the political environment. While in The Gambia and New Zealand the JCPC no longer served
the purposes of the governing coalitions, The Bahamas is a clear example where the governing
coalition with support from other elites still considers the JCPC a reliable partner and asset to the
credibility of the judiciary.
In The Gambia, the drastic change in the political environment was precipitated by a
military coup d’état and resulted in the adoption of an entirely new constitution. In the changed
political environment, the governing coalition may have been more sensitive to unfavorable
JCPC decisions undermining its legitimacy. My examination suggests that the replacement of the
JCPC in 1998 may have been an indirect response to the possibility of the politically charged
Jawara case reaching the JCPC. By replacing the JCPC, the appeal process had to be aborted,
and the decision of the domestic court of appeal favorable to the governing coalition remained.
However, the adoption of the new constitution changed the governing institutions and the
relationship between the state and the citizens.
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While the character of the change in the political environment in New Zealand was
subtler, it was clearly articulated and executed by the governing coalition. A more detailed
examination of the political environment reveals that more nuanced changes in the political
environment can also be important. The election of a party with a different ideology and vision
for the state led New Zealand to the abolition of appeals to the JCPC. The process tracing
approach facilitates examination of the nature JCPC decisions and links them to events within
the state. The governing coalition viewed the JCPC as incompatible with its new vision. Once
the governing coalition was sufficiently motivated, the constitutional change abolishing appeals
is realized fairly quickly, despite having allowed appeals for 74 years. The political decision to
abolish the JCPC was done by amendment without the adoption of a new constitution, as seen in
The Gambia.
The examination of The Bahamas reveals that while the governing coalition was sensitive
to the unfavorable decisions, the discontent was only with JCPC decisions involving the death
penalty, with conflicting views among the elite and the public on that issue. Unfavorable
decisions on this particular single issue were not enough to threaten the legitimacy of the
governing coalition. Further, any discontent with the JCPC decisions on this single issue was
accompanied by neither subtle nor drastic changes in the political environment. As a result, there
was no nexus between any reaction to unfavorable JCPC decisions and a change in political
environment producing a governing coalition with the political will to replace the JCPC with a
domestic appellate court.

174

7
7.1

CONCLUSIONS

Summary and Major Findings
The primary goal of my dissertation is to examine and contribute to our understanding of

the relationship between extraterritorial courts and states. More particularly, it is to suggest
explanations for why a state would accede to an extraterritorial court which has the jurisdiction
to constrain the policies of the state’s governing coalition. I suggest that the state’s relationship
with an extraterritorial court is underpinned by the prestige and reputation of being associated
with the court and the expectation of reliability of the court decisions when the governing
coalition’s policies are challenged. Accepting the jurisdiction of an extraterritorial court,
therefore, is prefaced by that expectation, and if not realized the state would act to remove the
jurisdiction of the court. The state’s continued relationship with the court is partly influenced by
the perceived benefit of being associated with the court. Based on the case study, my
examination finds that multiply factors contribute to the perception of the governing coalition.
These factors are interconnected contributes to whether the governing coalition is willing to
accept this apparent affront to sovereignty and JCPC retain at independence for the perceived
benefit and credibility that court could bring to the new state. This suggests that the decision of
state to accede to other extraterritorial court is partially influenced by the governing coalition
perceiving some benefit. I suggest that the benefit may be garnered by signaling to other states
that the state is part of the international community and adding to their legitimacy. My case also
provided the opportunity to examine what happens after the state acceded. Among those states
that retained the JCPC at independence, the emergence of the political will to subsequently
change the status quo is driven in part by the nature of the court ‘s decisions and the domestic
political environment. How then are the decisions of current extraterritorial courts and changes in
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the domestic political environment influencing the relationship with member states? Are there
implications for current extraterritorial courts?
To the extent that the literature focuses on the JCPC, it is limited to the judicial process
and qualitative research on a few states (Weiden 2010). Only focusing on a few states using a
single methodological approach does not provide a more general understanding of why states
would choose an extraterritorial court as the court of final appeal. Other research focusing on the
economic benefits of retaining appeals to the JCPC (Voigt et al, 2007) are post facto and provide
no insight into why the states may choose the JCPC at the critical junctures.
Given that the final appellate court has the power of judicial review, this makes the court
an important legitimizing legal institution within the governing coalition. The causal logic of my
theory is grounded in the goals of the governing coalition having a broad range of public policies
supported by the final appellate court as a feature of constitutional rule. I theorize that the
governing coalitions want a final court of appeal that can be relied on as a partner in policymaking. When legal challenges are mounded, the governing coalition ultimately wants its
policies to be upheld and legitimized by the court. Justice Jallow notes that the “judiciary,
therefore, functions to ensure legality, fairness, accountability and objectivity in the process of
governing” (as cited by Senghore 2010, 216). The goal of a governing coalition, therefore, is to
ensure that the extraterritorial final court of appeal is a reliable partner in the policy-making
process of the governing coalition for POGG.
Ultimately, I seek only to better understand the factors influencing the decision of the
governing coalition with regard to the final court of appeal as a policy-making institution. We are
in era of an increasingly globalizing world with the emergence of new extraterritorial courts. My
results suggest that unfavorable decisions of the court can influence the decision to abolish the
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jurisdiction of the court. Further, the governing coalition’s political will to remove the court is
dependent on and shaped by the domestic political environment. Changes in the political
environment may be in the nature of the regime on the democratic-autocratic continuum, or more
changes in the governing coalition relationship with the people and in the vision for the state may
make the extraterritorial court incompatible or a potential liability. The implication is that the
role of extraterritorial courts is dependent upon the interests of the state. My findings could have
implications for other extraterritorial courts such as the International Criminal Court, the
International Court of Justice, the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights. Though the jurisdictions of these courts vary, the policies of states that accede to
the conventions that establish these courts are influenced and constrained by the decisions.
The case of the British Commonwealth and the JCPC provides an extended time period,
states, and data to examine the phenomenon of extraterritorial courts. In Chapter 1, I introduced
extraterritorial courts and two current examples of interactions between states and these courts.
In Chapter 2 I then showcased the expansion of the British Empire, the development of the
JCPC, and the significant role it played in the colonial enterprise and as an important and
arguably the first extraterritorial court. In Canada, for example, the JCPC played an important
role in the struggle between the provinces and the central government over the interpretation of
the North American Act between 1867 and 1949, when appeals were finally abolished (Johnson
2012; Swinfin 1987; Tuck 2006; 1994). Not only is the choice of final appellate court integral to
policy-making and implementation, but also the choice of an extraterritorial court such as the
JCPC as a final court of appeal appears to contradict the general understanding of state
sovereignty while enhancing the credibility and legitimacy of the new state.
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In Chapter 3 I present my theory and hypotheses. I argue that the choice of court is
underpinned by the path-dependent effects of colonial rule experienced by the state leading up to
independence. This influences the governing coalitions’ expectations of this prestigious and
reputable extraterritorial court. States, however, can change course after independence. Changing
conditions and new developments in the political environment can disrupt the status quo,
resulting in institutional alterations. I posit that unfavorable decisions by the court and changes in
the political environment create the impetus for the governing coalition to abolish the jurisdiction
of the extraterritorial court.
It is important to better understand what factors help shape the decisions of the governing
coalition with regard to the JCPC at the critical junctures. Using the JCPC and the British
Commonwealth as my case, my mixed methods comparative research focuses on the questions of
why states choose this extraterritorial court and what factors influence some states to
subsequently decide to change course. In Chapter 4, I analyzed the first critical juncture at
independence when the emerging governing coalition had the first opportunity to participate in
the decisions about the governing institutions to be enshrined in a new constitution, and in
particular the final appellate court. The choice is either to establish a domestic final appellate
court or to retain the JCPC as the final court. Large states including Australia, Canada, India, and
Malaysia as well as small states such as The Gambia, The Bahamas, Singapore, and Kiribati
retained the JCPC. My challenge was to better understand why colonies, on becoming
independent of the colonial power, would choose to retain an important colonial institution like
the JCPC. This speaks to the issue of the persistence of important institutions that have existed
for an extended period of time and the states perception of the institution. I assert that the
emerging governing coalition that led the colony to independence represents the change in the
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political environment necessary to gain independence from the colonial power. However, in
some states the change in the political environment did not result in the severance of all ties with
the U.K. Based on the perception of the JCPC, the new governing coalition in some states chose
to retain the JCPC, expecting this final court of appeal to support its policies. The decision that
resulted in the persistence of this institution was influenced by the strength of the colonial
influence that shaped their perception of the JCPC. The quantitative analyses of the 50 states
provide some support for my theory – the stronger the ties between the colony and the U.K., the
more likely the states were to retain the JCPC. These findings highlight historical underpinnings
that link the past and the future (Vergne and Durand 2010). In other words, change is hard and
the perception of the governing coalition is shaped by the context. The extended presence and
reputation of the JCPC during the colonial period would support the retention of the JCPC and
the expectation of the governing coalition that the court would be a reliable partner in policymaking.
In Chapter 5, I asserted that states sever ties with the extraterritorial court when a
disconnection develops and there is doubt that their policies will be supported. Of the 30 states
that accepted the apparent anomaly of this colonial extraterritorial final appellate court at
independence, 19 subsequently abolished appeals, leaving 13 states that maintained the status
quo. Though not inevitable, this juncture is the function of the governing coalition’s perception
of the extraterritorial court influenced by a disconnection that developed over time between the
court and the state with a heightened sensitivity to the role of the extraterritorial court in its
affairs. If the perception is that the court’s decisions become increasingly unlikely to reflect their
preferences, the governing coalition may view this as a threat to the legitimacy of their policies
(Dahl 1957). I analyze the factors that led the governing coalition of some states to replace that
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court while others retain the JCPC. I demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that the
governing coalition’s decision to abolish appeals at some point after independence is
significantly influenced by the decisions of cases adjudicated by the court. Further, it is the
changes in the political environment of the state that heighten the governing coalition’s
sensitivity to the decision. These two factors can provide sufficient political will for the change
in final appellate court. The results of the SPS analysis on the 26 states that retained the JCPC at
independence generally support the two tenets of my theory. First, governing coalitions are
responsive to decisions of the JCPC, and unfavorable decisions increase the likelihood the JCPC
will be replaced. Second, changes in the political environment influence actions of the governing
coalition. The findings of the quantitative analyses are supported by the qualitative analyses of
The Gambia, New Zealand, and The Bahamas explicated in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 6, I conducted a within-case comparison using causal-process observations
leading to the abolition of appeals to the JCPC. This involves a closer examination of historical
events and how political changes influence the governing coalition. I examined the interactions
among the governing elite, public opinion, and how shifts in the attitude of the governing
coalition towards the extraterritorial court can lead to the political will necessary for abolition of
appeals to that court. The governing coalitions in the three states exhibited differing degrees of
sensitivity to the unfavorable decisions of the JCPC. When changes in the political environment
heightened political sensitivity to unfavorable decisions, two (New Zealand and The Gambia) of
the three states replaced the JCPC. In The Gambia, the overthrow of the democratically elected
Jawara government by the military ushered in the autocratic period reflected in Freedom House
(2014a) and Polity IV Project (2014) scores. This is similar to events in Fiji in 1987 (Martin
1988). In both cases the new governing coalition abolished the jurisdiction of the JCPC within
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two years. In Singapore, opposition election victories led the government to take legal action to
expel an opposition leader, Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam (Bell 1999; Seow 1997), and to remove
him from the roll of attorneys. The governing coalition abolished the jurisdiction of the JCPC
following Jeyaretnam’ s successful appeal to the JCPC in 1988. That JCPC decision also
contained scathing criticisms of the Singaporean judiciary and the persecution of Jeyaretnam
(Bell 1999; Seow 1997; Worthington 2001).
This qualitative analysis revealed that changes in the political environment on a
democratic-autocratic continuum may not capture changes that still influence the position of the
governing coalition vis-à-vis the JCPC. In reality, more nuanced changes in the political
environment can be important. In New Zealand, the 1999 victory of the Labour Party shifted the
vision for New Zealand, which was deemed incompatible with a continued role for the JCPC as
the final appellate court (Wilson 2010). In the case of The Bahamas, the political parties
contested regular peaceful parliamentary elections since independence in 1973 with the two
major political parties campaigning on primarily domestic economic, public safety, and
corruption issues (Country Watch 2015; Meditz and Hanratty 1987). In the arena of public
safety, a bifurcated response to unfavorable decisions by the JCPC showed a negative response
to the single issue of the death penalty while general support for the JCPC remained. The public
and elite responses did not produce enough of a change in the political environment. As a result,
there was no strong political will to replace the JCPC with a domestic final appellate court.
My results point to some important questions facing the emergence and effectiveness of
extraterritorial courts and tribunals. Do extraterritorial courts support the policies of the states? If
a state accedes to an extraterritorial court, are they ready to accept unfavorable decisions that
constrain national policies? If the findings in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are correct, the states will be
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more likely to accede to an extraterritorial court with the expectation that it is expected
contribute to the reputation of the state and be a reliable partner. The states are sensitive to the
decisions of the court, which can precipitate a response from the governing coalition and may
negate any perceived benefit accrued to their reputation by acceding to the court. Further, the
response is influenced by the political environment, and responses can vary depending on the
degree of change. It does not require an endogenous shock such as military coup, as seen in The
Gambia and Fiji; changes in the majority political party, as in New Zealand and Canada,
constitute a significant shift as well. In other words, high levels of democracy do not necessarily
insulate extraterritorial courts from the changing expectations of governing coalitions. In the case
of South Africa, the victorious National Party in 1948 which championed apartheid policies
sensed the changed attitudes in the U.K. and the Empire in relation to race and race equality
(Hyam and Henshaw 2003). If those policies were challenged, the National Party seemed to
anticipate the possibility of unfavorable decisions by the JCPC. Abolition of that court in 1950
was quickly followed by a series of laws further entrenching the apartheid system
(Commonwealth Network 2015).
7.2

Implications
The goal of my research is to better understand the relationship between extraterritorial

courts and states. First, extraterritorial courts such as the ECJ and the ICC do not have the 400year tradition and reputation that contributed to the propensity of former British colonies to
retain the JCPC at independence. My findings suggest that how embedded the institution is in the
governing structures of the state influences the governing coalition and contributes to the
persistence of the institution. The state’s governing coalition does pay attention to the decisions
of the court, and its ability to tolerate unfavorable decisions or the possibility of unfavorable
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decisions is influenced by the domestic political environment. The results of my analysis of the
JCPC and British Commonwealth states have two major implications. Second, the strength of the
tie between the state and the extraterritorial court is influenced by how long the relationship has
existed. In other words, the longer the relationship between the state and the extraterritorial
court, the more difficult it is for the governing coalition to marshal the political will to sever ties.
However, the longer extraterritorial courts are utilized by the state the less likely the state is to
sever ties. Third, the perception of the reliability of the extraterritorial court is influenced by the
decisions of the courts and the domestic political environment. Ultimately, therefore, the state’s
commitment to the continued jurisdiction of the court is based on that expectation that its
policies are likely to be upheld and, if not realized, the courts will be considered expendable. The
broad implication is that while states remain publicly interested in the jurisdiction of
extraterritorial courts and the relationship with the state, their commitment to accepting the
jurisdiction of these courts is heavily determined by the states’ perception of where their interests
lie and whether the courts will support their policies. States seem unwilling to merely push for
renegotiation of the administrative and institutional structures but to sever ties with
extraterritorial court. This is exemplified by South Africa’s withdrawal from the ICC (Duggard
2013) and threats by the U.K. to with draw from the ECJ (Watt 2015).
7.3

Further Questions and Research Opportunities
The first phase of analyzing 50 states at the first critical juncture of independence

supports the claim that colonial rule has a significant influence on the new governing coalition’s
choice of final appellate court. The second phase quantitatively analyzes the effects of decisions
and the domestic environment in 26 states that retained the JCPC at independence. The findings
that these factors are significant are further supported by the qualitative analyses of the
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experiences of The Gambia, New Zealand, and The Bahamas with regard to the JCPC. My
findings support the claim that the decisions of the JCPC in cases to which the state is a party
and changes in the political environment have a significant and predictable effect on the choice
to abolish appeals to the JCPC and establish a domestic final court of appeal. Nevertheless, as is
always the case, there are further questions that remain unanswered and issues unsettled.
Research in this area is no exception. It presents many opportunities for additional research to
expand our knowledge about the future of extraterritorial courts and the interaction of these
institutions with the governing coalitions in states.
First, based on the case of states having replaced the JCPC, is the domestic final appellate
court a reliable partner? In other words, is the new court more likely to uphold and legitimize the
policies of the governing coalition? While Tan (2015) points out that the governing coalition in
Singapore never lost a defamation or slander case in the lower courts, it is important to determine
how governing coalitions faired across multiple jurisdictions. Further comparative cross-national
research on the decisions of the courts is needed to determine whether states are more successful
before domestic final courts of appeal than they were when appeals went to the JCPC. This also
is important as the role of the judiciary goes beyond dispute resolution and into the broad realm
of public policy development (Tate and Vallinder 1995; Tate and Sittowong 1989) as a partner of
the governing coalition. The emphasis should be on cases where the state is a litigant (appellant
or respondent). In other words, are domestic final appellate courts a more reliable partner for the
governing coalition than extraterritorial courts? There is a need for more comparative analyses of
the actual decisions of the other extraterritorial courts including the Caribbean Court of Justice
(CCJ), the Inter-American court of Human Rights (IACHR) and the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights (ACJHR). For example, the CCJ replaced the JCPC for three Caribbean
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Community (CARICOM) states (Barbados, Belize, and Guyana), and there is the potential for 13
more CARICOM states to accede to the court. With both original and appellate jurisdictions, the
CCJ heard its first case in 2007 and has adjudicated 75 cases as of January 1, 2015 (The
Caribbean Court of Justice 2015). Has the CCJ been a reliable partner for the governing coalition
in the three states that currently use it as the final appellate court?
Second, while the literature on the European Court of Justice (EJC) is increasing, there is
a gap in our understanding of the development of extraterritorial courts outside of Europe and the
role played in broader regional integration as experienced throughout the European Community
(Garrett et al 1998). There are opportunities to increase our understanding of existing
extraterritorial courts such as the CCJ, IACHR, and ACJHR. Accepting that institutional
structure matter (Robinson 2012), several more questions emerge about extraterritorial courts.
What is the structure of the CCJ that makes it a viable extraterritorial court? While agreeing in
principle to the CCJ in the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973 (Caribbean Community Secretariat
2011b), are there institutional concerns explaining why more CARICOM member states have not
acceded to the CCJ? Further, how does the CCJ compare to other extraterritorial courts, and what
can we glean from those efforts to design, build capacity, and increase the chances of success of
fledgling courts?
Another example is the African Court of Human and People’s Rights. Established in
2009, it may not yet have adjudicated enough cases to determine any significant tendencies or
trends in its decisions. Additionally, it probably needs more time to build up a reputation and the
institutional strengths that can not only encourage more African states to accede, but also
increase the likelihood that states will be constrained by its decisions. In addition, there have
been other extraterritorial courts in Africa, for example, the East African Court of Appeals
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(EACA) that served Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The EACA (1967-1977) emerged from a
colonial court of appeal only to be abandoned later by the member states (Harvard Law School
Library 2014; Katende and Kanyeihamba 1973). Katende and Kanyeihamba (1973) state that
“the reactions of the governments to decisions of the Court have not always been favorable”
(52). Further, there is the African Court of Justice based on the Constitutive Act of the African
Union adopted in 1999 that is yet to be realized (African International Courts and Tribunals n.d.).
Yet, it is important to increase our understanding of what precipitated the development of the
court and of the features of the court that may increase the confidence of states in its abilities and
independence for current and future courts.
Third, in a world of growing economic interdependence with international agreements
and laws impacting domestic laws and governance (Keohane and Nye 1987; Slaughter 2000;
1995), do exterritorial courts have a role to play in fostering cooperation and economic
development? In a comparison of states (former British colonies) that retained with those that
abolished appeals to the JCPC, Voigt et al (2007) conclude that the JCPC contributes to investor
confidence and economic development. There is a need for more comparative research on cases
such as the ECJ and CCJ. Have these extraterritorial courts contributed to the political and
economic development of member states? Research is particularly lacking outside of Europe and
the ECJ. Besides the CCJ, there is a growing body of decisions from other extraterritorial courts
such as the Inter-American Court on Human Rights and the African Court on Human and
People’s Rights.
Fourth, my research focuses mainly on changes to the regime and effects on the political
environment. The case of New Zealand shows that changes in political ideology are important.
The change from the more conservative National Party to the more liberal Labour Party in 1999
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did not result in any drastic changes in the nature of the democracy. However, the change did
alter the vision of the governing coalition that the final appellate court would be the most
appropriate and reliable partner in furthering national policies. The quantitative data does point
to the tendency of states to replace the JCPC when there are changes in the nature of the regime.
As discussed earlier, nine of the 10 states that experienced changes in the regime did abolish
appeals to the JCPC (see Figure 5.1). We need a better understanding of the nature of the
changes, with particular emphasis on ideological differences of the political parties, and how that
influences the governing coalition’s approach to and relationship with the final appellate court,
or what Weiden (2010) refers to as “judicial politicization theory” (p. 336).
In an era of increasing globalization and regional integration, the emergence and
continuing relevance of extraterritorial courts does not seem to be in doubt. An institution of the
Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had
1,955 petitions and cases pending from 34 states in 2014, which was 37 percent more petitions
and cases than in 2006, from 30 states (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2014).
The Caribbean Court of Justice has been functioning since 2005. Although only three members
of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have acceded to the court, 81 cases have been
adjudicated between 2005 and 2015 (Caribbean Court of Justice 2015). Other regional
organizations have also discussed extraterritorial courts, including an International Islamic Court
of Justice as envisioned by the Organization of Islamic Conference (Romano 2013); the Arab
Court of Justice was discussed by the League of Arab States (Romano 2013); and the Mercado
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) is developing a framework for the MERCOSUR Court of Justice
as part of the process of integration by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and
Venezuela (full members) along with Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador (associate members)
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(Vervaele 2005). The ECJ and ECtHR remain the most successful examples of modern
extraterritorial courts. They have evolved over a long period of political peace among E.U.
member states (Romano 2013). These developments exemplify the growing importance of
extraterritorial courts around the world and the need to intensify and expand the research on their
relationships with states.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: The length of colonial rule for each state in the sample
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Appendix B: Length of self-government prior to independence for the 50 states
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Appendix C: Colonies excluded and sets included for analysis
Excluded from
Analysis
Hybrids
Cameroon
Somalia
Yemen
Internal Colonies
N. Ireland
Wales
Scotland
Mandate Territories
Iraq
Jordan
Palestine
Middle East
Egypt
Kuwait

Included in Analysis
Antigua & Barbuda
Australia
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Botswana
Brunei
Canada
Cyprus
Dominica
Fiji
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guyana
India
Jamaica
Kenya
Kiribati
Lesotho
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Malta
Mauritius

Myanmar
Nauru
New Zealand
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
Rep. of Ireland
Pakistan
Samoa
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts/Nevis
St. Vincent/ Grenadines
Swaziland
Tanzania/ Zanzibar
Tuvalu
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Uganda
Vanuatu
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Appendix D: The 30 states that retained appeals and the 20 states that abolished appeals to
the JCPC at independence

Retained Appeals to JCPC (30 states)
Antigua &
Guyana
Sri Lanka
Barbuda
Fiji
Australia
India
St. Kitts & Nevis
Bahamas
Jamaica
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
Barbados
Kenya
St. Lucia
Belize
Brunei

Kiribati
Malaysia

Trinidad & Tobago
Tuvalu

Canada
Dominica
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada

Mauritius
New Zealand
Nigeria
Singapore
South Africa

Uganda

Abolished Appeals to JCPC (20 states)
Botswana
Samoa
Cyprus

Lesotho
Malawi
Ireland,
Rep. of
Maldives
Malta
Myanmar
Nauru
Papua New
Guinea

Seychelles
Sierra
Leone
Solomon
Islands
Swaziland
Tanzania/
Zanzibar
Tonga
Vanuatu
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Appendix E: The year of independence; number of years as a colony and when state
retained JCPC at independence (The Commonwealth 2015)
Country
Botswana
Cyprus
Ireland, Rep of
Lesotho
Malawi
Maldives
Malta
Myanmar
Nauru
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Seychelles
Solomon Islands
Swaziland

Year of
Years as colony JCPC PostIndependence
Independence
1966
No
48
1960
No
82
1931
No
120
1966
No
80
1964
No
73
1965
No
78
1964
No
150
1948
No
16
1968
No
49
1975
No
87
1962
No
43
1976
No
161
1978
81
No
1968
No
66
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Tanzania & Zanzibar
Tonga
Vanuatu
Zambia
Zimbabwe

1964
1970
1980
1964
1980

45
70
74
40
90

No
No
No
No
No

Antigua & Barbuda
Australia
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Brunei
Canada
Dominica
Fiji
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guyana
India
Jamaica
Kenya
Kiribati
Malaysia
Mauritius
New Zealand
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Singapore
South Africa
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & Grenadines
Tuvalu
Trinidad & Tobago
Uganda

1981
1931
1973
1966
1981
1984
1931
1978
1970
1965
1957
1974
1966
1947
1962
1963
1979
1957
1968
1931
1960
1961
1965
1931
1948
1983
1979
1979
1979
1962
1962

314
141
256
339
119
78
168
219
96
77
55
190
135
89
292
68
87
61
158
91
60
146
153
59
135
360
165
195
83
148
57

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Appendix F: The 50 states, prime ministers, whether educated in the U.K. and sources

Country

Leader

Antigua/
Barbuda

Vere Bird

Australia

Edmond
Barton

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/54
441/Sir-Edmund-Barton

Belize

George Cadle
Price
Richard
Bedford
Bennett
Archbishop
Makarios II

No

http://www.belize.com/george-price-belize.html

No

http://www.pc.gc.ca/APPS/CPNR/release_e.asp?bgid=557&andor1=bg

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/35
9142/Makarios-III

Dominica

Patrick Roland
John

No

http://thecommonwealth.org/our-membercountries/dominica/history
http://www.lennoxhonychurch.com/heritage.cf
m?Id=83

Fiji

Ratu Sir
Kamisese
Mara

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/36
3718/Ratu-Sir-Kamisese-Mara

Ghana

Kwame
Nkrumah

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/41
6674/Kwame-Nkrumah

Grenada

Eric Matthew
Gairy

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/22
3562/Sir-Eric-Matthew-Gairy

Ireland, Rep
of
Kenya

William T.
Cosgrave
Jomo Kenyatta

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/13
9138/William-Thomas-Cosgrave
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/31
5185/Jomo-Kenyatta

Kiribati

Leremia Tabai

No

Canada

Cyprus

U.K.
Educated
No

No

Source
http://caribbeanheroes.com/index.php/30-theright-doctor-honourable-vere-cornwall-birdsr.html

http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/comm
onwealth/eminent-persons-group/
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Lesotho

Leabua
Jonathon

No

http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Joseph_Lea
bua_Jonathan.aspx

Malawi

Hastings
No
Kamuzu Banda

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/51
447/Hastings-Kamuzu-Banda

Maldives

Muhammad
Fareed Didi
Giorgio Borg
Olivier

No

http://www.antimoon.com/forum/t14871.htm

No

https://vassallohistory.wordpress.com/primeminsters-of-malta/dr-giorgio-borg-olivier/

Myanmar

U Nu

No

Nauru

Maggabi
DeRoburt

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/42
1460/U-Nu
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/15
8640/Hammer-DeRoburt

New Zealand

Joseph Ward

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/63
5777/Sir-Joseph-Ward

Papua New
Guinea

Michael
Somare

No

http://www.polymernotes.org/biographies/PNG
_bio_somare.htm

Samoa

Fiame
Faumuina
Mataafa

No

http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Samoa.asp
x
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiame_Mata%27af
a_Faumuina_Mulinu%27u_II

Solomon
Islands

Peter
Kenilorea

No

http://www.parliament.gov.sb/index.php?q=nod
e/238

South Africa

Louis Botha

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/75
099/Louis-Botha

Sri Lanka

Don Stephen
Senanayake

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/53
4303/D-S-Senanayake

St. Kitts/
Nevis

Kennedy
Simmonds

No

http://historicbasseterre.com/hs_persons.asp?H
SID=5&PID=11

Swaziland

King Sobhuza
II

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/55
0819/Sobhuza-II

Tuvalu

Toaripi Lauti

No

http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/toaripi_lauti

Tonga

Taufaʿahau
Tupou IV

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/10
17392/Tupou-IV

Malta
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Uganda

Milton Obote

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/42
3934/Milton-Obote

Vanuatu

Father Walter
Lini

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/342449/the-Rev-Walter-Hayde-Lini

Zambia

Kenneth
Kaunda

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/31
3461/Kenneth-Kaunda

Zimbabwe

Robert
Mugabe

No

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/39
6102/Robert-Mugabe

Bahamas

Lynden
Pindling

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/46
0896/Sir-Lynden-Oscar-Pindling

Barbados

Grantley
Adams

Yes

http://www.totallybarbados.com/barbados/Abou
t_Barbados/Local_Information/People/Barbado
s_Prime_Ministers/1st_Premier_of_Barbados_,
045_Sir_Grantley_Herbert_Adams/

Botswana

Seretse Khama

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/31
6195/Sir-Seretse-Khama

Brunei

Hassanal
Bolkiah

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/72
165/Haji-Hassanal-Bolkiah-MuizzaddinWaddaulah

Gambia

Dawda
Yes
Kairaba Jawara

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/30
1838/Sir-Dawda-Kairaba-Jawara

Guyana

Forbes
Burnham

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/85
663/Forbes-Burnham

India

Jawaharlal
Nehru

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/40
8232/Jawaharlal-Nehru

Jamaica

Norman
Manley
Tunku Abdul
Rahman Putra
Alhaj

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/36
2449/Norman-Manley
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/91
2/Tunku-Abdul-Rahman-Putra-Alhaj

Seewoosagur
Ramgoolam

Yes

Malaysia

Mauritius

Yes

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G23435000151.html
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Nigeria

Abubakar
Tafawa
Balewa

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/50
151/Sir-Abubakar-Tafawa-Balewa

Seychelles

James Richard
Mancham

Yes

http://jamesmancham.com/biography.php

Sierra Leone

Milton Margai

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/36
4553/Sir-Milton-Margai

Singapore

Lee Kuan Yew

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/33
4621/Lee-Kuan-Yew

St. Lucia

John George
Melvin
Compton

Yes

http://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/primeminister/form
er_prime_ministers/john_g_m_compton/biogra
phy.htm

St. Vincent/
Grenadines

Milton Cato

Yes

http://www.embsvg.com/History_of_SVG.htm
http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/milton_cato

Tanzania/
Zanzibar

Julius Nyerere

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/42
3105/Julius-Nyerere

Trinidad/
Tobago

Eric Williams

Yes

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/64
4344/Eric-Williams
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Appendix G: The average number of cases and percentage in favor of state for the 26 states
and disaggregated for the 11 states the retain and the 15 states that abolished appeals

30

28 States

81

38

13 States with JCPC

Ave. # of Cases

82

Ave. Win %
22

15 States Ablished JCPC

72

0

20

40

60

80

100

Appendix H: Summary statistics the independent and control variables
Variable

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

State Win Ratio in all cases

673

0.78

0.36

0

1

State Win Ratio when state is
the appellate (salient)

673

0.88

0.31

0

1

State Win Ratio when state is
the respondent

673

0.81

0.34

0

1

State conflict

640

224.08

704.90

0

6312

State GDP per capita

673

6448.71

3803.20

617

21314

Democratization
Free
Partially Free
Not Free

N
568
62
32

%
85.80
9.37
4.83
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Appendix I: JCPC Decisions disaggregated by a total in each of the following categories of
law: (1) constitutional rights; (2) torts/administrative law; (3) criminal law and (4) “other
areas” of law
Category of Law

# of Cases

1

Constitutional/individual rights

225

2

Torts/administrative law

168

3

Criminal law

330

4

“other areas” of law

142
Total

865
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Appendix J: The number of cases and the percent in favor of each state between the date of
independence and removal of the JCPC or January 1, 2015, whichever came first

0

Uganda

100

Trinidad & Tobago
0

Tuvalu

158

67
100

1

South Africa

100
10

St. Vincent &…

83

3

St. Lucia

94

5

St. Kitts & Nevis

94

43

Sri Lanka

73

16

Singapore

85

3

Nigeria

50

83
87
85

New Zealand
Mauritius
46

Malaysia

65

77

0

Kiribati

100

# of Cases

1
0

Kenya
Jamaica

158

59
37

India
Guyana

100
10

Grenada
Ghana

3

Gambia

3

90
88
94

8

Fiji

83

7

Dominica

88
49

Canada

83

4

Brunei

97
44

Bahamas

48

Australia
12

Antigua & Barbuda
0

Win
Average*

70

3

76
80
79

50

100

150

200

*If there are no cases in a year the win average is 100% indicating that there were no legal challenges to state policy
at the JCPC
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Appendix K: Freedom House categories of democracies, human rights scores and civil
liberties scores (Freedom House 2014)

Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings – A country or territory is assigned two ratings (7
to 1) – one for political rights and one for civil liberties – based on its total scores for the
political rights and civil liberties questions. Each rating of 1 through 7, with 1
representing the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the smallest degree of freedom
corresponds to a specific range of total scores.
Free, Partly Free, Not Free Status – The average of a country’s or territory’s political rights
and civil liberties ratings is called the Freedom Rating, and it is this figure that
determines the status of Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0)
POLITICAL RIGHTS
1 – Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of political rights, including
free and fair elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are
competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power, and the
interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and government.
2 – Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker political rights than those
with a rating of 1 because of such factors as political corruption, limits on the functioning
of political parties and opposition groups, and foreign or military influence on politics.
3, 4, and 5 – Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 either moderately protect almost
all political rights or strongly protect some political rights while neglecting others. The
same factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken
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political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to a greater extent at each
successive rating.
6 – Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted political rights. They are ruled
by one-party or military dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. They may allow
a few political rights, such as some representation or autonomy for minority groups, and a
few are traditional monarchies that tolerate political discussion and accept public
petitions.
7 – Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no political rights because of severe
government oppression, sometimes in combination with civil war. They may also lack an
authoritative and functioning central government and suffer from extreme violence or
rule by regional warlords.

CIVIL LIBERTIES
1 – Countries and territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, including
freedoms of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They have an
established and generally fair legal system that ensures the rule of law (including an
independent judiciary), allow free economic activity, and tend to strive for equality of
opportunity for everyone, including women and minority groups.
2 – Countries and territories with a rating of 2 have slightly weaker civil liberties than those with
a rating of 1 because of such factors as limits on media independence, restrictions on
trade union activities, and discrimination against minority groups and women.
3, 4, 5 – Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 either moderately protect almost all
civil liberties or strongly protect some civil liberties while neglecting others. The same

246

factors that undermine freedom in countries with a rating of 2 may also weaken civil
liberties in those with a rating of 3, 4, or 5, but to a greater extent at each successive
rating.
6 – Countries and territories with a rating of 6 have very restricted civil liberties. They strongly
limit the rights of expression and association and frequently hold political prisoners. They
may allow a few civil liberties, such as some religious and social freedoms, some highly
restricted private business activity, and some open and free private discussion.
7 – Countries and territories with a rating of 7 have few or no civil liberties. They allow virtually
no freedom of expression or association, do not protect the rights of detainees and
prisoners, and often control or dominate most economic activity.

Appendix L: Definition of domestic conflict (DataBanks 2015b)
Variable

Domestic Conflict Event Data Definition

Anti-government

Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the purpose of

Demonstrations

displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority,
excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.

Assassinations

Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high government
official or politician.

General Strikes

Any strikes of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involve more
than one employer and are aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.

Guerrilla Warfare

Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands
of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present
regime.
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Major Government

Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall of the

Crises

present regime – excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow.

Purges

Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition
within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.

Revolutions

Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt to such
a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is
independence from central government.

Riots

Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the
use of physical force.

Weighted Conflict
Measure

The specific weights are variable. As of October 2007 the values
entered were: Assassination (25), Strikes (20), Guerrilla Warfare (100),
Government Crises (20), Purges (20), Riots (25), Revolutions (150), and
Anti-government Demonstrations (10). Multiply the value for each variable
times the specific weights; multiply that sum of products by 100 and divide
the result by 8.

Appendix M: Freedom House scores for Singapore from 1972 to 1998

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Respecting political
rights: High (1) to
Lowest (7)
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Protecting civil
liberties: High (1)
to Lowest (7)
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Freedom Score:
Free (1); Partially Free
(0); Not Free (-1)
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
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1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
4
5
5

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free
Partially Free

Appendix N: Maps
Exilon Maps. (2009a). The Political Map of Gambia. 1:24,000. Retrieved from
http://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/gambia-maps.html
Exilon Maps. (2009b). The Political Map of New Zealand. 1:60,000. Retrieved from
http://www.ezilon.com/maps/oceania/new-zealand-maps.html
Exilon Maps. (2009c). The Political Map of The Bahamas. 1:6,000. Retrieved from
http://www.ezilon.com/maps/caribbean/bahamas-maps.html

